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ABSTRACT
This thesis analyses the development of economic and 
ideological forms of domination of the state over the exploited 
classes, Indians, African slaves and poor whites, in colonial 
Spanish America.
Agriculture was throughout the colonial period the main 
economic activity both in terms of the labour force employed 
and its economic value. The initial control of the productive 
process by the Indian communities was slowly replaced by the 
increasing production of the big landed estates owned by 
Spaniards. The expansion of Spanish production was more 
rapid in those regions where urban centres and mining pro­
duction created substantial markets for agricultural production.
Gold and especially silver mining was the main export 
economic activity during the period. It used a relatively 
small labour force but its value was high and it stimulated 
commodity production in agriculture and industry. Industry 
was of little importance, both in terms of its economic value 
and the labour force employed, and was limited by both European 
imports and domestic production.
The forms of labour used by Spanish enterprises were 
determined mainly by the existence or absence of an abundant 
and politically organised aboriginal population, the impact 
of the regional or world market, and political factors including 
the pressure of the colonists, the resistance of the exploited 
and the regulating action of the state.
The Catholic church was the main state ideological apparatus 
in colonial Spanish America. It had control over education
and health care and during the 16th century it legitimised the 
Spanish conquest, regulated Indian-Spanish relations and gave 
ideological support to the process of conquest. The 
importance of these functions decreased as the civil state 
apparatuses developed, the process of conquest receded and 
the church developed sources of income which created interests 
in common with the colonists.
Table of contents
Preface
Part I: Theoretical and Historical Background
Chapter Is
a)
b)
c)
Theoretical framework
The economic structure
The modern state
P.eligious ideology, religious
apparatuses, religious practices
Chapter 2:
a)
b)
c)
Constituent elements in the formation 
of colonial Spanish America 
Prehispanic America 
Castille before 1500 
The conquest
I
Part II: The Economic Structure
Chapter 3:
a)
b)
c)
d)
State administration of the labour force
in Spanish America
Indian slavery
African slavery
The encomienda system
The repartimiento
Chapter 4:
A.
B.
a)
b)
c)
d)
Agriculture I: The agrarian structure 
of colonial Spanish America 
Legal framework
The formation of the colonial agrarian 
structure in some areas of Spanish America 
Mexico 
Peru
Colombia
Chile
Chapter 5:
a)
b)
c)
d)
e)
f)
g)
Agriculture II
Definition
LabourHacienda markets and agricultural prices
Sources of capital
Return upon capital
Hacienda turnover
Conclusions
Chapter 6:
A. 
1 ) 2)
3)
a)
b)
c)
4)
B.
C.
Mining and Industry 
Mining
Legal framework
Gold
Silver
Labour
Technologies
Capital, taxes and profits 
Other metals 
Note on Industry 
Conclusion
- Ill
1
2
2
10
11
18
19
38
44
53
55
57
64.
110
130
139
140
144
145 
181 
202 
209
222
223
225
253
275
282
292
302
317
318 
319 
332 
348 
355 
367 
382 
392 
405
U 3Part III: The Ideological Structure
Chapter 7: The ideological conjuncture in l6th 
century Spain
Chapter 8: Foundation and expansion of the chu] 
in America
Chapter 9: The church's economic resources 
Chapter 10:The church and Indian exploitation 
Chapter lltlndian acculturation and resistance
561Conclusions
_ 583Appendix la 585
Appendix lb 537
Appendix 2 595
Appendix 3 596
Appendix K 597
Appendix 5 598
Appendix 6 599
Appendix 7
603Bibliographical notes to chapters
630Bibliography
IPreface
The characterisation of the dominant mode of production in 
colonial Spanish America has been the object of a long debate 
among Latin American Marxists. A large part of the diffi­
culties encountered in solving the problem rests on the mis­
understandings derived from different conceptions of society 
and history which are, furthermore, not always explicit.
Another substantial part of the difficulties results from the 
relative lack of empirical studies of Spanish American economic 
history and materialist studies of the superstructure. In 
this thesis we attempt to make a contribution to this task, 
clearly specifying our assumptions and the limits of the data
collected.
We will begin by stating our conception of society and 
history within the framework of historical materialism and we 
will then outline the constituent elements of the Spanish 
American colonial social formation; that is, the prehispanic 
societies, the social structures of Castille at the time of 
the conquest and the process of conquest itself.
In the second part of this thesis we will analyse the 
economic structure of colonial Spanish America. Here we 
start by analysing the labour systems imposed by the Spanish 
colonists on the aboriginal population and African slaves and 
the limitations imposed by the state on the exploitation 
these peoples. We will also examine the limits imposed by 
demographic factors, the impact of the markets, profita ' ' y
of the enterprises and availability of capital in the labour
system employed.
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We will then go on to study the development of the 
agrarian structure and the formation and expansion of the 
landed property of the big Spanish landed estates (haciendas) 
and the consequent weakening of the Indian landed patrimony.
We will then examine the economic performance of the hacienda 
and its connection with other agricultural producers such as 
Indian communities, tenants and so on. Here we will consider 
the specific forms of labour used by the haciendas, their 
markets and profitability, access to capital and the stability 
of the landowning class.
To round off our study of the economic structure we will 
analyse mining and industrial production,their dynamics, the 
types of labour force employed, capital formation and 
technological developments. We will argue that the commercial 
policies of the Spanish state constituted an important element 
in both the relative success of mining production and the 
virtual collapse of the most dynamic sector of industry, the 
textile sector.
In the last part of this thesis we will deal with the 
dominant ideological state apparatus of the Spanish empire, 
the Catholic church. Here we will start by examining the 
politico-ideological conjuncture of 16th century Spain in 
relation to the rights of the Spanish crown to rule in the 
Indies and the debate about the legal rights of the Amer­
indians. Then we will go on to examine the expansion of 
the church in the Indies, both in terms of the creation of 
a secular hierarchy and the missionary work of the religious 
orders who were in direct contact with the Indian flock, 
will show that this missionary work was an effective means of
'domesticating' the aborigines, spreading the Spanish system 
of values and beliefs and thus cementing the military conquest.
We will then examine the economic resources of the church 
and its policies in relation to the exploitation of the Indians 
It will be shown that during the period both the secular and 
religious arms of the church amassed substantial wealth, 
through the acquisition and management of productive enter­
prises, lending money and levying the tithe. This created 
an economic independence in relation to the civil administra­
tion and at the same time created economic interests common to 
the Spanish entrepreneurs. This was to a large extent 
reflected in the increasingly compromising attitude of the 
church vis-a-vis the exploitation of the Indians.
Finally we will examine the effects of religious 
indoctrination on the Amerindian peoples. It will be shown 
that the world view and practices of the colonial Amerindians 
were still permeated by religious values and beliefs which 
reflected and articulated their conformity, accommodation or
rebellion vis-a-vis the political order.
1PART I; THEORETICAL AND HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
2Chapter 1: Theoretical Framework
In this chapter we attempt to define the main concepts 
used in the following chapters and outline the theories which 
guide our research. This will show the reader the theoretical 
limits of the research as well as, in part, the criteria for 
the selection of the facts which are presented and organised 
in the following chapters. Obviously the outline presented 
below touches on a series of theoretical problems which have 
been debated at length within Marxist thought. We have 
avoided a detailed discussion of these issues here limiting 
ourselves to referring to our sources, but we will take up 
some of these problems in relation to colonial Spanish America 
in our conclusions.
Below we deal successively with the economic structure, 
the modern state and religious ideology.
a) The economic structure
To provide for their needs human beings appropriate and 
transform nature by applying to an object of labour (nature 
itself or an already transformed natural object or raw material) 
their physical and intellectual ability (labour power) with the 
help of instruments of labour (tools, machinery or any other 
thing(s) which mediate between the labourer and the object of 
labour and are necessary for production). Production, the 
result of the labour process, does not exhaust the 'economy' 
which is also formed by exchange, distribution and consumption. 
Although the latter are far from irrelevant and react on pro­
duction, they are determined by production in so far as (a) 
there is no exchange without a division of labour corresponding 
to a particular stage of the process of production, (b) only
the results of production or the means of production (objects 
and instruments of labour) can be distributed and (c) pro­
duction provides the objects of consumption.
The labour process considered in abstract above does not 
exist historically but under the determination of specific 
relations of production and a specific development of the pro­
ductive forces. The relations of production are defined by 
the possession or non-possession of the means of production 
by the direct producers. These relations imply, in exploita­
tive relations of production, the existence of a class of 
direct producers, dispossessed of the means of production, and 
a class of owners of the means of production and non-direct 
producers who extract surplus labour from the direct producers. 
In cooperative relations of production (those of the primitive 
community and communism) the difference between necessary 
labour (the proportion of labour time necessary to cover the 
reproduction of labour power both at the level of the individual 
and society, that is the production of new direct producers 
over time) and surplus labour remains, but surplus labour 
instead of being appropriated by a class of non-producers 
serves purposes of accumulation or is socially redistributed.
The productive forces are the way in which the producers 
appropriate nature and this involves the degree of technical 
development of the means of production and the form in which 
production is technically organised (i.e. autonomy of the 
producer, simple or complex cooperation, etc.)
Historically relations of production and productive forces 
appear indissolubly combined in specific modes of production.
The fact that relations of production and productive forces 
always appear combined means that they do not have a separate
Kexistence but this does not imply a strict correspondence 
between them. The mode of production constitutes the economic 
structure of a society and determines in the last instance 
its superstructure, viz. its political and ideological instan­
ces. It does so by creating in the process of production 
itself different classes with objectively opposed interests 
(particularly in relation to the augmentation or decrease of 
surplus labour) and exacerbating these contradictions in 
critical periods/ 1 These contradictions and crises are 
reflected in the superstructure which in turn reacts on the 
infrastructure by creating the possibility of a transformation 
of the relations of production or a reduction in the antagon­
istic character of the class contradictions by mediation or 
repression. The superstructure also has effects on the re­
production of the mode of production under 'normal' conditions. 
Thus the ideological apparatuses provide the conditions which 
ensure that the direct producer becomes a good worker both in 
terms of the acceptance of the relations of production and 
technically. It also provides for the reproduction of labour 
power over time through the family or the community.
The reproduction of the relations of production therefore 
is not only tendentially ensured by the economic dynamic of 
the mode of production, which will be studied below, but also 
by the superstructure. This implies that the study of modes 
of production requires the study of the social formations 
where historical modes of production are born, reproduced and 
disappear. The location of a mode of production in its concrete
(i) In cooperative modes of production the social possession 
of the means of production and the direct or social control 
over the process of production tend to eliminate the conditions 
of emergence or reappearance of social classes. This tendency 
is reinforced by a political instance and an ideology which 
reproduce these relations of production.
5site permits a study of the transformations in its necessary 
relations with the superstructure and its relations of sub­
ordination or domination with other modes of production. It 
also permits us to think the effects of the class struggle 
(struggle between classes generated by the same or different 
modes of production) and the manifestations of this struggle 
(economic, political and ideological) in the social totality.(l) 
This conception of history and society implies for the 
researcher the primacy of the study of the relations of pro­
duction in concrete social formations, the relations of 
domination/subordination between different relations of pro­
duction and their combination with specific productive forces. 
This permits a definition of social classes in specific social 
formations, their material contradictions and, in the last 
instance, provides the key to understanding political and 
ideological practices. Obviously no research starts in a 
vacuum. Marxist research has studied the dominant modes of 
production of a number of historical social formations and 
although serious disagreements exist over the usefulness of 
some of them as theoretical tools, the definition of the con­
cept (or notion) of specific historical modes of production 
will provide us with a starting point for our analysis of 
colonial Spanish American social formations. Below we out­
line the main characteristics of precapitalist modes of pro­
duction. ^
l) The primitive Community.
In this mode of production the productive forces are
(ii) We will refer here only to those modes of production ~ 
which have relevance for the colonial Spanish American socia 
formations. Thus we will not deal with the ancient mode 01 
production or pre-agricultural modes (Nomadism, hunting and 
gathering).
6reduced to human energy and instruments of work which are pro­
duced and used individually. Agriculture is the main pro­
ductive activity and this presupposes the knowledge of tech­
niques which, in particular ecological environments, permit 
the production and storage of food necessary for the physical 
reproduction of the community over time (e.g., in between 
harvests, in times of drought, etc.). The possession/owner- 
ship of the means of production (lands, seeds) appears linked 
to membership of the community through real or adopted relations 
of kinship (affinity or filiation). These not only imply re­
lations of production characterised by cooperation between the 
members of the community but also a system of power and an 
ideology which gives cohesion to the community and which per­
mits the reproduction of the relations of production. The 
structure of power within the community is determined by the 
control of the means of production and reproduction of indiv­
iduals, i.e. food and women, by the elders and is reinforced 
by an ideology which exalts the elders and the ancestors and 
imposes sexual prohibitions which make the control of women 
by the elders effective. The distribution of the product is 
determined within the community by the principles of recip­
rocity and redistribution. This means a system of advances 
and restitutions of seeds and foodstuffs which operates cycli- 
cally (that is from older to younger generations) and does not 
tend to create social classes. A surplus product does exist 
but instead of being appropriated by a specific social group 
is spent on sacrifices or ritual feasts.(2)
2) The tributary or 'Asiatic' mode of production.
In this mode of production the ownership of land is in 
the hands of the ruler of the state. This presupposes the
7non-existence of private property in land (as opposed to its 
possession which is more or less recognised by custom) and the 
existence of a system of political domination based on the 
use of the threat of violence. The primitive communities 
under the political domination of the ruler, who is usually 
the head of a community which is linked by ties of kinship, 
pay a tribute in kind or in labour to the ruler. Within the 
dominated communities the relations of production remain those 
of the primitive communities with the difference that part or 
all of the surplus product or labour is appropriated by the 
dominant community through the state. The productive forces 
are developed by using part of the tribute for works which 
permit an increase in the productivity of labour and the social 
division of labour (hydraulic works, roads, etc.). These 
works imply forms of simple cooperation in the labour process 
but remain relatively external to the community. Thus co­
operation in major public works is performed under the command 
and the direction of the state by the communities or by per­
sonnel paid by the state. The reproduction of the mode of 
production is based on the continued existence of the threat 
of force, the growth of the productive forces (expansion of 
land under cultivation, submission of their communities, public 
works, etc.) and a system of legitimation which incorporates 
the political and ideological background of the subjected 
communities into a comprehensive system (religion, a trans­
formed and exploitative version of the principles of recip­
rocity and redistribution, etc.)-(3 )
3) Slavery.
In the slave mode of production the relations of production 
are defined by the ownership o»f the means of production and
8of the direct producers (the slaves) by a class of slave 
owners who, because they have possession of all the objective 
conditions of labour, appropriate the product and realise it 
in the market. This process presupposes (a) the development 
of private property in land and its relative concentration,
(b) the development of commodity production to a significant 
extent and (c) the existence of a state which politically 
recognises and guarantees the exploitation of the slaves by 
their owners. The slave owner completely controls the pro­
cess of production and the slave is separated from the means 
of production both legally (he or she has no property) and 
technically (they have no control over the productive process). 
As a counterpart the slave owner, to maintain the physical 
strength of the worker, is compelled to provide food, clothing 
and lodging for the slaves or to allow them to spend time and 
energy in the provision of them themselves. This necessary 
labour, the cost of obtaining the slaves and the surveillance 
necessary to make them work are factors which limit the ex­
pansion of slave relations of production. Therefore these 
relations of production can only be dominant in a social for­
mation where the local population is insufficient to provide 
labour power or surplus product under other relations of 
production,or where political and economic circumstances 
impede this (e.g. the existence of self sufficient free 
peasants with real rights over the land they work). These 
limitations are counterbalanced by the possibility of a higher 
degree of development of the productive forces in the slave 
mode of production. The concentration of significant numbers 
of permanent full-time workers in one productive unit permits 
simple cooperation, the specialisation of labourers in specific
9tasks and the specialisation of entire agricultural enter­
prises in the cultivation and processing of crops which are 
highly demanding technically and very rewarding in terms of 
returns for the slave owner. ( A )
A) Feudalism.
In the feudal mode of production the relations of pro­
duction are defined by the ownership of the land by a class 
of feudal lords and the extraction of surplus from the masses 
of serfs or semi free peasants (the direct producers) by 
means of rent in the form of labour, kind or money. The 
units of production are constituted by the lands of the direct 
producers, usually family plots, which provide for their sub­
sistence needs (and in the case of rent paid in kind or money 
also the surplus) and the demesne of the feudal lord worked 
by the serfs which provides the surplus product. The tech­
nical independence of the direct producer in the production 
of his means of subsistence and the existence of areas of un­
cultivated land mean that the use of extra economic coercion 
to extract the surplus from the direct producers is essential. 
This coercion varies from monopoly rights over certain services 
(grain milling, baking etc.) to total adscription to the land 
or serfdom. (5)
5) The transition to capitalism.
The transition from feudalism or other modes of pro­
duction to capitalism can only be analysed in relation to 
specific social formations with their own concrete combination 
of modes of production, forms of state, development of the 
class struggle and so on. Here we will limit ourselves to 
pointing out the preconditions of existence of the capitalist
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mode of production. Firstly the capitalist mode of production 
presupposes the existence of a mass of juridically free labour­
ers, secondly capitalism presupposes the separation of these 
labourers from the means of production, thus compelling them by 
economic means to sell their labour power in order to obtain 
their means of subsistence. Thirdly and partially as a conse­
quence of (b) capitalism presupposes a high development of com­
modity production. Finally it presupposes the concentration 
of money wealth in the hands of a capitalist or would be capit­
alist class able to purchase the means of production and labour 
power in the market for use in productive consumption. (6)
b) The Modern State^ ^ ^
As we have seen, the reproduction of the mode of pro­
duction requires the intervention of the ideological and 
political structures in the economic structure. This inter­
vention takes place through the mediation of the bearers or 
supports of the structures (e.g. the agents of production) who 
are organised in social classes and, through their economic, 
political and ideological practices, maintain or transform these 
structures. In class societies the juridico-political struc­
ture of a social formation is constituted by the state which 
is its centre of power. The power of the state, or more 
strictly the power of the social class(es) whose interests 
the state serves, gives cohesion to the different levels of 
the social formation regulating the practices of the existing 
social classes and permitting the reproduction of the social 
conditions of production. The achievement and maintenance of 
such cohesion requires the relative autonomy of the state vis- 
a-vis society. This means that to accomplish the objective, 
long term interests of the ruling class(es) the state may act
(iii) By modern state we understand the late feudal (absolutist) 
and the capitalist type of state.
against the immediate interests of members or fractions of 
these classes but does not mean neutrality in the struggle 
between the exploited and ruling classes.
The state maintains the unity of the instances of the 
social formation by imposing or encouraging those class prac­
tices which are considered to serve the interests of the ruling 
class(es) and discouraging or banning those which do not serve 
them by means of repression, ideological indoctrination and, 
to a lesser extent, by direct and indirect intervention in the 
economy. These functions are embodied in specific state 
apparatuses which include all those institutions which servb 
or could serve the interests of the ruling classes, whether 
they are juridically public or private. Within the modern 
state repressive state apparatuses (government, army, police, 
courts, etc.,) increase their size and importance and become 
the core of the state. They centralise the means of repression 
and the control of repressive practices under unified command.
On the contrary the ideological state apparatuses (the churches, 
the educational and cultural systems, etc.,) and their branches 
tend to acquire a relative autonomy first from the dominant 
ideological apparatus, which during the middle ages was the 
church, and later from the government. A consequence of this 
relative autonomy of the Ideological State Apparatuses is that 
it creates a space for the influence of the ideology of the 
non-hegemonic classes or fractions within the ruling class(es).
c) Religious Ideology, Religious Apparatuses. Religious 
Practices
The religious field, that is the set of religious practices 
produced and reproduced by relatively coherent religious appara­
tuses bearing a particular group of explicit or implicit
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assumptions about the world, society and their process of 
development, stands relatively associated with/separated from/ 
opposed to/congruent with the constituted political power, 
other ideological practices and the forces operating in the 
economic structure. The contradictions generated in these 
three spheres, important as they are, do not totally determine 
the religious field. The constitution of the religious field 
itself, and to a greater extent, the constitution of a hierar- 
chal, coherent religious apparatus with an organised corps of 
priests, body of doctrine and set of regulations, both for the 
cult and relating to important aspects of private and social 
life, eliminate or tend to eliminate as legitimate the compe­
tition of other religious practitioners (magicians, diviners 
and prophets and priests of other cults). To acquire monopoly 
over the control of legitimate religious practices, the appa­
ratus in question (in this case the church as opposed to sect 
or ecclesia) needs the support of the political power and a 
degree of sophistication, in terms of doctrine and practices, 
which gives the religion a plausibility and emotional impact 
and which at the same time makes it impossible for the lay­
person to fulfil the same functions without a process of 
initiation into the 'secrets' of the cult and doctrine. Once 
the apparatus has been established, it has to maintain this 
monopoly by constantly repressing the external danger re­
presented by popular religion and prophets as well as keeping 
their own more 'deviant' ranks in line.^v  ^ This,in turn,
(iv) In medieval Christianity, the Order of St. Francis pre­
sented a case of special concern for the established church. 
Their emphasis on apostolic poverty in contrast with the worldly 
attitude of the church led to two major breaks within their 
ranks. The 'Spirituals' in the 13th century and the Fraticelli 
in the l<(.th and 15th centuries, both created parallel organisa­
tions and were repressed by the Catholic church. However, a
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requires the setting up of special tribunals to deal with 
systematic religious deviance, a recorded body of doctrine and 
a special training system which can homogenise the practices 
of the church everywhere and reproduce and expand the corps 
of priests to cover a larger flock. In order to retain or 
to impose this monopoly the church (or would be church) requires 
the concurrence of the politically constituted power. This 
is in order to carry out the material destruction of non- 
authorised religious practitioners as well as to acquire or 
retain the economic basis which permits the maintenance of a corps 
of specialised, non-productive priests (beneficees, dowries, 
monasteries, etc.), and the means of performing the cult (temples, 
symbolic paraphernalia etc.). As a counterpart to this the 
church provides the means of legitimation of political power 
and the social order and 'domesticates' the masses by standardi­
sation, not only of religious but also of moral and social 
practices through the cult, its doctrine and the institutions 
under its control (schools, hospitals etc.). These practices 
are the realisation of social (moral, productive, political 
etc.) codes which are objectified to a greater or lesser extent 
and are products of previous practices accumulated by mere 
repetition and recognition of its actuality and which are 
later legitimised as 'necessity' by the ideological practitioners. 
The symbiotic relationship between the church and political 
power is however imperfect. The historical forms of this 
relation: theocracy, hierocracy and caesaropapism - to use
Weberian terminology - and the more or less secular state, along 
with the transformation of one into the other, reveal the
substratum of non-conformity towards the opinions of the popes, 
who considered as heresy the assertion of the absolute poverty 
of Christ and the apostles, persisted in the division between 
the 'observants', Franciscans maintaining a strict rule of 
poverty, and the more worldly 'conventuals'•(8)
ustruggle between church and political power in order (a) to 
control the means of legitimation and the other ideological 
apparatuses and (b) on the part of the church to retain a set 
of privileges (administrative, judicial, economic etc.).
While the second case resembles the corporate needs of 
all bodies of specialists (the army, the bureaucracy, the 
professions, etc.) the first one has a societal scope and aims 
at monopolising the control of the principles which guide the 
construction of social reality.
The interdependence of the religious field and apparatuses 
and the economic structure can be established on three main 
counts:
(a) the increasing relative autonomy of the religious 
field and the emergence of religious specialists and the 
consequent sophistication of religious ideology (monotheism, 
systematisation of morals, etc.) are strongly associated 
with the social division of labour, society's split into 
classes and the process of urbanisation,
(b) the division between intellectual and manual work, 
of which the dichotomy religious/lay is only one aspect, 
rests on the privileged position of the church as regards 
the allocation of economic resources (stipends paid by 
the secular power, levying of special taxes, landed 
property, investments of almsgivings etc.).
(c) Finally, the following of a new religion, or the 
religiosity/irreligiosity of the 'flock' of an established 
church, varies according to economic practices (for 
instance the paganism of the peasantry) and each strata 
of society emphasises different aspects of the religion 
according to their own mental schema.
At the ideological level the religious apparatus tends
struggle between church and political power in order (a) to 
control the means of legitimation and the other ideological 
apparatuses and (b) on the part of the church to retain a set 
of privileges (administrative, judicial, economic etc.).
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classes and the process of urbanisation,
(b) the division between intellectual and manual work, 
of which the dichotomy religious/lay is only one aspect, 
rests on the privileged position of the church as regards 
the allocation of economic resources (stipends paid by 
the secular power, levying of special taxes, landed 
property, investments of almsgivings etc.).
(c) Finally, the following of a new religion, or the 
religiosity/irreligiosity of the 'flock' of an established 
church, varies according to economic practices (for 
instance the paganism of the peasantry) and each strata
of society emphasises different aspects of the religion 
according to their own mental schema.
At the ideological level the religious apparatus tends
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to control (by means of patronage, suppr> e ssion or censorship) 
the whole ideological field, stimulating or inhibiting the 
development of autonomous ideological fields (art, jurisprudence, 
science, etc.)
Religious ideology, as other forms of ideology, operate 
through cognitive and normative principles. Myths, cos­
mogonies and, in a more sophisticated way, theology, incorpo­
rate history, the social order and an explanation of both in 
their discourse. At the same time religious ideologies, pre­
scribe a set of practices, compatible with that explanation, 
which help to reproduce the social order. The cognitive 
content of religion involves special (arbitrary) assumptions 
about the social order and its organisation, thus religion 
privileges (or sanctifies the privileges of) certain lineages, 
ethnic groups or classes. The consolidation of these assump­
tions into unquestionable social reality (doxa) implies a 
process of legitimation which transforms the de facto result 
of economic practices, kinship practices, wars, etc., into 
objective necessity. The questioning of the 'doxa' by dis­
affected groups or individuals can result in either the con­
stitution of a new church and possibly a reorganisation of the 
social relations or, more likely, a sophistication of the 
orthodox discourse by enlarging its explanatory power and 
eventually incorporating within it the heterodox 'gods continuing 
to live on as d e m o n s ' I n  its daily practice the constituted
^ b o h n  brilliantly traces back the witch stereotype, usually 
associated in the minds of the persecutors with the cult of the 
devil, to the beginnings of Christianity. At that time the 
emergent Christian church was accused of slaughtering small 
abies, orgies, etc., by the Romans. Conversely, for the 
athers of Christianity, the persistence of pagan religions 
was the work of the devil. The witch-stereotype, Cohn demon­
strates, was applied in the Middle Ages to emerging Ghristian 
eresies (the Fraticelli, Waldesians), practitioners of ritual
church finds and deals with unsystematic deviations (as opposed 
to organised religious deviations such as heresy and apostasy. 
In these cases methods of therapy, i.e. communion/penitence, 
are used to correct heterodox practices and beliefs. ) Both 
the elimination of organised deviation (theoretically and 
practically) and the therapy of unsystematic deviations con­
tribute to the reinforcement of the effectivity of the doxa 
as an unquestionable area of arbitrary assumptions, while the 
appearance and maintenance of heterodox practices, and even 
more so organised deviation, removes the dogmas from the 
terrain of necessity (doxa) to that of possibility (orthodoxy/ 
heterodoxy) in which both religious discourses compete for 
legitimacy. This competition involves the natural question­
ing of the legitimising power of both systems (heterodoxy/ 
orthodoxy), that is their capacity to explain the social 
order and their implicit strategies to keep it as it is or 
to transform it. In this process whole areas of what was 
considered unquestionable may be put into question, opening 
up the experiential and therefore cognitive universe of society, 
particularly for the social sectors materially interested in 
transforming the social order^v^ .
Finally the domination of the religious field over the 
rest of the ideological fields in pre-secular societies 
implies the active participation of the church in the processes
< K o  + ?nd r e?tUally enemies of the political power.---Thi—
of +>, 1 tn travelled to America in the minds and writings
w i + w v T PaniS,h . Clergy and laiety and was quickly assimilated 
pr?-hlsPandc deities. This did not lead to massive 
e ^ ngV nd witch-hunt hysteria as in some countries in 17th 
Deninnni ur°P®' The Spanish clergy both in America and the 
S_1 r ar d?-d not lose a sense of reality, and accusations and 
, ns of sorcery were treated leniently in Spain. 
e in America, pagan practices did not imply capital 
olo=STlment for the Indian practitioners unless they were learly associated with political revolt. (9)
(vi) The supremacy of the pope and the whole machinery establishe
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of political transformation (wars, class struggle, liberation 
movements etc.) and, conversely, the expression of political 
thought in the categories elaborated by the religious 
ideologies. v^^^^(ll)
by the papacy to administer the church is a case in point.
Its rejection was common-place in medieval heretic movements, 
and the protestant schism gave it a material realisation.
This erosion of papal economic, political and ideological 
power and the consequent concession of privileges in ecclesi­
astic matters to Catholic kings led to the further deteriora­
tion of papal power, (cf Gallicanism and the overwhelming 
Catholic regalism of the 18th century). (1 0 )
(vii) cf. 'The middle ages had attached to theology all the 
other forms of ideology - philosophy, politics, jurisprudence - 
and made them sub-divisions of theology. It thereby con­
strained every social and political movement to take a theo­
logical form. The sentiments of the masses were fed with 
religion to the exclusion of all else, it was therefore 
necessary to put forward their own interests in a religious 
guise in order to produce an impetuous movement'. (1 2 )
It is necessary to qualify this assertion. Firstly, the 
list of medieval mass movements, revolts etc. with clerical 
participation, direction or religious ideology is impressive, 
however there is a core of mass movements in the late middle 
ages in which clerics and religious ideology played little or 
no part, while juridical ideology seems to have played an 
important role.
As Maravall has pointed out for the Spanish case there 
seems to be no unilinear development of secularism. He ob­
served that Spanish kingship from the 10th to the 13th century 
had a secularised vision of power while Ferdinand V and 
harles II (l6th century) gave their rule religious connotations, 
we are faced, in Spain, with a contradictory process. On the 
one hand the monarchs (at least from the 1 6th century onwards) 
ried to curtail the power of the church while at the same time 
making great political use of it, (repression of real or 
potential enemies of the political unity of Spain through the 
Inquisition, domesticating the American Indians through 
missionaries etc.). On the other hand ecclesiastics, while
their. prerogatives put forward theological positions 
w ich differentiated temporal power and spiritual affairs 
bus giving a powerful impulse to secularisation (13).
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Chapter 2: Constituent elements in the formation of colonial 
Spanish America
In this chapter we will examine the origins of colonial 
Spanish America, namely the prehispanic Amerindian societies, 
Spanish society at the time of the conquest and the process of 
conquest itself.
Colonial Spanish America emerged during the 16th century 
from modes of production and, to a lesser extent, political 
forms of organisation and systems of beliefs and values which 
were already established on American soil before the Conquest. 
Despite the fact that the Spaniards introduced new political 
and ideological structures and, in some cases, new relations 
of production, the geographical expansion and acceptance of 
the new order by the Amerindian peoples was conditioned by the 
social structures and practices already in existence before 
the donquest. The capacity of the conquerors to establish a 
form of domination which related to the ideologies and practices 
of the conquered was also conditioned by the interests and 
strength of the conquering nation in the economic, political 
and ideological fields. The adequate supply of personnel, 
instruments of production and weaponry and communications with 
Spain also depended on these interests and strength. Finally, 
colonial Spanish America was also the result of the process of 
conquest itself which cannot be reduced to the social structures 
of the conquered and conquering peoples. Important factors in 
this process were for instance the alliances between different 
Amerindians or Spanish factions, the intervention of the state 
to regulate the conquest, the different strategies adopted in 
different times and places to subordinate the Amerindian 
societies, etc.
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a) Prehispanic America.
Prehispanic American societies cannot be considered as a 
unity. In the area which is now known as Spanish America 
several human groups with different characteristics existed.
They ranged from nomadic hunters and gatherers with no social 
organisation apart from the nuclear family and the occasional 
hunting band to the sophisticated social organisation of the 
Inca empire and the Aztec confederacy. Between these two poles 
a variety of societies of different degrees of social complexity 
existed. We will limit ourselves to the analysis of prehispanic 
Mesoamerica and the central Andean region, both of which played 
a key economic and political role during the colonial period, 
and will give a rapid overview of the remaining Amerindian 
societies at the time of the conquest.
1. Mesoamerica.
Mesoamerica is formed by Central and Southern Mexico and 
territories of present day Guatemala and Honduras (see map).
It is made up of three plateaux cut across by valleys and 
mountains and separated from the inhospitable coastal plains by 
the eastern and western Sierra Madre. The central plateau is 
the site of the Valley of Mexico, the most fertile area of 
Mesoamerica and which had a remarkable economic and political 
importance before and during the colonial period. The southern 
central and southern plateaux (Oaxaca and the plain of Guatemala 
respectively) also have fertile valleys but their agricultural 
potential is more limited, (l)
Mesoamerica was very early the place of settlement of 
advanced cultures. By 1500 B.C. agricultural villages began 
to develop and by c. 200 A.D. this had led, through a process 
which has yet to be established, to the formation of city states.
These city states reached a relatively high level of develop­
ment in scientific and technological matters which permitted 
the construction of gigantic buildings, the presence of a system 
of writing, a calendar and probably sophisticated systems of 
irrigation. Social stratification also emerged with military 
or theocratic rulers and nobilities, traders, commoners and 
slaves. The population of these city states might have reached, 
in some cases, 100,000 or more inhabitants but unfortunately 
the level of political integration (territories controlled by 
each city state, formation of empires or confederacies etc.,) of 
the whole area during this period is unknown, although the city 
state of Teotihuacan in the central plateau seems to have played 
a key role. (2 )
By the beginning of the 10th century A.D. all the big city 
states had lost their power and had been abandoned or destroyed 
(Teotihuacan, Monte Alban in the central South plateau and the 
Maya cities), although minor cities survived. This collapse 
is attributed by Katz to a combination of factors, among them 
the deterioration of agriculture, revolts and external attacks 
from the south and, more importantly, the invasion of the 
Toltecs from the north in the 9th or 10th century A .D. The
Toltecs, an agricultural but relatively unsophisticated people, 
rapidly came to dominate most areas in Mesoamerica ranging from 
the peninsula of Yucatan to the central plateau where they 
founded their capital, Tula. However, the empire rapidly dis­
integrated into several city states. Major internal conflicts 
and new invasions in the 11th and 12th centuries destroyed Tula 
and its citizens withdrew to small cities. The new invaders, 
among them the Aztecs, were far more barbaric than the Toltecs 
and their immediate achievements were also small. They con-
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quered the north eastern part of the Valley of Mexico, which 
was of little agricultural value, and received the patronage 
of other city states usually as mercenaries or allies. (3)
By c. 1330 the Aztecs had settled in Tenochtitlan, an 
island in the middle of the Texcoco lake which was of great 
agricultural value and had received the patronage of the power­
ful Atzcapotzalco city state as mercenaries. As tributaries 
and allies of Atzcapotzalco they took part in the military 
campaigns which resulted in Atzcapotzalco controlling the 
whole Valley of Mexico and some other regions. The rule of 
Atzcapotzalco over the Valley of Mexico came to an end in 
14-33 when his old allies, the Aztecs, and former tributary 
states (Texcoco and Tacuba) successfully rebelled and established 
their own rule over the Valley of Mexico. In the mid 15th 
century military expansion outside the Valley of Mexico by 
the triple Alliance (the Aztecs of Tenochtitlan, Texcoco and 
Tacuba) began. By the time of the arrival of the Spaniards 
they had extended their dominion over most of central Mexico 
from coast to coast, although some city states managed to avoid 
their control (Tlaxcala for instance), and on the West they 
were effectively stopped by the Tarascan of Michoacan in I4.8O.
Also free from Aztec domination were the Huaxteca and Meztitlan 
on the north eastern border of Mesoamerica, Tlapaneca and 
Tototepec on the southern Pacific coast, Zapoteca and 
Coatzacualco in the isthmus of Tehuantepec and the major 
areas of Yucatan, southern Mexico and Guatemala. Some of 
these societies (i.e. Michoacan and Tototepec) were small 
empires resembling the triple Alliance but having less economic 
and political power, while most of the other territories were
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site of small states loosely connected politically, like
t
Tlaxcala or the Mayas at the time of the conquest. (4-)
Within the territories controlled by the triple Alliance 
several semi-autonomous states existed.. They had arable land, 
urban production and a tribute system which permitted them to 
maintain local bureaucracies or nobilities as well as to pay 
tribute to the confederation or other semi-autonomous states 
which were in turn tributary to the Alliance. States that 
refused Aztec domination and were defeated militarily lost 
their independence and their leadership was replaced by 
governors sent by the triple Alliance. (5 )
Social organisation among the Aztecs changed a good deal 
between the time prior to their settlement in the Valley of 
Mexico and the Spanish ¿onquest (1519-21). The original basic 
social unit of the Aztecs was, as in most of central Mexico, the 
calpulli. The calpulli was a semi-democratic social unit 
based on real or ideological links of kinship. Ownership of 
the land was vested in the calpulli and its members (or 
macehualtin) cultivated and used it but could not sell or lease 
it. Failure to cultivate the land led to its loss and its 
subsequent distribution to non members of the calpulli. Its 
leader was elected but always from the same lineage and was 
assigned a plot of land which other members of the calpulli 
worked on his behalf. (6 )
The structure of the calpulli changed little until the 
arrival of the Spaniards but inequalities between different 
calpulli arose. Very soon after the Aztec settlement in the 
Valley of Mexico functional differences among the calpulli 
seem to have developed. Some were dedicated exclusively to 
agriculture while a minority were dedicated to government and 
religious affairs. These differences increased even more later
I
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on with the appearance of calpulli traders and craftsmen. In 
parallel to this the supra-calpulli organisation of the Aztecs 
was radically modified. In 1376, long before their independence 
from Atzcapotzalco (14.27), the Aztecs nominated a chief speaker, 
representative of all the calpulli, to whom special lands were 
assigned which were cultivated by different calpulli chosen 
on a rota system. Apart from this the chief speaker had his 
own lands (i.e. different from those attached to his office) 
which were cultivated by bondsmen (or mayeques). The original 
power of the chief speaker was, however, limited. His suc­
cessor was elected from his lineage and to declare war he had 
to have the favourable vote of the war council which was con­
stituted by different representatives of the calpulli and out­
standing warriors. The nobility was initially recruited ac­
cording to war services and the chief speaker had nothing to do 
with their nomination. However the descendants of the chief 
speaker became an adscribed aristocracy as did the descendants 
of the successful warriors when military expansion began. (7 ) 
Aztec conquests in. the Valley of Mexico permitted the 
appropriation of lands by the state and the nobility. State 
lands were worked by the commoners of the calpulli on a rota 
basis while the lands of the nobility were cultivated by 
mayeques who, while retaining the right to usufruct of the 
land, paid part of their produce to the nobles as rent. The 
rights of these nobles could be transferred to other nobles or 
to merchants. Apart from this, representatives of the triple 
Alliance with military, judicial and administrative duties were 
appointed in each calpulli. They were assigned lands within 
the calpulli and a number of workers (teccaleque) to cultivate 
them. The teccaleque was a group of members of the calpulli
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only differing from the common macehuales in that they paid 
their tribute to a representative of the triple Alliance 
instead of directly to the átate. (8)
To round off this outline of the social structure of the 
triple Alliance it is necessary to mention two other social 
strata: the merchants (pochteca) and tlatacotin. The mer­
chants were an influential class among the states of the triple 
Alliance. They controlled the long distance trade between 
the Valley of Mexico and the southern lowlands of Mesoamerica 
importing valuable items such as cacao, cotton, gold, etc., 
and exporting manufactured goods. They had a wide network 
of commercial contacts throughout Mesoamerica and were able to 
obtain commodities that the empire could not obtain through 
conquest and the. subsequent tributes. The pochteca class 
obtained extensive rights from the rulers of the triple Alliance 
who appreciated their council, services as spies in foreign 
territories, their presents and tributes which were paid in 
kind. Tlatacotin was, in contrast to pochteca, not a here­
ditary status. They were people who as punishment for 
criminal acts or through economic need became servants of a 
buyer or the person affected by the crime until the tlatacotin 
or his family could redeem the debt or the crime. In cases 
of grave offences tlatacotin could be kept indefinitely until 
they were sacrificed. (9)
The state created by the triple Alliance was based on 
military expansion and the tribute paid by the dependent 
states and communities. Additional duties of the dependent 
units were the contribution of warriors and foodstuffs for the 
military campaigns, and the acceptance of traders of the 
dominant states on their territories. For these purposes
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tribute collectors and governors were appointed by the rulers 
of the Alliance and the army had to be increased by extensive 
recruitment within the calpullis. The maintenance and ex­
pansion of such political organisation needed a sound economic 
base which was developed through the use of the privileged 
environment of the Valley of Mexico and the construction of 
dams, channels and irrigation works for which tribute labour 
was used. This permitted not only an impressive population 
growth (300,000 people in Tenochtitlan alone) but also the 
political integration of the Valley through the dependence of 
its states on common hydraulic systems. (1 0 )
By the eve of the Spanish conquest the triple Alliance 
controlled vast territories which were probably inhabited by 
over 8 million people. (11) The level of social complexity 
at the top levels of society (i.e. the hegemonic states) was 
high although at the bottom a semi democratic and relatively 
backward society of peasants continued to exist. The link 
between these two poles was weak and existed mainly through 
tribute exacted by means of the threat of, or actual, conquest. 
Its dissolution or reconstitution needed only further conquests.
2* The central Andean region and the Inca empire.
The central Andean region comprises what is today Peru and 
the north-western part of Bolivia. It is bounded by the 
Pacific Ocean in the west and by the tropical Amazonian basin 
in the east. The southern and northern limits of the region 
are less clear. South of the present Chilean border coastal 
valleys become scarcer and agriculture virtually impossible.
the north, beyond Tumbez on the border with Ecuador, the 
desert like coastal plain interspersed with valleys typical of
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the region's coast gives place to tropical jungle. Within
the region 3 natural areas can be distinguished: l) the narrow 
coastal plain, 2 ) a series of plateaux and mountains full of 
deep valleys which have different climatic characteristics and 
3) the hot and humid areas of the tropical jungle. This 
ecological setting created a complementary agricultural system 
where cotton and maize were produced on the coast, potatoes, 
quinua (a grain) and meat and wool from llama and other 
cameloids in the high plateau (or puna) and a combination of 
potatoes and.maize in the deep valleys (sierra). (1 2 )
The first important human settlements in the region seem 
to have been established around 1500-2000 B.C. on the central 
coast and were associated with fishing but also an incipient 
agriculture. After 1000 B.C. to 1300 A.D. a long, uneven 
and still unconvincingly explained process of development of the 
productive forces and social organisation occurred. These 
developments consisted of class differentiation, the formation 
of theocratic or military states and the emergence of multi­
state organisations and at the technological level, the control 
of water resources through irrigation systems, the building of 
great terraces to avoid soil erosion and so on. (13)
Information about the region in the period before and 
following the Inca invasions (c. 1438) is more abundant 
although its interpretation is still a matter of controversy.
By 1460 the Chimu kingdom controlled the north coastal plains 
probably down to the Lima Valley and possessed some enclaves 
in the n'orthern highlands. As for their predecessors on the 
coast, the Mochica culture, the economic and political power 
of the Chimu rested on the development of irrigation works on 
a large scale which permitted the expansion of the areas under
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cultivation, the emergence of marked class differences and the 
development of urban centres, among them Chan Chan with a 
population of 50 to 100,000 inhabitants. Urbanisation and 
warfare encouraged building on a large scale and the expansion 
of crafts, however trade seems to have been controlled by the 
state and so no independent merchant class appeared. (14.)
Before the Inca expansion other political units reaching 
relatively high demographic density (i.e. of around 20,000 
households) existed; there were probably state structures in 
the region as well. They were the Lupaca west of Lake Titicaca 
the Wanka and Cajamarca in the central and northern highlands, 
Chincha on the southern coast and the Incas in the valley of 
Cuzco. For the rest of the many ethnic groups of the region 
the information available suggests their independence from 
major political organisation, democratic generation of their 
leadership and constant territorial or ritual warfare. (1 5 )
In their beginnings the Incas were organised in ayllus 
(clans) and communities of ayllus. Ownership of the land 
was vested in the ayllu and it was redistributed periodically 
according to family size. Land was communally worked by all 
members of the ayllu excepting the old, the young and the sick.
At the top of the community of ayllus there was a Sapay-Inca 
or chieftain with limited functions elected from only one 
ayllu by an assembly and a council of ayllu elders or warriors 
who made the decisions. By 1438 or soon afterwards this semi 
democratic system changed. A nobility of military or theo­
cratic character emerged and the Inca rulers started imposing 
their own successors. (1 6 )
Inca territorial expansion began in 1438 after the Chancas, 
a federation of tribes of the southern highlands, had attacked
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and been defeated by them. The Incas then proceeded to conquer 
the surrounding ethnic groups of Cuzco, the central and northern 
highlands and most areas of Ecuador. From that strategic 
position they attacked the Chimu kingdom whose major fortifica­
tions were in the south and turned the situation against the 
Chimu by occupying the water sources in the highlands and 
threatening to block their supplies. In the following decades 
(1471-93) the empire expanded through the southern coast of 
Peru, eastern Bolivia and Argentina and Chile down to the 
Maule river where their expansion was halted militarily by the 
Mapuches. Conquest at a more limited level continued until 
1525 including Cajamarca in the northern Peruvian highlands 
and the rest of highland and coastal Ecuador. There again 
expansion was effectively checked by the Pasto of southern 
Colombia. Thus an ethnic group of c. 100,000 members which 
controlled only part, of the Valley of Cuzco grew, in about 90 
years, into the dominant group of a vast empire which was 
comprised of territories stretching for over 3,000 miles with 
an estimated population of well over 12 million people before 
the arrival of the Spaniards. The key to the success of Inca 
territorial expansion did not reside in their military strength 
but in their political skill which enabled them to integrate 
the conquered people into their armies, to retain and develop 
already existing local structures of power, to establish 
multiple marital alliances, to construct a system of legitima­
tion based on the categories of Andean thought and to permit, 
through a 'Pax Incaica' , the retention or development .of pre- 
Inca economic patterns. (17) A brief analysis of the social 
structure of the Inca empire on the eve of the conquest will 
substantiate these assertions.
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The socio-economic organisation of the Inca state has 
been characterised as a combination of a) the pursuit and 
achievement of vertical control of different ecological 
levels by the ethnic groups, and b) the principles of recip­
rocity and redistribution. The former was based on the need 
of the ethnic groups to have access to products of different 
ecological areas (the high plateaux, main valleys, sub-tropical 
valleys). In the case of the Lupaca kingdom, with its centre 
on Lake Titicaca, cotton,maize and fertilisers were produced 
on the Pacific coast by ethnic colonies, potatoes and wool 
were produced on the high plateau around the lake and wood 
and coca were produced by the Lupaca colonies in the eastern 
tropical or subtropical plains or valleys. Other ethnic 
groups pursued the same ideal of self-sufficiency although 
this was achieved in many cases in more limited territories 
which contained within a relatively small area warm valleys and 
high plateaux. The Incas seem to have extended this pattern 
of ethnic self-sufficiency beyond the central Andean region.
This is certainly true as far as Ecuador is concerned.
Circulation of goods and labour within the ethnic groups 
operated through relations of reciprocity and redistribution. (19) 
Thus the work done by members of one ayllu on the lands of 
another was recompensed by gifts such as food and by the promise 
of future cooperation on their lands. In the case of the 
lands of the chieftains (sometimes up to 50 or 100 times the 
normal size of the commoners’ land) communal work (or mita) 
was enforced. All participants received food and drink as 
a form of reciprocity. This implied a process of concentration 
of wealth in the hands of the chieftain. However it seems
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that the chieftains provided for the needs of the communities 
or specific commoners in times of difficulties (bad harvests, 
widowhood etc.) so the community chieftains must be considered 
as agents of redistribution. (20) The Inca invaders as­
similated this scheme keeping it formally unaltered but in 
fact radically modifying the principles of reciprocity and re­
distribution. As a result of the conquest all land became 
legally the property of the Inca state which returned most of 
it in usufruct to the ayllus for their subsistence needs and 
kept a variable proportion for the cult of the sun (the Inca 
religion) and the state. This principle was also applied to 
the herds of cameloids possessed by the ayllus although in 
this case the proportion of animals actually appropriated by 
the Incas was far higher. As in the case of the chieftain's 
lands the state lands were worked by the community (excluding 
the chieftain) and the workers were recompensed with food and 
drinks. This real reciprocity, which was of course uneven 
since the objective was to provide a surplus for the state, 
was reinforced by the fictional generosity of the Inca who 
allowed the communities the usufruct of 'his' lands. In the 
case of state lands these seem to have been kept by yanes or 
serfs whose origin is obscure. Although the Inca state did 
not look after the welfare of the communities (this was the 
duty of the communities themselves and their chieftains) it did 
give back part of the surplus to them via the chieftains who 
received gifts (herds of cameloids, textiles and women,etc.) 
from the Inca. The state laid down duties for the communities 
which included service in the army, mines, manufacture of 
textiles, construction worksite. These services (mita) were 
carried out on a rota basis and the Inca made retribution with
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extra fibre for personal use in the case of textile manufacture, 
textiles and special food in the case of the army, and food 
and drink in all other cases. (2 1 )
The management of an empire of such huge dimensions 
required the development of a military, religious and civil 
bureaucracy. Apart from the ethnic chieftains who organised 
the mita and dealt with the internal problems of the ayllus, 
nobles were in charge of the central and provincial govern­
ment and they ensured that the different types of mita were 
performed, recorded the amounts of grain, textiles etc., in 
the state depots and organised warfare and the cult. This 
nobility was composed of the members of 10 ayllus of royal 
origin and the ayllus of Cuzco, the Inca capital. They 
enjoyed several privileges, among them exemption from the 
mita, a separate, more lenient, system of justice, allocation 
of yanas to work their lands and the right to use special 
types of symbols of prestige (jewelry, vicuna textiles etc.).
On top of this they received the gifts of the Inca (jewelry, 
textiles, women, etc.,) because of their kinship relation to 
the Inca or their functions in the bureaucracy. The local 
chieftains were to a certain extent assimilated into this 
nobility. (2 2)
The 'generosity' of the Inca was only part of the ex­
penditure of the Inca state. Military campaigns and the 
maintenance of garrisons on the frontiers demanded heavy ex­
penditure, particularly given the privileged character of the 
army. The religious cult involved the sacrifice of animals, 
burning of textiles, heavy drinking of maize beer, the 
erection of temples and the maintenance of a non productive 
class of priests. Finally the construction and maintenance
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of the agricultural, military and administrative infra­
structure and services (roads, bridges, terraces, irrigation 
works etc*,) absorbed the remaining surplus of the empire*
Here again redistribution reappears in the form of ritual 
consumption and public services which were imposed and con­
trolled by the state and which legitimated Inca domination. (23) 
The rapid expansion in its last 50 or 60 years increased 
the need of the state for specialists. The nobility had 
provided the state from its beginnings with able full time 
generals, priests and bureaucrats who supervised and organised 
the mitas of non specialists in the communities. Towards the 
end of the Inca period however full time weavers, silver­
smiths, shepherds and warriors who were either partially or 
totally under the control of the state or the nobility 
appeared. Their social status is not clear but they seem 
to have belonged to two main categories: mitimaes and yanas 
and acllas. The mitimaes were colonists sent by the Inca 
to peripheral areas to establish garrisons or to develop 
special crops. They produced their own means of subsistence 
but otherwise they can be considered professional soldiers or 
specialised producers since they had no mita obligations.
In theory they retained links with their original ethnic 
groups but in fact they formed enclaves depending only on 
the state. Yanas and aclla were on the other hand truly 
servants of the state or nobility, they could be granted by 
the Incas to the nobility or the local chieftains. They 
served for life but their status was not truly hereditary.
Thus yana status was inherited only by one descendant, the 
others were probably assimilated by the ethnic communities of 
origin, while acllas (mainly weavers) were either celibate
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or the concubines of* the Inca or the nobles. As servants of* 
the Inca or the nobility they were exempt from the mita and 
they could specialise in what their lords saw fit, weaving, 
herding, growing special crops,etc. It seems that the yana 
stratum never constituted more than 1% of the population in 
the peripheral areas but reached higher proportions in the 
administrative centres, especially in Cuzco. Mitimaes were, 
on the other hand, much more important numerically out­
numbering the original local population in some areas. (24.)
By the time of the arrival of the Spaniards (1532) the 
society under Inca domination was suffering radical trans­
formations. At the level of the communities a separation 
between the commoner and the chieftain was developing through 
the 'generosity' of the Inca, which increased the power of 
the chieftain. The community was also feeling the dis­
ruptive effects of forced emigration or immigration of 
mitimaes and the subjection of the community to units between 
the ayllu and the Inca empire which were not based on kin­
ship. The demographic expansion of a polygamous nobility 
increased the pressure on the lands and human resources of 
the communities while the cessation of expansion at the 
beginning of the 1 6 th century diminished the spoils to be 
taken by the nobility. According to Katz this would have 
provoked the rivalries between the nobility which ended in 
the civil war of 1525-32 between the two sons of the Inca 
for the succession. Weakened by the war and with an Inca 
just beginning to legitimise himself the empire was relatively 
easy prey for the Spanish conquistadores. (25)
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Map 1: Native peoples of Spanish America
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3. Other prehispanic social formations.
None of the social formations considered in this section 
reached the level of political organisation and development 
of the productive forces which existed in Mesoamerica and 
the central Andean region. However, state or proto-state 
organisation occurred among some of these peoples and 
different degrees of development of the productive forces 
can be discerned among them. These social formations can 
be classified into 1 ) Chiefdoms, 2) Non-tropical farming 
communities, 3) Tropical forest villages and 4) Nomadic 
hunting and gathering lineages.
l) Chiefdoms were of different types and importance but 
their main features were surplus production and a high 
population density which were made possible by a privileged 
environment. This in turn permitted a division of labour, 
class formation and state development to varying degrees.
The main productive activity among these peoples was intensive 
farming which in some cases required terraces and irrigation. 
Domestication of small animals and hunting and fishing com­
plemented their diet. The relatively large population 
which inhabited the villages made technical specialisation 
(pottery, textiles, rudimentary metallurgy with prestige or 
ritual purposes, etc.,) and engineering works of some complexity 
(irrigation, road systems etc.) possible. A high population 
density also made hierarchical differentiation possible which 
might or might not be hereditary but which implied privileges
classification and most of the content of this section 
^ken from Steward and Faron 1959 passim. We have re- 
a elled their 'Farmer and pastoralists' category as Non- 
ropical farming communities so as to include in it the 
peoples of north west Mexico who did not practise stock raising.
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such as the reception of tributes, the practice of polygamy 
and the use of symbols of prestige by the upper echelons of 
the hierarchy. This hierarchy consisted of the chieftain, 
'nobles' of military or theocratic character and the common­
ers. (26)
These chiefdoms were located around the Caribbean and 
the northern Andes, although proto chiefdoms also existed in 
eastern Bolivia (see map). The most important of these 
chiefdoms in terms of population and political organisation 
were those of the Muisca or Chibcha in the central Colombian 
highlands. They were organised into two big confederations 
or 'realms': the Zape around Bogota and Zaque around Tunja. 
Together they formed a population of 300,000 to 500,000 
people at the time of the Spanish conquest and were politically 
and economically integrated through payment of tribute both 
in produce and labour. Regular trade within and outside 
their territories was practised to obtain gold (used in 
coins, jewelry or for ritual purposes) crafts, salt and so on.
The basic unit of organisation of the Muisca was the 'parte' 
or capitania' with leaders of a probably hereditary character. 
One or more 'partes' formed a village (cacicazgo or chiefdom) 
which was under the rule of a hereditary chieftain who received 
the tribute of the 'partes' and had access to other privileges.
By the time of the arrival of the Spaniards (1537) the chief­
tains of Bogota and Tunj'a had subj'ected around A0 other 
chiefdoms, some of which were already organised in confeder­
ations, to tribute and were about to fight each other to 
obtain total hegemony over the area. (27)
2, Non-tropical farming communities existed in the southern Andes
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and north west Mexico. Their main characteristic was the 
lack of hereditary classes and political organisation beyond 
the isolated village or hamlet; the latter was probably formed 
by only one lineage. Among these people sedentary agriculture 
was the main activity supplemented by hunting and fishing and 
in the southern Andes by the raising of cameloids. The 
economy was simple with only restricted forms of commerce 
with the exception of the Atacamenos people bordering the 
central Andean region. Villages or hamlets were of low 
demographic density probably due to the absence of a suitable 
environment for intensive agriculture. The exception was 
the southern Andean region where the habitat provided for a 
population estimated to consist of between 500,000 to 
1,500,000 inhabitants by the time of Spanish contact. In 
this case however the population was dispersed and villages 
remained small. (28)
3) Tropical forest villages. Like non tropical farming 
communities tropical forest villages lacked states, hereditary 
social classes and their population was sparse. Their 
economy was based on slash and burn agriculture as well as 
fishing and hunting. This type of agriculture in a tropical 
forest environment created the need for constant displacement 
of the villages in order to reach new lands which had not been 
exhausted by extensive cultivation. It seems that where 
communications between the village and their fields were eased 
by navigable rivers or the proximity of the coast the village 
population reached sizeable proportions. The social structure 
was based on kinship and sex and age differences. Prestige 
derived from participation in warfare provided additional 
social differentiation but was not heritable. (29)
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4) Nomadic hunters and gatherers. The environments 
inhabited by these people were characterised by low food 
productivity and could therefore only support small popula­
tions. These societies depended on wild plants* animals 
and fish. Technology and material culture were poor due to 
constant mobility and the isolated and competitive practice 
that hunting and gathering implies. The scarcity of big 
mammals tended to diminish the importance of hunting bands 
who jealously protected their territories and, therefore, no 
social units beyond the multilineal band appeared. Their 
social structure was based on kinship, sex and age differences 
with no hierarchical or technical full time specialisation 
among their members. (30)
b) Castile before 1500
During the second decade of the 8th century Arab and 
Berber armies destroyed the Visigothic kingdom, gained control 
of most of the Iberian peninsula and turned it into a province 
of the Caliphate of Damascus. The Christian kingdom formed
m  the mountains of Asturias by the Visigothic refugees and 
later its off-shoots, Castile and Portugal,and in the eastern 
part of Spain the off-shoot of Charlemagne's empire, the 
Catalonians, fought to conquer or reconquer the whole peninsula 
until the last Moslem enclave in Granada was subjected in 1492.
This prolonged war and the Christian repopulation process 
that ensued created peculiarities in the development of the 
P nish social formation and deserve to be dealt with in some 
ail* ^he conquest of America was a process controlled
sively by the crown of Castile we will limit ourselves to 
analysis of the development of the reconquest of the terri­
tories which became part of this kingdom, that is modern
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continental Spain minus the provinces bordering France and the 
Mediterranean provinces down to Alicante.
The first wave of Christian resettlement occurred in the 
9th and 1 0th centuries in the desolate frontier area between the 
Cantabrian mountains and the river Duero. This colonising 
process was in part directed by the crown which delegated the 
power to organise settlements to the nobles and magnates.
Probably in the majority of cases this process took place by 
'spontaneous' colonisation, with or without the authorisation 
of the crown, which was then taken up by families, monasteries 
or lords and their dependants. To stimulate migration to 
these zones vast concessions in terms of personal freedom and 
rights were made to the settlers bringing about semi- autonomous 
communities of a democratic character, especially in Old Castile. 
A second period of territorial expansion occurred in the 11th 
and 12th centuries when Christian forces conquered the Muslim 
kingdom of Toledo in 1085 and reached and went beyond the Tagus 
river. The process of settlement that accompanied and 
followed military conquest was marked by increased state 
participation in the organisation of the settlements which 
included the choice of the site and the convocation of the 
new settlers. The settlements they founded were organised 
with town councils and endowed with rights and privileges and 
a vast territorial base which permitted them a high level of 
autonomy. South of the Tagus however, the military orders 
created in the 1 2 th century were granted vast territories for 
their participation in the reconquest and they started a slow 
seigneurial colonisation. A third phase of reconquest can be 
identified for the years 1212-70. In this period Castile 
increased its territory by just over 50$ reaching the western
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south Atlantic coast and Murcia in the Mediterranean. The 
colonisation process that ensued also combined the efforts of 
the crown and the military orders and religious and lay 
magnates, but in this case the participation of the latter 
prevailed. This gave rise to enormous latifundia in Murcia 
and particularly Andalucia and Extremadura. (31)
The last phase of the Spanish reconquest, that of the 
kingdom of Granada in 14.82-92, had a very different character 
from the previous ones. Firstly the kingdom retained its 
dense population (c. 500,000) and according to the terms of 
its capitulation was to retain its laws, customs and religion.
It was only in the western part of the kingdom which was taken 
by force by the Castilians before surrender, that lands 
became immediately available for the Spanish settlers. In 
the central and western areas of Granada land was retained by 
the Muslim population although a slow process of expropriation 
of lands by the Castilian crown began in 1559. This was done 
by demanding title deeds from the land holders and in those 
cases where they were absent selling the land as royal property. 
This and other grievances (forced conversion to Ghristianity, 
from 1502 taxes and subsidies demanded by the crown and in 
1567 the total ban of the Arabic language and customs) pro­
voked a massive rebellion in the 1 5 6 0's which ended with 
forced resettlement of the Muslims in other areas of Castile. (32) 
The Muslim invasion and the slow reconquest by the Spanish 
kingdoms caused a late, formation of the feudal system in 
Castile. During the first centuries of reconquest the small 
size of the territories under the control of the Christian 
kings made it unnecessary to delegate powers with a hereditary 
character to feudal lords. Later on, especially from the
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mid 14-th century, delegation of powers did occur through the 
concession of jurisdictional seignÉUries with judicial and 
tributary rights over their domains. The Castilian crown 
however reserved for itself the right to mint coin and judge 
certain cases. Furthermore war conditions and royal legis­
lation impeded a total adscription of the peasants to the 
land up until the late 13th century. From then on the 
seigneurial nobility enlarged and consolidated its power by 
subjecting former free villages to their exactions, restrict­
ing the freedom of movement of the peasantry and, from the 
mid 1 4 th century to 1475, by obtaining seignéuries from the 
Trastamara kings. By around 1500 the power of the (lay) 
seigneurial nobility was impressive. They controlled, by 
means of jurisdiction or as proprietors, 52$ of the Spanish 
soil while the other 48$ belonged to high ecclesiastics, 
church corporations, the urban aristocracy and the knights. (3 3 ) 
The lower nobility, or simple 'hidalgos', was immediately 
below the upper nobility in terms of prestige and privileges 
(exemption from taxes, torture, imprisonment for debts»etc.).
In theory its status was defined in terms of lineage rather 
than function (knighthood) or economic power, but it seems 
that many a commoner reached the nobility via economic power 
and royal favour. The economic power of this sector varied 
enormously from the modest rural hidalgo, whose life style 
and wealth differed little from the surrounding peasants, to 
the owners of vast landed estates and rents. Very close to 
the status of the hidalgos were the caballeros (knights) of 
non-noble origin who, during this period due to their function, 
gained privileges such as tax exemptions and reservation of
- 42 -
municipal office in the towns. These two groups provided 
the church, the army and the bureaucracy with their high 
rank officials and, in many cases, were linked through kin­
ship with the higher nobility. (34)
A merchant class of importance only appeared with the 
development of export-import trade in Castile in c. 1300.
This trade was linked to the development of wool production, 
the basic Castilian export during the period, and the opening 
of the Mediterranean and South Atlantic trade after the con­
quest of Andalucia and Murcia. Merchants and ship owners 
were mainly based in Burgos and Bilbao in the north and Seville 
in Andalucia. In the north they carried on active trade with 
Flanders and France, exporting wool and Basque iron and 
importing manufactured goods, while in the south they par­
ticipated in the African trade in gold and slaves and ex­
ported wool in exchange for Genoese manufactured goods.
There were several factors impeding the development of a 
powerful merchant class during this period. Firstly it 
seems that the richest merchants operating in Castile were 
mainly foreigners (Genoese and French). An important 
exception to this was provided by the Castilian merchants 
and financiers of Jewish religion or Jewish descent. The 
former however were expelled from Spain in 1492. Secondly 
successful merchants usually ended up as landowners and 
rentiers and became members of the lower nobility or even 
became related to the upper nobility. (3 5)
Castilian industry during this period seems to have 
experienced a moderate expansion. The main industrial sector 
was textiles and by 1500 textiles of high quality were 
beginning to be manufactured using a relatively advanced
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technical division of labour. Textile production had been 
practised on a more domestic scale since the 1 2 th century and 
occurred in most areas of Castile. The desire to protect 
this emergent industry explains the attempts of the Cortes 
(parliament) of Castile, which usually represented the interests 
of the towns, to ban the import of textiles and the export of 
wool during the 14th and 15th centuries. This protectionism 
was, however, against the interests of the nobility who con­
trolled wool production, most of which was sold for export, 
the big merchants who exported it and the king who taxed the 
'profits' of the merchants and n o b l e s . T h u s  the route 
to industrialisation and the formation of a bourgeoisie 
remained hampered and these measures failed. (3?)
By 1500 the Castilian nobility although temporarily 
reduced to a passive political role (1480-1 5 0 5) was in full 
control of the economy. This control was achieved by 
carving out for themselves property or jurisdiction over 
enormous territories during the reconquest and the enlargement 
and consolidation of these properties through marital alliances 
and Mayorazgos (inheritance by primogeniture.) This in turn
permitted them to control wool production and to benefit from 
the wool trade. The urban classes were no political or 
economic match for the nobility and the kings were in no 
position to challenge the privileges of the nobility.
Furthermore the relative openness of the nobility to the
lusion of former commoners in its ranks and the propensity
active 8 Sf^ '1?usn?ss this contradiction was exposed in the 
of the ^artlclPation of the 'textile' towns in the 1521 rebellion 
teoti n n•comm°ners which included in its programme textile pro- 
reduot?oSm o1?ng wlth other demands (curbs on the feudal burdens, 
nobilit n u tax?s' limitation of royal power and so on). The 
down tto wa°s® fights were attacked, sided with the king and put 
e rebellion together with the royal forces. (36)
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of merchants to merge into the nobility limited the revolution­
ary character of the towns. Also the territorial expansion 
with its sequel of booty and expectations of social advance­
ment and the channelling of social resentment against success­
ful ethnic minorities (jews and Muslims) on Castilian land 
probably tended to defuse popular discontent against the 
nobility. (38)
c) The Conquest.
By 14-92 Castile was able to engage in major exploration 
and conquest expeditions overseas. The reconquest of Granada 
was about to be completed, the Canary Islands had been 
partially conquered and colonised and maritime incursions of 
piracy and trade in northern Africa and Granada were actively 
practised by the Castilians of Andalucia and Murcia. This 
created in southern Castile a population which was trained 
in, or at least mentally prepared for, war with religious 
overtones, commercial and piratical expeditions and the quest 
for booty which was to be an asset in the conquest of the 
Indies. Trade in south eastern Andalucia, the base of 
Castilian expeditions of discovery and conquest, was also 
well developed. Genoese merchants and navigators were well 
established there by the mid 1 5 th century providing its 
commercial and nautical expertise and operating with large 
capital. By 1500 they were financing enterprises of discovery 
and conquest in the Indies and the Canary Islands and beginning 
the commercial exploitation of the latter. The trade con­
juncture of late 15th century Europe was marked by the search 
for highly profitable and scarce commodities (spices and other
exotic products of the East, and bullion). The Genoese sea­
man and merchant Christopher Columbus was no exception. 
Although he agreed with the Castilian crown that he would 
discover a new route to the East Indies and discover or 
conquer (ganar) islands and mainlands, he was also entitled 
to barter, purchase, take, etc., 'pearls, precious stones, 
gold, silver, spices and other things and commodities of all 
sorts.' In the pursuit of this commercial aim, Columbus and 
the crown had the full financial support of the Genoese 
merchants resident in Sevile. (39)
From 14-92 to c. 1550 the Castilian crown 'discovered' 
and conquered the most densely populated territories of the 
Americas. Christopher Columbus initiated this process by 
exploring the Major Antilles, part of the Venezuelan coast and 
the Caribbean coast from Panama to Honduras and starting the 
colonisation of Hispaniola (present Dominican Republic and 
Haiti) between 1492 and 1504. Other explorers, conquerors 
and colonisers followed suit and by 1 5 19 they had explored 
the Atlantic coast from Tampico in northern Mexico down to 
the river Plate, and had crossed the Isthmus of Panama and 
reached the Pacific Ocean. By that time Spanish settlements 
were established in all the Major Antilles and in and around 
the Isthmus of Panama (Tierra Firme). Hispaniola was a 
commercial, productive and bureaucratic centre of some 
importance with several towns, a governor and an Audiencia 
(royal court), sizeable gold production and regular contact 
with Spain. This, however, constituted only the beginnings 
°f fw'ture Spanish empire in America since the conquest of
the areas of dense population and mining wealth was only about
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to begin.
In 1519 Hernan Cortes sailed with 600 men from Cuba to 
conquer Mexico, whose importance was only vaguely known.
After being joined by c. 1,500 more Spaniards and Indian 
allies he seized Tenochtitlan and the Aztec state in 1521.
In 1532-3 Francisco Pizarro with less than 500 men entered 
Peru, captured the Inca ruler and the empire surrendered, 
although Spanish dominion was not completed until the crushing 
of the Indian rebellion of 1536-7.
The conquest and settlement of central Mexico and Peru 
(as Hispaniola and Tierra Firme before) meant that two new 
powerful centres were established from which new conquests 
could be undertaken. The Aztec and Inca treasures which were 
easily plundered, attracted Spaniards from the peninsula and 
elsewhere, and this reinforced the initial groups of con- 
quistadores. The expectation of new treasures and rewards 
compelled the more adventurous or the less favoured of both 
the newcomers and old settlers to undertake new conquests.
Groups of allied or enslaved Indians provided the guides and 
war auxiliaries which complemented the Spanish retinues in 
these enterprises.
Thus, Pedro de Alvarado, one of Cortes' captains, went 
southwards from central Mexico conquering Guatemala (1523-4) 
and then attempting the conquest of Honduras but without success. 
In 1534 he abandoned the government of Guatemala and sailed 
southwards to the recently conquered lands of Peru. Finding 
the land occupied by other conquistadores and therefore offer­
ing no possible rewards for his efforts he sold his navy to
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the Peruvian conquistadores and returned to Guatemala. Cortes 
himself, from 1524-6, successfully undertook the conquest and 
settlement of Honduras. In the meantime, the men from Tierra 
Firme reached the southern limit of Alvarado's conquest. To 
the north several expeditions put the Spaniards in touch with 
northern Mexico, Florida, the Mississippi river, Texas and 
ornia• Although these expeditions were unsuccessful 
from the point of view of conquest, easy plunder and settle­
ment (with the exception of New Biscay, north west of Mexico) 
it opened the way for future colonising enterprises.
From Peru the conquistadores dispersed through South 
America in every possible direction. Diego de Almagro,
Pizarro's partner in the conquest of Peru, explored Chile in 
1535-7, a new expedition commanded by Pedro De Valdivia 
conquered and settled central Chile in the early 1540's. 
Belalcazar, one of Pizarro's captains, conquered and settled 
Quito (1533-4) and later southern Colombia (1536-7) and in 
1539 reached the Chibcha kingdom (Valley of Bogota) which had 
already been conquered by the retinues of Quezada (from Tierra 
Firme). In the 1540's and 1550's expeditions from Chile and 
Peru conquered and settled the western parts of the river Plate 
basin, while another expedition started from Quito and, 
following the rivers Coca and Napo, sailed down the Amazon 
river and reached the Atlantic. Thus the conquistadores from 
Peru explored and conquered practically all South America in a 
few years. Their only competitors were the men from the 
ettlements of Tierra Firme and Venezuela, the Portuguese and 
group of Spanish conquistadores who explored the river Plate 
basin from the Atlantic and reached and settled in Paraguay in 
the late 1 5 3 0's. (40)
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The conquest of Spanish America was almost exclusively 
financed by private enterprise. The main exception to this 
was the first voyage of Columbus (1 4 9 2) which was financed by 
the crown although Columbus and his associates contributed up 
to an eighth of the cost of the expedition which amounted to 
c. 1.6 million maravedíes or 15 kilos of gold. In Spain 
private investors consisted of ship owners, adventurers backed 
financially by merchants and associations formed by merchants, 
rentiers, professionals, etc. In the Indies rich settlers of 
the m a m  colonies 'invested' resources obtained in gold mining, 
commerce, public office or previous conquests in future ven­
tures of conquest. For instance the expedition which con­
quered Mexico was financed by the prosperous agricultural and 
mining entrepreneur Hernán Cortes and Diego de Velazquez .con­
queror of Cuba and by then its governor. The spirit of 
private enterprise was not only concentrated in a few magnates 
who invested resources in the expeditions but existed in vast 
sections of the population, both in Andalucía and especially 
m  America. Thus the members of the bands of conquest or 
the crews of the voyages of discovery and trade were usually 
not paid a salary but obtained a share of the spoils of war, 
(slaves, gold, lands, servants, etc.,) or of the profits of 
the trade. These shares were previously determined and were
antially larger in the case of the leaders who usually 
Paid for the expenses of the venture. (41)
To compensate for the effort and expenditure of the con­
quistadores the crown granted generous rights to the prospective 
conquistadores or discoverers. Thus Columbus obtained through 
capitulaciones (contract) of 1492 the hereditary office of
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admiral with civil and criminal jurisdiction over the islands 
and mainland to be discovered, the temporary office of viceroy 
and governor of these, 1 0 $ of all the net profits to be made 
in themfetc. Later on the concessions were more modest but 
remained large enough to encourage the prospective conquerors 
to carry out the enterprise. For instance the capitulaciones 
of the crown with Francisco Pizarro in 1529 granted the latter 
and his associates the offices of governor, captain general and 
adelantado for life (these were not hereditary offices), lieu­
tenancies, bishoprics, etc., which were to be paid from the 
proceeds of the colony together with other minor concessions 
(exemption from taxes for 10 years, the concession of several 
charts of nobility or hidalgia, etc.). However, once the con­
quest and settlement of the new territories were achieved the 
crown systematically curtailed the rights of the conquistadores, 
especially in administrative matters. (4-2 )
During the 16th century Spain conquered vast territories, 
including developed states with large populations, with relative­
ly small contingents of Spanish men. This was to some extent 
due to the technical advantage of the Spaniards over the Indians. 
Among these we can count the possession of superior instru­
ments of destruction, such as fire and iron arms, horses, 
which were unknown to the Indians, and better lines of communi­
cation and supply, which were provided by ships and horses.
Some credit should also be given to the tactics developed by 
the Spaniards in fighting in an expanding frontier for pro­
longed periods. However the key to the success of small 
groups of Spaniards in the conquest of large states seems to 
rest on the conquered societies themselves and the skillful use
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of these by the Spaniards. Firstly the Indian peoples did 
not present a united front against the invaders. Thus the 
Tlaxcala of central Mexico, traditional enemies of the Aztecs, 
allied themselves with the Spaniards and, according to Konetzke, 
might have provided the Spaniards with an auxiliary army of
100,000 people for the conquest of the Aztec state. Secondly 
the Spaniards exploited the immense power and the almost sacred 
character of the rulers of the native states to obtain their 
surrender or at least to weaken their defences by simply 
capturing or killing them. Finally after a conquest the 
Spaniards made use of their position as rulers and the vertical 
structure of power of the Indian states to raise Indian armies 
against other Indian peoples. (4-3)
The social formation of colonial Spanish America resulted 
from the practices of the groups of conquerors, colonists and 
representatives of the Spanish state and the effects of these 
practices on the economic, political and ideological structures 
of the Amerindian societies during the process of conquest and 
colonisation. Of these the determinant factor was the charac­
ter of the social formations already in existence in America.
They determined, in the main, the direction, rhythm and outcome 
of the conquest. Firstly the conquerors desperately looked 
for treasure to plunder and this led them directly to the most 
politically and economically developed of the Indian societies. 
Secondly, plunder or exploitation of the conquered Amerindian 
peoples provided the means of continuing the process of conquest 
and therefore determined its rhythm. Finally, the relations 
°f production and the political system of the societies to be 
conquered determined the outcome and the methods of the process 
°f conquest. Thus, in those social formations where state
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development and tributary relations of production were deeply 
rooted (the Aztec confederacy, the Inca empire, Chibcha chief- 
doms etc«,) submission to Spanish rule was rapidly achieved and 
the cost, in terms of Spanish resources, was relatively small.
In these cases, after the war of conquest was over the con­
querors merely replaced the dominant native classes and started 
a slow process of transformation of the Indian economy and the 
corresponding political and ideological structures. On the 
other hand pre-state societies not previously submitted to 
tributary relations resisted militarily or evaded Spanish control 
for longer periods and once conquered, their social structures 
were radically modified or destroyed by the Spaniards. In 
these cases slavery or harsh forms of serfdom and the mission 
system were the strategies used by the Spaniards to control and 
exploit these peoples. (4-4-)
The social practices of the Spanish conquerors, colonists, 
bureaucrats and churchmen during the process of conquest and 
colonisation were, however, far from irrelevant. The Spaniards 
were bearers of social structures which were at least partially 
reproduced in the Americas and their social practices trans­
formed the Amerindian societies in several respects. During 
the 16th century political, economic and ideological structures 
and practices were brought into being which persisted in the 
main for the rest of the colonial period and beyond. We will 
deal extensively with the process of development of the colonial 
Spanish American social formation in the main body of this thesis. 
In part II (Chapters 3 - 6) we will study the transformations 
of the economic structure which came about as a result of the
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practices of the colonists and the state. Finally, in part 3 
(Chapters 7 - 13) we will analyse the transformation of the 
ideological structures of the Indian peoples under the impact 
of the dominant ideological state apparatus of the Spaniards> 
the Satholic church.
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PART II: THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE
A
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In this section we will analyse the formation and develop­
ment of the economic structure of colonial Spanish America 
under the impact of the practices of the colonists and the 
regulatory role of the Spanish state. By far the most impor­
tant economic activity during the period was agriculture in 
which the overwhelming majority of the population was engaged. 
Scarcely less important from the point of view of its value, 
although a relatively small number of workers was employed, 
was silver and gold mining which gave dynamism to the trans- 
Atlantic and internal trade as well as to agricultural commodity 
production. On the other hand industry (i.e. non mining and 
non agricultural production) was a marginal economic activity 
involving a small number of workers whose production had a 
limited commercial value.
V/e begin this part by analysing in Chapter 3, those forms 
of exploitation of the labour force in which the state had an 
important regulatory role, slavery, 'encomienda' and 're­
partimiento'. In Chapter 4 we analyse the agrarian structure 
of colonial Spanish America in relation to land ownership by 
Spaniards and Indian communities and the main types of pro­
duction in this sector. In chapter 5 we continue our analysis 
of colonial Spanish American agriculture based on the study of 
agrarian enterprises, mainly the 'hacienda' or big landed 
estate, their economic performance, the forms of labour employed, 
markets and returns.
In Chapter 6 we deal with mining, its impact on the Spanish 
American economies, the forms of labour employed, the economic 
performance of mining enterprises and their capital investments 
and returns. A note on industry at the end of this chapter 
rounds off our study of production in colonial Spanish America.
M
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Chapter 3: State administration of the labour force in 
Spanish America
In this chapter we will attempt a characterisation of the 
mode of exploitation of the subjected peoples and the different 
restrictions/stimuli imposed by the state in order to structure 
the economy and society in the Indies. As shall be noted, the 
impact of these policies was neither chronologically nor 
geographically homogeneous. Socio-economic factors operating 
at the time of the conquest permitted effective state control 
in certain areas and the virtual elimination of the more 
destructive colonial practices in a few decades (slavery of 
the aboriginal population, unregulated forced labour etc.). 
Other regions presented characteristics which permitted the 
survival of these 'primitive' forms of colonial exploitation 
for a longer period and a parallel underdevelopment of the 
control of the state over these economic social formations.
There were many factors operating in Spanish America 
during the conquest and thereafter which determined the 
different character of the relations of production in the 
different colonies: state (both governmental and eccle­
siastical) policies and practices, strategical factors 
(vis-a-vis the other European powers),the timing and circum­
stances of the conquest in different territories, but, above 
all, we will argue, the presence or absence of an abundant 
and politically organised population and the presence of 
mineral wealth or the suitability of the colonies for the 
production of crops which were highly valuable in the external 
market. The state had an important role to play in the 
provision of labour power for the colonists, it channelled
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human resources to the production of what it saw as most 
important and to those colonists it wanted to favour. But 
in relation to the degree and the forms of exploitation 
of the labour force, very strict limits were imposed on the 
crown by the productive patterns and the size of the native 
populations, the potential wealth of the colonies and the 
expectations and pressures of the colonists. Torn between 
its long term economic and political needs of preserving an 
abundant Indian population (tribute payers and eventually 
defenders of the empire) and the more immediate ones (high 
returns from the colonies and the insurance of the loyalty 
of the colonisers through a variety of grants) the crown 
gave way to compromise. Indian slavery (from which the crown 
received a fifth of the value of the slaves) and forced 
labour under the 'encomienda' and later the 'repartimiento' 
systems were basic mechanisms to satisfy the colonists and 
improve royal finances. African slavery represented until the 
late 18th century an expensive solution for the scarcity of 
labour power, a result of the wasteful character of early 
colonisation which only a few colonies could afford. In 
this case the impact of the royal policies was indirect. The 
slaves' exploitation was only limited by the economic interests 
of the owners, but fiscal factors (heavy taxes, the sale of 
virtual monopolies over the trade, etc) prevented an expansion 
of African slavery to the extent the colonists desired.
Our analysis of the labour force will follow an insti­
tutional rather than chronological or geographical approach, 
dealing successively with slavery, encomienda and reparti-
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miento.We have left for the next chapter those relations of 
production not so clearly regulated by the state and basic­
ally connected with the Spanish enterprises, especially the 
hacienda (debt peonage, free labour and the different forms 
of enfeoffment).
(a) Indian Slavery
By the time of the discovery of America, the slave 
trade was a well established institution in Spain. At least 
from the end of the 14th century African slaves were imported 
into Spain and with the opening up of West Africa by the 
Portuguese in the second half of the 1 5 th century the 
traffic increased enormously. Portuguese and Spanish entre­
preneurs competed in organising slave-raid expeditions to
West Africa until the treaty of Alcafovas (14.79) restricted 
the trade to Portuguese raiders only. Despite this, the 
importation of African slaves into Spain did not stop and 
during the 16th century Seville was an important slave market, 
second only to Lisbon, with over 6,000 slaves out of a total 
population of 85,000 (or 7.4$). In addition to the black 
slave trade, during the 15th century the aboriginal population 
of the Canaries suffered the slave raids of the Portuguese 
and Spanish alike, while the wars of reconquest permitted 
the enslavement of the Muslims who actively resisted the advance
of the Spanish armies. The legal principles governing the 
traffic and which were widely accepted in 15th century Europe 
were (a) the right to enslave non-Christian enemies captured 
ln a just war and (b) the purchase of slaves from a third 
Party. Although the loose interpretation of these principles 
ould legitimise the enslavement of any group of people of 
whatever race or continent, outside Christianity, through them 
state had an important instrument to regulate the trade
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according to its own interests, by means of applying its 
discretion in the interpretation of the law. Thus many 
aboriginies of the Canaries who had been enslaved illegally 
(not in a just war) were declared free by the crown under 
pressure from the church. In the same way, royal practices 
, concerning the enslavement of the American Indians at
first rather loosely conformed to these principles, but 
later severely restricted their application under pressure 
from the church and the realisation of their own long term 
interests.(1 )
During the first decades of American colonisation,
> Indian slavery was widely practised by the colonists.
Spanish explorers and conquistadores from Columbus onwards, 
in the absence of gold and other precious objects to barter 
with or to plunder from the Indians, engaged in slave raids. 
By 1520 many areas on the Caribbean coast from Cape San 
Agostinho (north of Brazil) to Yucatan and the Antilles had 
been subjected to slave raids, either to supply the Spanish 
markets or to meet the colonists' need for labour power in 
places where the production of a marketable product (gold 
mining, pearl diving, agriculture) was not accompanied by 
the presence or survival of docile Indian workers. By 1520 
the unbridled exploitation of the Indians of the greater 
Antilles had virtually annihilated them. The subsequent 
importation of slaves and naborias^^^ from the Bahamas, 
lesser AntiD.es and Caribbean mainland brought about the
f n  leg&l status of these Indians is not clear. Zavala, 
ollowing Las Casas, asserts that they were domestic slaves 
n_°t liable to be sold or bought. Sauer defines them as 
-¡J-fe-long serfs while Fernandez assimilates these Naborias 
into the category of encomienda Indians, that is a serf 
considered legally free working for the Spaniards with the 
consent of his chieftain(2 ) .
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extinction of the aboriginal population in certain islands 
and both triggered off the mistrust towards Spaniards and 
created mechanisms of self-defence everywhere else. The 
Spanish settlement of Castilla del Oro (Caribbean Columbia 
and Panama) lacked a docile Indian population reducible to 
encomiendas so slave raids were extended to the recently 
discovered Pacific coast of Central America. Thus during the 
1520' s, 1530's and 154-O's slave raids in that area provided 
Panama, and the recently discovered Peru, with the Indians 
the conquistadores needed for campaigning and production, 
and the bureaucrats and adventurers in Central America with 
a profitable export 'product'. Panama, the obvious route to 
the South Pacific, was therefore converted into an important 
market for Indian slaves brought particularly from Nicaragua 
although the raids reached as far as El Salvador. The 
conquistadores of Mexico and Guatemala, after distributing 
the more politically organised Indian nuclei in encomiendas 
among their followers, engaged in the slave trade in the 
peripheral areas of their 'kingdoms'. These slaves were 
acquired either by wars of conquest waged against (real or 
supposed) rebel Indians, or by 'rescate', that is the purchase 
or donation from the Indian chieftains of Indians supposedly 
having slave status in pre-hispanic society, but even 
encomienda Indians were submitted to slavery and sold.^^^
(ii) During the first decades of colonisation the legal diffe­
rences between slavery and encomienda were not clearly 
marked let alone enforced. Encomienda Indians were used as war 
auxiliaries, performed exhausting corvees for their encomen­
deros and could eventually be sold as slaves. Only the 
installation of local mechanisms of government made the legal 
differentiation clear and the actual condition of both 
categories of Indians significantly different.
In the rest of Spanish America no important groups of 
Indians were enslaved with the exception of Chile and 
Paraguay. The Indians of the former Inca empire were submitted 
to the encomienda system and firmly controlled by the 
encomenderos who effectively checked the attempts of other 
conquistadores to enslave their Indians. However, in fringe 
areas of the Inca empire (eastern Peru and Bolivia and 
northern Argentina) different Indian peoples suffered the 
slave raids of the conquistadores from the 1530's to the 
end of the 16th century. In southern Chile, the early slave 
raids of the 1540's continued throughout the century reaching 
enormous proportions and attaining a legal character in the 
17th century, supplying central and northern Chile as well 
as Peru and Upper Peru with slaves. Equally serious were the 
Portuguese raids on the Indians of the Jesuit reductions of 
Paraguay in the first half of the 17th century, which were 
only stopped by the effective self-defence of the missions. (3) 
Royal legislation about Indian slavery was, during the 
first half of the 16th century vacillating and contradictory. 
The first Indian slaves exported to Spain were favourably 
received by the crown but before the close of the 1 5 th 
century the queen ordered the suspension of Indian enslave­
ment until a group of theologians and jurists could decide 
about the justice of the trade. This cautious policy began 
to change in 1503, when the queen declared that the Indians 
°f certain islands and territories of northern Colombia, 
supposedly cannibals, could be subjected to enslavement. In 
1511 permission was extended to all the Caribbean coast from 
the gulf of Darien (Panama) to the Orinoco delta. A year later
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the crown authorised the transportation of Indians of any 
territory so far discovered to the Islas Utiles (useful islands 
that is the islands where precious metals were available for 
exploitation. Hispaniola, Cuba, Puerto Rico, Jamaica and 
Trinidad. This forced emigration consisted of the enslave­
ment of the rebel Indians and the granting of 'naboria' status 
to those Indians who submitted to the Spaniards willingly.
The Junta of Burgos (1512-3) introduced the formality of the 
requirement for every conquest expedition in the Indies. This 
grotesque procedure gave nothing more than a legal appearance 
to slave raids now disguised as 'just war'. The regency of 
Cisneros (1516-8) and then the rule of Charles I opened a 
period of revision and more strict regulation of the trade.
In 1518 a serious judge was appointed to discern the character­
istics of the Indians of the territories discovered (friendly 
or warlike) and to determine the legality of the enslavement 
of the Indians. His findings however did not lead to any 
practical measure. In 1520 several restrictions of the trade 
were imposed: the branding of the slaves (which made them legal 
slaves) was to occur in the presence of royal officials.
Legal enslavement was limited to those Indians obstructing the 
propagation of the Catholic faith or the exploitation of mines 
by the Spaniards. The traffic between the Islas Utiles and 
the rest of the discovered territories was stopped and revisions 
°f the titles of property of Indian slaves by the authorities 
were ordered. Finally in 1530 the crown forbade Indian 
slavery under all circumstances (purchase, just war, etc.).
In the following years however, under the pressure of the 
colonists, the crown permitted the trade again, under certain
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iseconditions: adult males captured in a just war or the purchae
of Indians originally enslaved in a just war. Once again in 
154-2, and this time for good, the crown banned Indian slavery 
under any conditions in the future. The new laws of 1542 also 
provided measures to liberate those slaves whose owners were not 
able to provide evidence that they had been enslaved in a just 
war notwithstanding the slaves' brands or the title of purchase 
of the owners. Exceptions to these laws were made in 1569 
for the Caribs of Venezuela, whose enslavement continued to be 
legal until the second half of the 18th century, the Chilean 
Mapuches, subject to legal slavery from 1608 to 1674, and 
other minor groups for variable periods. (4)
To ensure the implementation of the New Laws as far as 
Indian slavery was concerned, the crown sent high officials 
who were empowered to act drastically to America in order to 
enforce the legislation. They included a new Viceroy for New 
Spain, a new president of the Audiencia of Guatemala and 
another official to Panama. The thoroughness and the commit­
ment of the officials in charge of the enforcement of the {jew 
Laws varied. In Guatemala the new president acted drastically 
in removing the old judges - themselves owners of slaves - 
and went to the provinces to inspect and free the Indians in 
situ. As a result in the small province of San Salvador he 
liberated 500 Indian slaves, a large number, probably several 
times higher than this, in Santiago, and virtually eliminated 
Indian slavery in two years (1548-50). On the contrary in 
Mexico the process was slow and the commitment of the royal 
bureaucracy half-hearted. Although all the judges, officials 
and prelates of the religious orders were ordered to collaborate
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in denouncing the existence of Indian slaves held illegally, 
after two years spent dealing with the problem the Audiencia 
of Mexico had freed only 700 out of some 3,000 for the whole 
period (1 5 5 1 -6 1 ) (5).
Quantitative estimations: Contemporaries estimated the 
enslavement of the Indians in Spanish America up until the 
1550's in figures as far apart as three or four millions (the 
Indigenist Las Casas) and 200,000 (the pro-colonist friar 
Motolinia). Recently Simpson has discarded Las Casas' figure 
as exaggerated and estimated the total as some 300,000. More 
recent research however suggests that this figure is extremely 
conservative. For instance, MacLeod asserts that in Nicaragua 
alone more than 200,000 Indians were enslaved, while Radell 
claims that 'it is likely that between 1527 and 1 5 4 8, 450,000 
to 500,000 Indians were removed from Nicaragua by the slave 
trade'. This last figure is substantially the same as that 
given by Las Casas for Nicaragua and therefore would suggest 
that his estimation for the whole of Spanish America was closer 
to the truth than Simpson believes. The importance of the 
different colonies in providing slaves in the last decades of 
Indian slavery can be appreciated by looking at the categories 
of Indian slaves in the two major centres of the slave trade 
at the time. In Panama in the mid 16th century, half of the 
820 remaining slaves were Indians from the Venezuelan coast, 
a fifth were from Panama and its surroundings, another fifth 
were from Nicaragua and the rest were from other areas of 
Central America. In Peru a sample of Indian slaves taken by 
Lockhart from the archives and corresponding to the years 1533-43 
shows that two-thirds of them were aborigines from Nicaragua
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and the rest were evenly distributed between Mexico and Guatemala, 
while by the late 1540's the Venezuelan coast occupied a pro­
minent place as a source of Indian slaves for the Lima market. (6) 
The manumission of the Indian slaves represented a 
significant loss for the colonists despite their reduced 
numbers. Slaves performed tasks which were prohibited for 
encomienda or free Indians. These included the heavy and 
unhealthy work in mines, cloth mills and sugar mills, that is 
some of the most profitable lines of production in the colonies. 
The complaints of the colonists and their unsuccessful lobby­
ing before the crown is therefore understandable, but even the 
royal officials and acclesiastics attempted to impose devices 
which prolonged the captivity of the Indians. On this point, 
the crown acted firmly. The institution, as the number of 
freed Indians indicates, was on the wane.
The ability of the colonists to enslave Indians was dis­
appearing through the improvement of the checking capacity of 
the state to control the blatant abuses of the colonists, the 
exhaustion of easy sources of enslavement (un-warlike peoples), 
the wasteful character of the institution, and the precarious 
character of the property which it implied. Thus the age of 
plunder-colonisation' ended, at least in the nuclear areas, to 
be replaced by a more rational exploitation of the Indian 
labour force under the encomienda and repartimiento systems and 
the increase in the import of African slaves.
^k) African Slavery
African slaves were introduced into Spanish America from 
the very beginning of colonisation but they did not acquire
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numerical importance until the Indian population had substan­
tially declined, the royal regulations in protection of the 
Indians had been at least partially enforced (i.e. abolition 
of Indian slavery, limitation of Indian forced labour etc.,) 
and the mechanism of provision of African slave labour had 
been created. In this provision the state played a regulating 
role limiting or stimulating the importation of slaves to 
different colonies according to its contradictory fiscal and 
political needs. These were on the one hand the need to 
satisfy the colonists' demands for slaves, which in turn meant 
an increase in royal income through taxation of a higher 
volume of production, and on the other hand, the need to stop 
the flow of bullion to other European powers in control of 
the Atlantic slave trade. The liberalisation of the slave 
trade in the second half of the 18th century partially over­
came the contradiction. The crown renounced its short-term 
high income which was provided by the lease of quasi-monopoliStic 
rights of importation of African slaves, for a more realistic 
policy encouraging Spanish subjects to participate in the 
trade and giving foreign traders facilities not enjoyed before. 
This, plus a favourable political and economic conjuncture in 
the world economy,created favourable conditions in the 
remaining Spanish American colonies (Cuba and Puerto Rico) 
in the 19th century for the development of dynamic plantation 
economies based primarily on slave labour.
We will leave aside the characterisation of the African 
slave trade and its importance for the world economy. It is 
however important to assess the effect of this trade in relation 
to the provision of labour in the Americas and especially in
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the Spanish Indies. Despite the scarcity and unreliability 
of the statistics on the trade some provisional estimates can 
be accepted in order to appreciate the colonists' need for 
labour in the different colonies, the economic characterisation 
of each area and its evolution in terms of its dominant 
relations of production . In Table 1 we present a recent 
quantitative estimation of the Atlantic slave trade. It shows 
a relatively low participation by Spain in the trade (16%) , 
a decreasing proportional participation in the trade over the 
period prior to 1810 vis-a-vis the other European colonies, 
but at the same time a constant absolute increase in the 
numbers of slaves imported into Spanish America up until the 
19th century. The regional distribution of black slaves 
inside Spanish America is shown in Table 2. Despite the 
fragmentary character of the information presented and with 
the help of estimates of slave populations at the end of the 
colonial period, the main trends of development of African 
slavery can be discerned. Firstly, there was no homogeneity 
of development of the institution in Spanish America. Thus 
Mexico heavily relied on slave imports in the 17th century, 
however by the end of the 18th century slave imports and the 
total slave population were insignificant in the context of 
the Mexican economy. While Puerto Rico and especially Cuba, 
where slavery was secondary up until the 18th century, trans­
formed themselves into quasi-slave societies. Secondly, the 
bulk of the slave imports are concentrated in a few colonies 
(Cuba, Mexico, Venezuela, Peru, Colombia), although the 
importance of slaves as a proportion of the total labour force 
differs markedly. Finally for the cases of Peru, Venezuela
- 67 -
and Colombia the figures suggest a rapid increase of imports in 
the early 17th century but no dramatic changes thereafter.
TABLE 1 - Estimated Slave Imports into the Americas (1451-1870)
(in thousands'!*
Regions and Colonies
1451-
1600
1 6 0 1-
1700
1701-
1810
1811-
1870
TOTAL
British North America - - 348.0 51.0 399.0
Spanish America 75.0 292.5 578.6 606.0 1,552.1
British Caribbean - 263.7 1,401.3 - 1 ,665.0
Jamaica - 85.1 662.4 - 747.5
Others (Barbados,
Leeward Islands etc.) - 178.6 738.9 - 917.5
French Caribbean - 155.8 1,348.4 96.0 1 ,600.2
Saint Domingue (Haiti) - 74.6 789.7 - 864.3
Others (Martinique,
Guadaloupe, Louisiana, 
French Guiana) 81.2 558.7 96.0 735.9
Dutch Caribbean - 40.0 460.0 - 500.0
Danish Caribbean - 4.0 24.0 - 28.0
Brazil 50.0 560.0 1,891.4 1,145.4 3,646.8
Europe and Atlantic 
Is. 149.9 25.1 - - 175.0
TOTAL 274.9 1.37L.1 6,051.7 1,898.4 9,566.1
* Slightly modified from Curtin 1969: 268
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Table 2 - Estimates of black slaves imported into SpanishAmerica ^j
Colonies
TOTAL
1521-1870
:d1521-1550 1551- 1595- 1641- 1595 1640 1773 1774- (2 1807
TOTAL (3) ) up until 1807
Cuba 702,000 (C. 16 - 3,000)^ (0.17 -8,000)^ ‘119,000 132,000
Puerto Rico 77,000 14,800 20,100
Mexico 200,000 (1521/94-36,500)5(74.025)5 5,000 200,000
CentralAmerica 21,000 21,000
Venezuela
SantoDomingo
121,000
30,000
( 5,000)7(6,900)7(18,775)7
)
121,00030,000 
(24,9007)
6,000 30,000
Chile 6,000 )
(9,350)6(53.550)6 )
6,000
Peru 95,000 30,000 95,000
Colombia) Panama ) 
Ecuador ) 200,000
8 >(80,000) 200,000
La Plata Area
(Argentina, Paraguay t Uruguay, Bolivie) 100,000 (44,000)® 20,300 100,000
TOTAL 1,522,000 15,000 36,300 132,600 516,100 2 2 5 , 1 0 0 925,100
Average p.a. A.349 500 810 2,880 3,880 6,620
( + )_ Source: Curtir, 1969: see notes to this table. Additional estimates have been written in brackets and do not necessarily agree arithmetically with Curtin's estimations.
1. Curtin 1969: ¿6-7 - Curtin estimates an error of 20 per cent oneither side of this total. This total seems to be conservative, 
i n*a**e f°r instance estimates the total for the whole period as 3,000,000. Estimations of the imports to particular areas or periods made by other authorities also suggest an under-estimation. (f'^ llafe 1975: 73 and notes below).
2 . Curtin 1969: 35.
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3. This column has been calculated subtracting the slave
imports from 1808 onwards from the totals of Cuba and Puerto 
Rico (Curtin 1969: 4-0, 44) from the first column. For the
rest of the areas we have assumed a total suspension of the 
traffic. This seems to be valid for most of the new republics. 
Imports to Peru, Colombia and Argentina seem to have been 
important but we lack estimates (Rout 1977: 124.-6, 239, 249-50
261-2, 279, 186-7, 217-8, 228-9; King 1942: 56).
4. Perez 1978: 111. Moreno estimates the total slave imports
into Cuba as 1,008,376, from which 138,006 would have arrived 
in 1789 or before, 105,611 in the period 1780-1809, 761,547
in the period 1810-69 and 3,222 in 1870 and after (Moreno in 
Rubin et al (eds.) 1977: 188-9).
5. Palmer 1976: 28. The total he gives for the whole of
Spanish America is 73,000 for the period 1521-94 and 151,205 
for the period 1595-1604. Thus, according to him almost half 
(49$) of the slaves landed in Spanish America up until 1640 
would have been received by the Mexican colonists. Vila on 
the other hand, after researching the Spanish slave trade 
exhaustively during the period 1595-1640 estimates for that 
period a total importation of 268,644, but gives for Me xico 
(Veracruz) a figure similar to Palmers' (70,000) (Vila 1977:
6. Figures based on the allegedly rough estimates of Bowser. 
The first corresponds to 1555-88 and the second to 1594-1611 
and 1615-40 (Bowser 1977: 113-15).
7• _ The figures come from Brito 1963: 115-7, 134, 136-7 on
which Curtin based his estimations for Venezuela. The dis­
agreement for the years 1774-1807 derives from Curtin's assump­
tion of an increase in slave imports due to the expansion of 
the economy during the last decades of the 18th century.
8. Very rough estimates based on the dates and estimates 
provided by Vila. For the La Plata region we have accepted 
her estimation for Buenos Aires and assumed that there were no 
exports to other areas. For Colombia, Panama and pcuador, we 
have accepted her estimations of imports through the port of 
Cartagena (Colombia) of 135,000 slaves and subtracted 55,000 
for the re-exports to Peru and Chile. (Vila 1977: 197-209).
'
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TABLE 3 - Estimated slave population in the Spanish 
American colonies around 1800
Colonies Year of the estimation or census
Slave
population Totalpopulation Percentage
Cuba (1) 17741827 36,879286,942 171,620704,487 22.840.8
Puerto Rico (2) cal800 13,333 174,192 7.6
Mexico (3) eal803 10,000 5,800,000 0.2
Venezuela (4) 1800 87,800 898,043 9.7
Santo Domingo (5) 1794 30,000 100,000 30.0
Chile (6) 1790's 4,000 308,043 1.3
Peru (7) 1812 87,800 1 ,4 0 0 , 0 0 0 6.4
Colombia (8) 1779 53,788 800,000 6.7
Ecuador (9) 1800 8,000 424.037 1.9
La Plata Rerion 
Paraguay (10) 1782 3,945 97,480 4.0
Argentina (11) 1778-1810 14,850+ 400,000 -
Montevideo (12) 1803 899 4,676 18.0
SOURCES: (1 ) Knight 1970: 22
(2) Mintz 1959: 276
(3) Humboldt 1811, I: 64-5, 130(4) Brito 1973: 160(5) Rout 1977: 95: Vicene (ed) 1974, IV: 273(6) Villalobos (et al): 252-4. Total population does notinclude some 100,000 Mapuche Indians not under Spanish dominion.
(7) Rout 1977: 95: Vicens (ed) 1974, IV(8) Jaramillo 1963: 7
(9) Rout 1977: 95: Vicens (ed) IV: 27510) Rout 1977: 95: Vicens (ed) 1974. IV: 277(11) Rout 1977: 95: Vicens (ed) 1974, IV: 277 - Slave populationincludes provinces of Euenos Aires and Cordoba and the town of Mendoza only.(12) Rama 1970: 31 - At the time Montevideo had almost half the total population of Uruguay.
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These marked regional and chronological differences 
in the development of the slave system in the Indies were the 
result of a combination of factors among which we can count 
the unavailability of other sources of labour, the profita­
bility of the exploitation of certain commodities in high 
demand on the regional or world market, the capacity of the 
colonists to invest capital, the royal regulations concerning 
the slave trade, the differential prices of African slaves 
in particular regions due to difficulties of transport or the 
facilities for contraband^etc. To disentangle this complex 
set of relations and to evaluate the social and economic 
impact of the slave system we turn now to an analysis of the 
institution in those colonies in which it was quantitatively 
important. These were Hispaniola island, Mexico, Peru, Colombia, 
Venezuela and Cuba.
The concentration of Spanish settlers in the island of 
Hispaniola during the first two or three decades of coloni­
sation and the unchecked exploitation of the natives resulted 
in rapid depopulation of the Indians and therefore a scarcity 
of labour which was already acute in the mid-1510's. Black 
slaves had started their forced emigration to the island since 
at least 1 5 0 1 . However these arrivals were occasional and not 
necessarily aimed at providing the labour market with slaves for 
productive purposes. Only after 1510 with the pressure of the 
colonists, officialdom and ecclesiastics were significant 
numbers of slaves sent from Spain and later from Africa 
to supply the labour market. By 1514- the Indian population of 
the island had dwindled to a mere 30,000 while the black 
Population (c. 1 ,000) was slightly higher than the Spanish.
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At that time the basis of* the export economy of* Hispaniola 
had started to switch from gold mining to agriculture and 
by the 1520's sugar was one of the two main pillars of the 
island's economy. Despite the decreasing importance of the 
island in the expanding Spanish economy, emigration of its 
settlers to the mainland etc, the plantation economy of the 
colony, based on slave labour, saved the island from economic 
mediocrity during the 16th century. The success was however 
relative. Data from the early 1570's indicates the presence 
of some 5,000 slaves engaged in sugar production (or 34 sugar 
mills with an average of 150 slaves each) and an almost complete 
dominance of the sugar interest over the economic and political 
life of the island. But for reasons not clearly known, sugar 
production markedly declined in the mid-1 5 7 0 's and finally 
collapsed at the beginning of the 17th century after the 
depopulation of 1605-6 . ( 7)
The Spanish settlement of the Antilles was soon extended 
to the mainland. Mexico was the logical target of most of the 
colonists due to its dense population and economic potential. 
After two or three decades of colonisation New Spain was 
experiencing economic expansion and diversification. In addition 
to the indigenous agriculture, European livestock, new crops 
and productive systems were introduced, silver mining was being 
developed and the basis of a manufacturing industry was being 
laid. However, the rapid process of expropriation of the
(ail) Ramos explains this decadence of Hispaniola's sugar 
production at the end of the 1 6 th century by the effects of the 
competition of Cuban sugar and more importantly by the exclu­
sion of Hispaniola from the return voyages of the Spanish fleet. (8)
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Indian labour force which permitted this expansion together 
with the environmental and cultural changes brought about 
by the conquest, provoked a dramatic demographic collapse of 
the Indian population. Thus the original Indian population 
(estimated at 25 millions) had shrunk to a fourth of this 
figure by 154-8 (6.3 millions) and less than a twelfth (1.9 
million) by 1 5 8 0, beginning to recover only in the mid-17th 
century. The shortage of labour thus created was further aggra­
vated by royal legislation and its enforcement: elimination of 
Indian slavery, banning of the use of Indian labour in parti­
cularly heavy or unhealthy tasks (sugar mills in 1 5 U ,  1 5 5 1 ,
1590's, workshops in 1601 and 1608). As a consequence of this, 
for both colonists and royal officials, an abundant and cheap 
supply of African slaves became a panacea from as early as
d
1525 to at least the mid-17th century. The clamour for the 
provision of African slaves was especially strong in the
i
1540's after the crisis provoked by the New Laws and the 
plague of 1545 and again after the plagues of the late 1570's
t
Black slaves were introduced into Mexico with the retinues 
of the conquistadores. Later colonists and officials brought 
their black slaves with them as servants, but it is probably 
in the 1540's that African slaves began to be imported into 
the colony in significant numbers. Despite the high numbers 
involved in the trade in the early 17th century, black slaves 
were never numerically important in the context of the Mexican 
economy as a whole and never surpassed 2 per cent of the total 
Population. Moreover the geographical pattern of residence,
50% living in urban areas, mainly Mexico City, in 1570, 
suggests a high incidence of non-productive work (servants, 
bodyguards etc) or specialised labour (artisans) among them.
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Qualitatively, however, their importance was higher than their 
number suggests since they were an important source of labour 
power in some of the more dynamic sectors of the economy. In 
1570 black slaves constituted a fourth of the labour force in 
the mines and by the end of the century, 1 6 ?, and the requests 
of the miners for cheap slaves in the 1 6 3 0's suggests that they 
were still important in mining. (9)
Sugar plantations relied throughout the colonial period 
on a combination of African slaves and Indian labour (first 
slave, then repartimiento and free labour). We have quantative 
information for only one of the two or three major sugar 
enclaves in Mexico, Morelos. There the slave population working 
in the sugar mills was 300 in 1600 (or 18.8? of the labour force)
2,000 in 1700 (or 36.7?) and 1,000 in 1800 (or 10?). The data 
elaborated by Barret for the hacienda of Atlacomuleo in Morelos 
(Table 4) shows us in more detail the evolution of the labour 
force in a typical Mexican sugar plantation.
Table 4 ind'i0ates a notable increase in the participation 
of slaves in the labour force around 1600 which corresponds to 
the period during which it was difficult for the sugar planters 
to obtain Indian forced labour. As a result the hacienda had 
to buy 47 slaves between 1589-1600 and another group of 37 
was bought between 1614-23. From then onwards new acquisitions 
°f slaves were few and the hacienda had to rely on Indians for 
the supply of labour power. By 1800 only ten able-bodied 
slaves (or 4? of the labour force) remained CH the hacienda. A 
further indication of the decline of the participation of slaves 
ln suSar production in the 18th century is provided by the slave 
holding practices of the Company of Jesus. In 1645 they owned
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Table 4: Slave and Indian participation in the 
labour force in the Hacienda of Atla- 
çomulco, Morelos during the colonial 
period, (in man/days worked) (*]
Tears Slaves t Indians t White t TOTAL
1580'6 Total (5 years, 116,700 276,275 20,924 113,899
1581.1583, Average 1587-89) 23,340 28.2 55.255 66.7 4,185 5.1 82,780
Early and Total ’Bid 1590's 105,000 248,928 17,468 371.396
(5 years Average 1592-3,1595-7) 21,000 28.3 49,786 67.0 3.494 1.7 71,279
1598 27,000 34.8 47,051 60.6 3.575 4.6 77,626
1599 30,000 38.0 45,075 57.1 3.825 4.9 78,900
1600 35.400 39.2 51,016 56.6 3,810 4.2 90,226
1602 36,300 52.3 28,945 41.7 4,150 6.0 69,395
1620-4 Total 100,500 41.268 6,467 118,235
Average 20,100 67.8 8,254 27.8 1.293 1.4 29,647
1644-5 Total 20,300 59,544 2,019 81,863
Average 10,150 2 4 . 8 29,772 72.7 1,010 2.5 40.932
Last quarter of the C18th 14,400 312,211 33,279 359,890
(1779-80,1782, 1785 and 1795) 2,880 4.0 62,442 86.8 6,656 9.2 71,978
(*) Source, Barret 1977: 232-3, adapted. The years averaged are 
relatively homogeneous.
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six plantations and a total of 1 , 2 0 0  slaves, by the 1 7 6 0's 
they had only 181 slaves who were concentrated in the most 
profitable haciendas. By then cheap Indian labour power, low 
rates of reproduction of the slaves and their constant escapes, 
had transformed slavery into an unprofitable institution in 
all sectors of the economy. This was reflected in scarce new 
imports and a small slave population at the end of the colonial 
period. (1 0 )
Second only to Mexico in demographic and economic poten­
tial, Peru reproduced the Mexican model of conquest with its 
sequel of Indian depopulation and expansion of commodity 
production and Spanish capital accumulation. Black slaves 
arrived in the retinue of the Spanish conquistadores in the 
1530's and very rapidly formed a cushion between the conquered 
and the conqueror, being employed in many cases as overseers 
of Indian labour gangs. Others were employed as artisans or 
unskilled labourers, and in the urban centres, especially Lima, 
in all sorts of services. This pattern was partially altered 
in the 1570's. By this time, Indian depopulation had seriously 
affected the provision of labour power especially in the coastal 
valleys. Furthermore, administrative measures impeded the
use of the Indians of the sierra in the coastal regions and 
restricted the use of 'repartimiento' Indians of the coast to the 
few entrepreneurs connected with the Lima bureaucracy. Coastal
hnl ?he oriSinal population of c. 6,000,000 Indians in 1525 
shrunk to one and a quarter million in 1570 and continued 
, nish to under 600,000 in 1620. The coastal areas lost 
wh ‘ 1 °+ tributaries (adult males) between 1570 and 1620
• i e_the loss of tributaries in the Peruvian sierra (mountainous 
ef^or areas) was only 34-$« The disproportion of this demo- 
g aphic decline seems to have been more acute before 1570 
/^Pe°^ally in the late 1540's for which date a loss of 1,000,000 
r 90% of the total population) is estimated for the coastal areas. (1 2 )
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valleys had developed an early market economy and had already 
in the 154-0 1 s started using black slaves in their haciendas.
The high cost of importation of Negro slaves compared with 
the virtually free repartimiento Indians, who received a 
nominal wage, limited the expansion of slavery, but by the 
1570's no repartimiento Indians were available and free 
labour was extremely expensive so that coastal entrepreneurs, 
if profits permitted, had to rely even more on slave labour.(1 1 ) 
From the late 1570's onwards the demand, prices and actual 
imports of black slaves increased enormously. These imports 
must have been concentrated in the coastal valleys since an 
estimation of the labour force in three coastal valleys (Lima, 
Pisco and lea) gave a population of around 65,000 blacks (most 
of them slaves) and only 1,500 Indians subjected to labour 
drafts for the year 1600. The conditions which made possible 
the high investment represented by these slaves were the prox­
imity to the largest market in South America (Lima) and environ­
mental conditions suitable for the cultivation of highly 
profitable crops (sugar and vineyards) which were non-existent 
m  the Peruvian sierra and in most parts of the vice-royalty.
The dichotomy, coastal areas based on African labour and interior 
sierra dominated by Indian labour, grew sharper in the 17th 
century when blacks virtually disappeared from the sierra 
while Indian or mestizo labour, still necessary at harvest 
time, remained scarce and expensive on the coast. This pattern 
is clearly shown in the properties of the Jesuit Peruvian 
aciendas at the time of their expulsion (1767). Of a total 
of 5,224 slaves owned by the company, 29.8$ worked on their 
astal vineyard haciendas and 6 2.8$ on sugar haciendas of which
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14 out of 18 were on the coast. 31 of their remaining haciendas 
(or 59.6$) were on the sierra and operated mainly with Indian 
labour. The size of the slave population of eight major haciendas 
in Peru, which more than doubled between the 1670's and 1760's 
(from less than 800 to more than 2,000 slaves), and their 
reliance on purchases rather than natural reproduction of the 
slaves, suggest a continuous importation of slaves into Peru 
throughout the colonial period. The high slave population in 
Peru in the early 19th century and the resumption of the slave 
trade to Peru in the 1830's confirm the dependence of the coastal 
productive enterprises on new imports of slaves. The sierra 
which was well supplied with cheap forced or semi-free Indian 
labour, did not use slaves to any significant extent. Silver 
mining for instance, a key factor in the Peruvian economy, 
never used more than a few slave supervisors and relied mainly 
on forced labour paid at a low rate. In this case heavy invest­
ment in slaves for the sierra entrepreneurs made no economic 
sense. (1 3 )
The process of Indian depopulation of New Granada 
(present Colombia) is far less documented than that of Mexico 
and Peru, however, population estimates and regional analyses 
indicate that the native population declined from some 3 ,000,000 
at the time of contact with the Spaniards (1537) to 156,193 
at the time of the census of 1778. The stages and the degree 
°f depopulation of different areas of New Granada are unclear 
but Villamarin suggests a lower demographic decline in the 
eastern highlands (around Bogota) which was more controlled by 
the crown as compared with the Indian population in other areas 
which declined more rapidly. During the 16th century, slaves 
introduced by the colonists had little numerical significance
aX\
l
79
although they were already replacing the Indians in certain 
economic enterprises. In the 17th century the more intensive 
exploitation of mines and haciendas, the restrictions on the 
use of Indian labour dictated by the crown and the abundant 
supply of slaves through the port of Cartagena resulted in an 
expansion of slavery in New Granada. During 1595-1640 Cartagena 
received around 135,000 slaves to be distributed in New Granada 
or re-exported to Ecuador, Peru and Chile. At the end of the 
17th century, the province of Cartagena alone had 5,700 slaves, 
a figure which was probably higher than the total Indian popu­
lation of the province (5,786 in 1610-1). However, in the 
context of the whole of New Granada, its importance was still 
low. (14) It was in the 18th century that slave labour reached 
numerical significance especially in the more dynamic sectors. 
Contemporary estimates of the Colombian population in 1789 
gave a figure of some 53,000 slaves or 6.5? of the total. The 
importance of the figure is higher if we consider that over 
half of those slaves were in the western gold-mining provinces 
of the kingdom where they reached 2 1 .2? of the population and 
surpassed the size of the Indian population. Gold, mined 
almost exclusively by slave hands, constituted, in the last 
decades of the 18th century, well over half of the exports of 
New Granada, and its exploitation was a very profitable invest­
ment. Apart from mining, Colombian slaves were conspicuous on 
sugar and livestock raising haciendas in the 17th and 18th 
centuries, and these, three sectors continued to be dominated 
by slave labour up until Independence and beyond.
By the 1790's however the slave system ceased to expand, 
the importance of new slaves seems to have diminished despite 
the liberalisation of trade regulations, while manumissions
and slave escapes and rebellions became frequent. The reasons 
for the ending of the expansion of slavery are various. Studies 
of the Choco gold mines (a province with almost 6,000 slaves) 
indicate that the expansion of the number of slaves, continuous 
for almost a century up to 1782, reached an over-capitalisation 
which rendered their investments less profitable. The miners' 
response was to reduce the size of the slave gangs and increase 
their efficiency. Interestingly enough the royal measures of 
the late 1780's to cheapen slaves and expand their numbers 
increased manumissions in the Choco. Slave owners were attracted 
by the mechanism of cohartacion (self-purchase of the slaves' 
freedom). Slaves bought in the early 1780's or before were 
manumitted after the payment of 500 pesos (the price originally 
paid by the owner) while a new one would cost him only 300.
In the sugar haciendas the same freedom of commerce decree 
put the slave owners in a difficult situation. The consequent 
importation of cheap Spanish spirits shrunk to a third the 
demand for products derived from sugar cane, and only the small 
producers using their own labour force or cheap free labour 
were able to cope with the loss of demand. Last but not least, 
the Colombian ruling classes were not totally committed to the 
ideals of a slave society and economic, ideological and poli­
tical factors were creating, by the end of the 18th century, 
favourable conditions for a slow transformation of slave 
relations of production into enfeoffment or free labour.
Hacienda owners without slaves stimulated the slaves to escape 
from their owners and eventually lent them money to buy their 
manumission in order to increase their own labour force. The 
abortive Creole rebellion of the 'comuneros' in 1781 appealed 
to the black slaves, promising them freedom to gain support
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for their struggle and abolitionist ideas were slowly taking 
root among the upper strata of society, no doubt because of 
the fear of a revolution 'a la Saint Domingue' and the 
relatively scarce number of slaves in the colony. (1 5 )
We have no serious estimates of the original Indian 
population of Venezuela. By the mid 17th century there were 
some 150,000 Indians in contact with the Spaniards and some 
125»000 more in marginal areas. In 1800 the first group had 
decreased to just over 100,000 and the second to 60,000 . It 
seems that the slow pace of Spanish colonisation in Venezuela, 
covering initially coastal and western areas, prevented a 
rapid destruction of the Indian population. However, in the 
areas effectively settled by the Spaniards the demographic 
consequences were similar to those which occurred elsewhere 
in Spanish America. Thus, according to the testimonies of 
Spanish settlers, the Indian population of the valley of 
Caracas declined from between 9.000 and 30,000 to between 
4-.000 and 12,000, or on average to some ¿0$ of the original 
in the years 1567-89. The early slave raids of the Spaniards, 
the warlike character of some ethnic groups, Indian escapes 
from the territories settled by the Spaniards, and forced 
labour, account for the small size of the groups of Indians 
granted in encomiendas to the Spaniards. The difficulties of 
appropriating Indian labour power in the Venezuelan territory 
meant a heavy reliance of the colonists on slave labour. The 
key economic activities of 16th century Venezuela (pearl 
fishing and gold and copper mining) were developed to a great 
extent by African slaves. The development of cacao and tobacco 
ln fhe 17th and 18th centuries boosted the importation of
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African slaves. By the second half of the 18th century, 
however, two related processes were undermining the basis of
the slave system in Venezuela. On the one hand slave escapes 
and rebellions meant a heavy loss of capital (in labour force 
or other assets, through theft or destruction) which the slave 
holders and the state were unable to recover. Thus an esti­
mated 20,000 to 4-0,000 black maroons remained in places which 
were inaccessible to the Spaniards, committing petty thefts in 
the plantations and threatening their discipline with further 
escapes due to the contact between the slaves and the runaway 
blacks. On the other hand, the 18th century expansion of 
cacao production signified a hunger for new lands and a desire 
to gain property from the state. The composición (recognition 
of the right of property) of lands required the actual culti­
vation of the land, so the planters manumitted (in fact sold 
freedom to their slaves) on condition that they till the land 
and give the master a half or more of the production. Thus a 
process of enfeoffment of slaves was brought about as a product 
of the need of the planters to appropriate new lands and, 
partially, the result of the slaves' struggles which raised 
the average cost of maintaining slaves in the plantation. (1 6 ) 
The ethnic composition of the Venezuelan population in 
1800 (Table 5) reflects the importance of the importation of 
slaves into the colony and the effects of maronage, manumissions 
and miscegenation on the slave system. The negroid population 
constituted the absolute majority of the population of 1800 and 
this proportion is even higher (65.9?) if we consider the 
Population under Spanish rule only. Slaves were still an 
important demographic element but the percentages of maroons
J
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African slaves. By the second half of the 18th century, 
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process of enfeoffment of slaves was brought about as a product 
of the need of the planters to appropriate new lands and, 
partially, the result of the slaves' struggles which raised 
the average cost of maintaining slaves in the plantation. (16) 
The ethnic composition of the Venezuelan population in 
1800 (Table 5) reflects the importance of the importation of 
slaves into the colony and the effects of maronage, manumissions 
and miscegenation on the slave system. The negroid population 
constituted the absolute majority of the population of 1800 and 
this proportion is even higher (65-9%) if we consider the 
Population under Spanish rule only. Slaves were still an 
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TABLE 5 - Ethnic composition and legal status of the Venezuelan
population in 1800 * ' - - - -
Spaniards 
Creoles
Mulattos (Pardos)
Freedmen and
manumitted blacks
Black slaves
Black maroons
Tributary Indians
Non-tributary Indians
Indians in marginal 
areas
* Source: Brito: 160.
A
and freedmen suggest a rapid dissolution of slave relations in 
the preceding decades, for which the diminishing imports of the 
late 18th century were not compensating. Finally the high 
incidence of mulattos in the total population probably rdlects 
Ihe same tendency over a longer period combined with a process 
°f miscegenation between blacks and the other races. (Under 
Spanish law children born from a free mother were free, what­
ever the legal status of the father.) (17)
The Spanish settlement of Cuba (1511 onwards) followed for 
few decades the early pattern of Hispaniola. The original
Number Percentage
12,000 1.3
172,727 19.0
4-07,000 45,0 )
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)
j 61.3
33,362 4.0
87,800 9.7 ))
24,000 2.6
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75,564 8.4 4
25,590 3.3
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TABLE 5 - Ethnic composition and legal status of the Vfinp?npinr
population in 1800 * -----
Number Percentage
Spaniards 12,000 1.3
Creoles 172,727 19.0
Mulattos (Pardos) 4-07,000 45,0 )
Freedmen and )
*’° J 61
9.7 j 
)
2.6 )
manumitted blacks 33,362
Black slaves 87,800
Black maroons 24,000
Tributary Indians 75,564 8.4
Non-tributary Indians 25,590 3.3
Indians in marginal 
areas 60,000 6.7
* Source: Brito: 160.
and freedmen suggest a rapid dissolution of slave relations in 
the preceding decades, for which the diminishing imports of the 
late 18th century were not compensating. Finally the high 
Incidence of mulattos in the total population probably reflects 
the same tendency over a longer period combined with a process 
of miscegenation between blacks and the other races. (Under 
P ’ sh law children born from a free mother were free, what­
ever the legal status of the father.) (17)
The Spanish settlement of Cuba (1511 onwards) followed for 
a few decad"" i1-- -es the early pattern of Hispaniola. The original
- 8-4 -
population (c. 100,000 Indians) was decimated in a decade or so 
during a period of gold rush and by 1550 only some 3.000 Indians 
survived. The exhaustion of the Cuban gold deposits and the 
settlers' emigration to the richer kingdoms in the mainland 
condemned the island to economic stagnation. During the second 
half of the 16th century Cuba was rescued from absolute decay 
by economic assistance from the crown, the strategic position 
of La Habana and the raising and export of livestock. In the 
17th century the expansion of the demand for tobacco in Europe 
and the Indies stimulated its cultivation in Cuba and thousands 
of Canary islanders settled in the island with economic aid from 
the crown and engaged in small scale tobacco production. This 
immigration constituted the bulk of the imports of labour in 
Cuba in the 17th century and permitted a population growth from 
a mere 10,000 inhabitants in 1600 to 50,000 in 1700. Tobacco 
cultivation in Cuba did not go beyond the small-scale production 
level during this period and depended along with the livestock 
haciendas, basically on free labour. During these two centuries 
'pastoral' Cuba imported a few thousand African slaves who were 
concentrated in the urban areas where they were engaged in 
artisanship, domestic chores, construction works, commerce and 
other services. (18) A boost in slave imports occurred in the
second half of the 18th century when in only one year (1762) over
4.000 slaves were introduced by the British in occupied Havana, 
the crown stimulated the trade from the 1770's onwards and 
favourable political and economic conditions in the world economy 
permitted a boom of sugar and coffee production in the island, 
uring the hundred years from 1760-1860 Cuba underwent a social 
nd economic transformation which revolutionised pastoral Cuba,
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which was based on small farms and plantations and backward 
cattle haciendas, changing it into a (spurious) capitalist 
society based on slave labour. Thus the population increased 
eight-fold between 1775-1852 and sugar production almost 90 
times between 1760-1860, and mechanisation of sugar production 
and transport was quickly introduced in the first half of the 
19th century. The expansion of slave imports was no less 
dramatic, despite international pressure to stop the trade from 
1807 onwards. Slave imports reached an estimated total of 
804,003 in the period 1790-1859, being at its peak between 1835 
and 1839, with an estimated importation of 120,000 slaves/1^  
Consequently the slave population increased from 38,879 (or 22$ 
of the total population) in 1774 to 436,495 (or 43$ of the 
total) in 1841. The profound changes in the Cuban economy and 
Cuban society in the century 1760-1860 were the result of a 
variety of factors: increases in the price of sugar (at least 
during the second half of the 18th century), the influx of 
emigres from Saint Domingue, Louisiana and later Spanish America 
after independence, heavy royal expenditure in the island in the 
late 18th century, changes in trade regulations, natural 
conditions appropriate to the extensive cultivation of sugar 
cane, the development of an entrepreneurial oligarchy, the 
failure of French colonialism and sugar production in Saint 
Domingue, the switch of American commercial interests from the 
British West Indies to Cuba etc. (20)
However, the key factor in Cuban economic expansion was the 
capacity of the Cuban entrepreneurs to acquire cheap labour, or,
(v) We accept here the import estimations of Moreno. Figures 
Knight are slightly higher while Curtin's are substan­tially lower. (19)
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in 18th century Cuban conditions, slaves. Little is known about 
the Cuban slave trade during the economic take-off period of 
1760-90, when sugar production trebled and the slave population 
more than doubled. Moreno estimates that only to satisfy the 
sugar plantation needs, imports must have been in the region of
2,000 per year. The slave flood of 1762 and the successive 
concessions to the slave traders which culminated in the cedula 
(royal order) of free trade of 1789 are compatible with these 
estimations. Now the primitive technology of the Cuban sugar 
mills in 1760 permitted an enormous expansion of production 
merely by adding new slaves to the existing installations, there­
fore the sugar planter's capacity to acquire slaves (that is the 
equation between prices, credits, capital available to invest 
etc.) virtually determined the sugar output. Sugar production 
expansion continued into the 19th century and became the main 
export product (e.g. in 1855 it constituted 83$ of the value of 
the total exports) as did the expansion of slavery until the 
184.0's. From the late 1790 ' s Spanish Cubans managed to obtain 
a share of the slave trade and by the 1820's they had displaced 
foreign merchants in the slave market making profits 200 or 
300$ above their investments. The international legal restric­
tions of 1817 and 1835 brought about an enormous rise in the 
price of slaves, from an average of 300 pesos in 1800 to over
1,000 pesos in I860. By that time, however, the sugar planters 
were well on the way to replacing African slave labour by legal 
indentured servants brought from China and elsewhere. Between 
1848 and 1874- over 120,000 Chinese indentured servants were 
imported into Cuba. Although the conditions of work and the 
high mortality rate in crossing the Pacific ocean were similar 
to those suffered by the black slaves, the indentured servant, in
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theory under a contract of limited length, and receiving a wage, 
eased the transition to a free-labour system. Moreover, 
mechanisation of the processing and transport of sugar cane rele­
gated slave labour to the unskilled tasks of the cane fields, 
leaving the now specialised tasks of processing and transporting 
the sugar cane to free or indentured workers. Thus when Spain 
passed legislation drastically punishing slave traders in 1866 
and abolishing slavery in 1880, allowing the owners eight years 
of patronage, it produced no major commotion among the Cuban 
ruling classes since the second measure only affected 100,000 
slaves or 1% of the population.(21).
One major result of the sugar and commercial revolution 
between 1760-1860 was the radical change in the slave system 
itself. Urban slavery, characterised by a certain degree of 
patriarchy, better treatment, participation in monetary profits, 
access to law courts, opportunities for manumissions etc., which 
was still numerically more important than rural slavery until 
c. 1830, lost its importance and was reduced by the late 1850's 
to a mere 17-19?. Furthermore, rural slavery became increasingly 
dominated by the sugar plantation especially after the 18^0's,and 
by the late 1860's nearly 50 per cent of all the slaves in the 
colony worked on sugar estates. The working conditions in 
these plantations in the 19th century were appalling. Slaves 
worked between 17 and 20 hours per day all the week through and 
had a death rate of over 6% per annum, high morbidity and rate 
°f accidents, sexual imbalance of the population since women were 
considered bad workers, etc. In contrast, in coffee plantations, 
which before their decline in the 1840's employed as many slaves 
as the sugar plantations, conditions were better for the slaves,
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tasks were not arduous, women were employed along with males, 
and the slaves were used to cultivate other crops so providing 
their own food. This progressive deterioration of the working 
conditions of the slaves was also reflected in the legislation. 
The Slave Code of 184.2 represented a less liberal attitude 
, towards slaves compared with the 1789 laws, emphasising discip­
line, restriction of the movement of slaves etc. Thus the 
sugar revolution of the 19th century which depended on a con­
stant import of slaves, stamped out in a few decades the semi- 
patriarchal character of Cuban slavery which had been predominant 
until the mid 18th century, transforming it into a 'calculated 
and calculating' system which aimed to accumulate capital at 
an increasing rate and provide favourable conditions for sugar 
production in the world economy. (22)
The preceding analysis indicates a correlation between the 
decrease in the original populations and the import of African 
slaves to replace a dwindling labour force. However, the 
correlation is relative. Geographical, economic and political 
conditions imposed limitations on the number of Africans that 
the colonists were able to count on at different times. Apart 
from the limitations imposed by international trade itself, 
internal conditions in the colonies prevented or stimulated the 
consolidation of the slave system. They can be reduced to 
three main factors which we will analyse briefly in the following 
pages: 1. Profitability and local capacity of capital invest- 
ment, 2. slave resistance and political conflict among the 
ruling classes or colonial powers, and 3. the legal framework.
i* Leaving aside the domestic slaves,bought or acquired by 
civil and religious officials or rich colonists,and slave
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artisans, which in small numbers provided help for other 
artisans or a secure rent (through the hiring out of the 
slaves) to modest colonists, a sizeable number of African 
slaves were found in Spanish America. This occurred when, 
in the absense of cheap Indian labour (whatever its legal 
status), particular economic activities rendered profitable 
the investment of capital in slaves and this capital was 
available ^ V1^. Thus Mexico and Peru, the richest colonies
of Spain, received well over half of all the imports of slaves 
to Spanish America in the late 16th and early 17th centuries, 
although the need for labour was higher in Central America,
Chile and probably elsewhere in the Indies. On the contrary 
by the 18th century, New Spain, by then the richest colony of 
Spain, managed virtually to do without slave imports, and the 
number of slaves diminished to an insignificant proportion of 
the labour force due to the plantiful supply of cheap Indian 
labour, a product of the demographic expansion of the Indian 
population in the late 17th and 18th century. In Cuba the 
early extinction of the Indian population, a favourable economic 
and political conjuncture in the world market, the availability 
of capital obtained through heavy royal expenditure in the 
island and favourable trade legislation made the expansion of 
slavery in the sugar and coffee plantations indispensable.
In Colombia the slave population in the 18th century was 
concentrated in the gold producing districts where high returns
?he importance of capital formation in the expansion of 
® p av? system has been pointed out by Kiehrer, MacLeod 
n Goveia for Central America and the West Indies 6 in a wider 
- t - t  by Patterson. It is not a coincidence then that the 
urch, with an enormous capacity for capital investment was at 
+ue time the major slave holder in Spanish America up until
the 18th century .(23)
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permitted capital accumulation which was superior to the 
rest of the kingdom. Finally, in Venezuela the proximity to 
the Dutch colonies of Curacao and Bonaire permitted, from the 
17th century, a profitable barter of local production (salt, 
tobacco, hides and cacao) for the much needed black slaves 
and manufactured goods., avoiding through contraband, the 
taxes on both imports and exports. The unusual inter-colonial 
trade between Mexico and Venezuela, which was a product of the 
expansion of cacao production, permitted the latter to obtain, 
during the late 17th and 18th centuries, an important share of 
the Mexican silver, which in turn enhanced the capacity of the 
Venezuelan colonists to participate in the slave trade. (24)
The profitability of Spanish colonial enterprises derived 
basically from the interaction of three main factors: the 
cost of labour, the value of the products, and the value of 
the means of production (lands, tools, installations etc).
The initial appropriation by the Spaniards of a plentiful 
labour force (without compensdion or for a nominal wage) 
made the African slave into a luxury item very rarely used 
directly in material production. V^11  ^ The decline or dis­
appearance of the Indian population rendered labour power 
scarce and expensive and then slave labour became an alter­
native despite its high price, depreciation, maintenance 
costs, etc. We have only two estimations of slave profita­
bility in Spanish America. Sharp has calculated the net
(vii) Exceptions during the early period of colonisation 
provided by the small gangs of slaves working in the 
placers throughout Spanish America, the incorporation 
° blacks as supervisors of production which was carried 
t by gangs of Indians, and finally the training and use 
expert artisans whose value increased with their skills.
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profitability of the total investments (around 75# in 
slaves) in gold mining in the Colombian Choco in the 18th 
century to be an average of 15.8# per annum. The range of 
variation for the five years considered (1724., 1779, 1778,
1782 and 1804) was 5.2# to 34.3# which compares favourably 
with the usual lending rates in 18th century Colombia (5#).
The second case is that of the Jesuit haciendas of coastal 
Peru. Cushner explains the financial recovery of the Company 
in Peru from mid-17th century to early 18th century by the 
acquisition, through loans at 5# interest, of its coastal 
haciendas. Macera has calculated the gr o ss profit of nine of 
these coastal haciendas in the 1760*s (8 sugar plantations 
and one vineyard farm) and they fall within a range of 24.6 
to 64.9i .  Our own estimate of the net returns of 4 of these 
haciendas during the 18th century falls within a range varying 
from 4.0 to 14.4# (see Appendix 3, cases 32-35). (25)
2. Slave resistance (26) and political conflicts among the 
ruling classes or imperial powers throughout the colonial period 
From the beginnings of colonisation, slave holders in 
Spanish America were faced with slave resistance in the form 
of petty crimes and temporary escapes, rebellions in the places 
of work and, eventually, the constitution of independent 
villages of maroons outside the control of, and in conflict with, 
the colonial order. The fear of slave uprisings and the need to 
submit the black population to a rigid discipline brought 
about several regulations imposed either centrally or locally. 
One of the first devices to diminish slave resistance was to 
balance the ratio of males and females in the colonies. After 
the complaints about the rebelliousness of the slaves of
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Hispaniola in 1514-, the crown decided to stop sending 
male slaves to the colonies. Later a ratio between the sexes 
of 50:50 was established for the importation of slaves into 
the Indies and in 1528 it was definitely established that at 
least a third should be female slaves. The rationale behind 
the measure was to alleviate the tensions of the slave popu­
lation through the constitution of slave families which would 
result in social conformity and, incidentally, the reproduction 
of the labour force of the colonies. A short-lived measure 
(1526-8) forbade the imports of slaves from Spain, since they 
were supposed to be more prone to disobedience. Later other 
categories of slaves were banned under the same suspicion, the 
Wolofs in 1532 and the mulattos in 1543, and at the same time 
the crown commanded that the black population should not exceed 
a third of the Spanish population. Apart from these measures, 
such as the role of the church in socialisation (see Chapter 
10), measures limiting the power of the slave holders (see 
below) and the regulation of major conflicts involving slaves, 
the colonial state dealt with slave resistance through rep­
ressive apparatuses, and legislation.(27)
Local government, very early during the colonial period, 
legislated against slave resistance and established harsh 
penalties. The punishments varied according to the gravity of 
the offence and included lashes, mutilation, torture and 
death. During the 1570's the legislation against slave resistance 
was semi-codified for the whole of the Indies and finally 
included in the code of 1680. For runaway slaves the code 
demanded a punishment varying between 50 and 200 lashes according 
to the time absent from their place of work, the death penalty
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in the case of absences longer than six months which were 
aggravated by other offences, and extreme penalties in the 
case of robbery, murder or rape. In New Spain and Peru, and 
probably elsewhere in the Indies local legislation imposed 
severe limitations on the movements of slaves (curfews, pro­
hibition of the use of horses) and prohibited the carrying of 
arms. Slave holders and the state dealt with runaways through 
control and punishment in the work place and through the 
normal means of suppressing social deviance, the police and 
eventually the army. However the extent of the escapes in 
certain places created the need to organise special bodies 
to capture and return runaways to their owners. In Mexico,
Peru and Cuba, holy brotherhoods were created for this purpose 
and were financed through a tax on the slave-holders. Although 
they had a nucleus of specialised slave hunters, the efficiency 
of these institutions does not seem to have been great and 
eventually groups of freelance slave hunters came into 
operation.(28)
Slave resistance took the form of petty crime and 
temporary escapes, long-term escapes, mass rebellions and 
finaJly the constitution of independent villages or palenques 
out of the control of both the state and the slave owners, 
which posed the threat of further escapes by the slaves of 
the plantations who were attracted by the possibilities of 
freedom given by the palenque to the slave runaways, the 
assaults on Spanish haciendas etc. Obviously there was a con­
tinuity between, these forms of resistance. Slaves in revolt, 
after being partially crushed by the superiority of Spanish 
arms, found refuge in isolated areas which were inaccessible
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to the Spanish troops and established sometimes sizeable 
maroon communities. These isolated palenques protected by 
natural defenses, palisades (hence the word palenque), systems 
of security, counter-attack and escape, permitted many such 
communities, enlarged by new runaways or even free blacks, to 
exist for long periods of time and eventually to be recognised 
by the colonial state. Slave rebellions and rebellion plots 
differed markedly in scope and aim. While some aimed at elimi­
nating Spanish rule altogether, others merely aimed at getting 
better conditions of work (better feeding, more resting hours, 
etc), although most of them were designed to provide a chance 
of gaining freedom. In every case the colonial state reacted 
by smashing the revolt and, if possible, killing the leaders, 
capturing the runaways and bringing the survivors back to the 
old conditions of work. Maroon communities proved to be more 
difficult to deal. with. Two examples of such palenques and 
the attitudes of the state and the colonists towards them casts 
light over a situation which was general in several regions of 
Spanish colonial America.
(i) Maroon communities around Cartagena (Colombia) in the 
17th century.
In about 160Q, some 30 slaves revolted, ran away and 
settled south of Cartagena. Abducting and attracting slaves 
from nearby plantations and assaulting farms and ranches, they 
managed to subsist and repel Spanish attacks until 1619 when 
peace was achieved and the maroons were declared free because 
°f the impossibility of reducing them, and the high costs of 
the campaigns. Not all the maroons accepted the truce, and 
escapes from the haciendas continued. By 1680 Cartagena was
surrounded by eight palenques, half of them with an estimated 
population of 200 blacks each. These communities subsisted by 
means of land cultivation, gold mining and its barter and 
robbery. Its members were runaways from Cartagena's haciendas 
and the mere existence of the palenques instigated a relaxation 
of the discipline inside the production units, since slaves 
threatened the slave holders with escape if conditions of 
work deteriorated. During the 1680's unsuccessful armed 
expeditions were sent to the maroon villages to destroy them 
or negotiate a treaty which included the devolution of the 
slaves recently es.caped and freedom for the rest. At the same 
time, a priest negotiated a peace treaty with the maroons 
which offered more favourable terms, including freedom for 
all the maroons and their descendants and the concession of 
lands to cultivate. The maroons for their part were to give 
back runaway slaves who had escaped after the signing of the 
treaty, to obey royal authority and to pay tributes. After 
lobbying at court he obtained in 1691 a royal order accepting 
the conditions of peace negotiated with the maroons. Cartagena's 
slavocracy however ,did not give up their rights to the runaway 
slaves and imposed the decision to totally destroy the 
palenques on the local government notwithstanding the royal 
order. Thus during 1693-4- all the eight communities were 
destroyed, their members killed, re-enslaved or disbanded by 
the governor and Spanish colonists. The problems for the 
Cartagena slave holders did not stop .there, since again in 
1713-7, the local government was negotiating with maroon 
communities located in the same area as the villages which had 
been destroyed in the 1690's. This time, bishop-governor
- 96 -
Casiani signed a treaty similar to the one negotiated in the 
l690's which was observed to the letter thereafter.(29)
(ii) The Mandinga-Amapa Maroon community (Mexico): sugar 
and tobacco plantations in southern Veracruz were shaken by 
five major slave revolts from 1725 to 1768. The second one in 
1735 gave rise to several palenques in the area, one of them was 
Mandinga. Links with the local population (both whites and 
blacks) provided them with information about slave hunting 
expeditions and the means to develop some trade. Influential 
whites used the maroons to intimidate sectors of the population 
for their own interests (one of them being to dispossess Indian 
communities of their lands), and in 1762 the maroons obtained 
a short-lived decree of freedom from the Viceroy after volun­
teering to defend, the port of Veracruz from the English threat. 
In the interim five.different expeditions (1748-59) had tried 
unsuccessfully to reduce them to slavery, the population had 
grown due to natural reproduction and new runaways, robberies 
against the Spanish haciendas continued and agriculture in 
the village improved. By the 1760's two factions had developed 
inside the community. The old maroons and their families who 
were in favour of negotiation with the Spaniards and the 
legalisation of their precarious freedom, and newly arrived 
runaways who were mostly single males or men with their 
families still in bondage and who were in favour of continuing 
the hostilities with,the Spanish state and were unprepared to 
negotiate. Open war broke out among the factions and after 
defeating the 'radicals' the moderate faction handed over their 
ex-partners to the Spaniards and accepted a peace treaty with
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them in 1769. This included freedom for all the villagers 
and their descendants (the rebels excluded), the concession 
of lands, the subjection of the community to royal authorities 
and the promise to periodically carry out searches for runa­
way slaves who were to be handed to the authorities. There­
after, both sides honoured the treaty and the ex-maroons were 
integrated into Mexican society. (30)
These two cases, show the degree of ambivalence displayed 
by the colonial order and slaves alike towards slavery and 
emancipation. The Spanish colonial ruling classes were not 
always united in the pursuit of the 'ideals' of a slave society 
(no limitation on the slave holders' rights over their 
chattels, total segregation etc). This was natural enough, 
since the slave population was a small fraction of the labour 
force and correspondingly slavocracy was not strong enough to 
impose its class interests over the whole society. The case of 
Cartagena in the 1 6 9 0's is atypical, since slaves at the ip
time probably constituted over half of the total labour
force (see above). Yet even in this case compromises were made
with the maroon communities in the early 17th and 18th centuries.
On the side of the slaves and ex-slaves, the pursuit of freedom 
was limited to the level of the individual and his/her kin- 
ship groups and it seems that only in the cases of slaves 
recently arrived from Africa did a sense of ethnicity with a 
revolutionary character develop. (31) As in the case of 
Mandinga and the palenques of Cartagena, several maroon commu­
nities became settled.under Spanish rule after promising to 
hand over runaways to the authorities. In many cases the 
Spanish state solved the conflict of interests created by
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the palenques by protecting the general interests of the
slave holders but sacrificing their immediate interests
through the transformation of the maroons into slaves themselves.
International wars and political conflicts among the 
ruling classes encouraged slave resistance by creating 
favourable conditions for rebellion or escape or by providing 
resourceful allies in their struggle against the slave owners. 
Slave rebellions occurred in Lima, Havana and Buenos Aires 
in 1578, 1726 and 1806 when the British attacked, threatened 
or occupied these cities, and local black slaves helped in 
the 1538 looting of Havana by the French troops. Some 1,500 
slaves, abandoned by their Spanish masters in Jamaica in 
1655, fought alternately with the Spanish guerrillas or with 
the British invaders and retained for decades their inde­
pendence from both as separate communities. The rebellion of 
the free zambo Andresote in the 1730's, who had the support 
of a large band of negroid freedmen and runaways in Venezuela, 
had the financial backing of the Dutch of Curacao and initially 
the support of many creole planters. On the other hand, Indian- 
black alliances had no political relevance in the period 
under study. Both ethnic groups occasionally worked out mutu­
ally beneficial relations, miscegenated and eventually resisted 
Spanish domination for decades on the coasts of Ecuador and 
Honduras, the latter with the help of the British. But under 
Spanish rule, blacks and Indians excluded each other from 
their uprisings and the state used them both to repress and 
exploit each other. Thus, while the black .maroon was chased 
by Indian and white troops (and sometimes black slaves!),
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during the Indian rebellions the slave had to side with 
his master.
The major slave upheaval in the Americas was the 
Saint Domingue (Haiti) revolution of 1789-1803 which totally 
eliminated the colonial power and its main consequence, 
slavery, from the rich colony. The differences between Haiti 
and Spanish America around 1790 do not need to be emphasised. 
While in the former colony slaves totalled almost half a 
million and the French a mere 30,000, cushioned by a minority 
of free negroids, none of the Spanish colonies had a slave 
population above k5% of the total population. Furthermore, 
the French revolution weakened the unity of the planters and 
the colonial state and spurred on the instincts of the black 
masses for freedom with,its egalitarian ideology. At the 
same time a long international confrontation in Europe and 
elsewhere prevented a military restoration of the colonial 
order. During this long period the slave masses grew ideo­
logically and militarily, learned at a high cost the treach­
erous character of the colonial powers, forged the unity of 
slaves and free negroids and successfully eliminated coloni­
alism and slavery. These conditions did not occur in colonial 
Spanish America. Only in a few cases did the slave population 
surpass the Spanish population and this was during early 
colonisation and in Cuba in the 18^0's. In the former 
cases their numbers.were limited and the possibility of 
subsistence was reduced to primitive and isolated maroon 
villages which were always liable to be destroyed by the 
superiority of Spanish arms. In mid-19th century Cuba, the 
commercial and agricultural prosperity of the island prevented 
ny raaJor confrontation among the ruling classes up until 
the late 1860's and by then the slave population had dwindled
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to well below the number of whites. Furthermore, throughout 
the period the majority of the slave population lived under 
conditions similar to modern concentration camps, and escapes 
and revolts were prevented by means of the total seclusion of 
the slaves and high security measures. (3 3)
The Spanish American wars of independence presented, in 
certain cases, opportunities for escape, rebellions and manu­
missions, and in the long-run accelerated the dissolution of 
the system. Apart from fairly effectively stopping the slave 
trade and half-heartedly legislating against slavery itself, 
some independence movements in continental America acted as a 
dissolver of slavery by recruiting slaves for their armies.
In the 1810's Argentinian and Chilean rebel governments and the 
Uruguayan guerrillas enlisted slaves in thousands to enlarge 
their armies under the promise of immediate or future emancipa­
tion. On the contrary, in Venezuela, the slave and colour 
issues were initially agitated around by the royalists. They 
effectively recruited coloured freedmen to fight their exploiters, 
the hacienda owners, who constituted the core of the independence 
movements, and eventually declared the slaves belonging to the 
patriots to be free. After serious defeats, the creole leader­
ship realised that the negroid masses represented an important 
military force, and, prejudices apart, promised lands to the 
predominantly mulatto llaneros (cowboys) and freedom to the 
slaves volunteering in the rebel armies. However, as in the 
case of the abortive Cuban independence movement of 1868-78, an 
enthusiastic response from the slaves was not forthcoming. In 
both cases, the initial hesitation of the creole leadership to 
ally with the slaves alienated the latter from participation in 
the confrontation. The Spanish forces, for their part,
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further weakened this possibility by making overtures towards 
emancipation- (3 4).
3. The Legal Framework. Much of the legislation in force in 
the Indies derived from Castilian law, although with the 
progress of colonisation specific measures applying only to 
the colonies became more important. In relation to slavery, 
the 1 3 th century Castilian code (las siete Partidas) in force 
at the time of the conquest created several restrictions on 
the property rights of the slave owner. Assassination and 
castration of the slave by the owners were severely punished, 
slaves could marry without the consent of their owners and, 
if they belonged to different masters, they had to be sold 
in order to have a common owner to ensure family life. Manu­
mission was recognised in two forms, by the owner's own will 
or by the state when the slave had performed a service to the 
state or his master. Abuses of the slave (excessive punishment, 
castration etc) entailed the freedom of the slave or the forced 
change of master, and other dispositions provided further 
avenues for slave manumission (marrying his/her owner, 
inheritance of part of his/her owner's property etc) and 
some recognition was given to the slave's right to own property.
Sixteenth and 17th century legislation in the Indies 
dealt basically with repressive measures against maroons (see 
above), against abuses of the Indians by black people (free 
°r slave) and the Christianisation of the slaves, but the 
basic principles of the Castilian code were retained with only 
ninor changes, e.g., the slave's right to own property was 
fully recognised, but marriage to a free person did not 
entail his/her manumission. The slave code of 1789 reiterated
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the need for religious indoctrination of the slaves, protection 
of the family etc* The importance of the code, however, rests 
in the standards of physical and social welfare that its 
enforcement ensured for the slaves of the Indies. Its measures 
included the reduction of the working day to daylight with a 
break of two hours at midday, exemption from full field labour 
for women, the very old and the very young, proper feeding 
and clothing, respect of festival days, establishing of a 
protector of the slaves (legal representative), reduction of 
punishment to a maximum of 25 lashes etc. As in all cases of 
radical royal legislation, the protest of the interested 
parties was immediate and the code was at least temporarily 
suspended in 1794-. Finally, in the heyday of slavery in the 
remaining Spanish colonies, Spanish legislation hardened the 
conditions of exploitation of the slaves (and incidentally 
the free non-propertied classes) as a recognition of the 
importance of the plantation economy in Cuba and Puerto Rico, 
although it retained the rights of manumission and the pro­
tectorship. (36)
More important than the formal rights of slaves as 
reflected in the codes is the actual enforcement of these 
rights and the actual conditions of work and life experienced 
by the slaves
(viii) The excessive or absolute reliance of some writers 
on formal law (Tannenbaum, Elkins and in a modified way Klein)
II em "^° spurious comparisons between Hispanic slavery and 
orthern European colonial systems. Such comparisons emphasise 
he acceptance and encouragement by the Iberian church and 
government of the enforcement of slave rights such as religious 
ha family life, manumission etc. As shown below, these rights 
were purely theoretical for certain categories of slaves in 
panish America. In fact these broad generalisations overlook 
e size and productive functions of the slave population in
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(footnote (viii) continued)
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K r o n e n ?  11*e'al' appfoa^  to it, although t L
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eSonLy I n The development of a dominant plantation 
a hardenIri the ?panlsh colonies in the 18th century led to 
mention tlg °f ,th® legislation concerning slaves, not to 
the Dlantfl+*actaal conditions of the slaves themselves. Had 
whole econnm°n ®C?u°my developed earlier and dominated the life ®c+oaomy 0f the^ colonies the legal framework ruling the 
brutal li 8 slaYes might have developed along the harsh, 
masters ine?uWhl?i? Soverne<i the behaviour of slaves andn the other 18th century plantation societies. (37)
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In the following pages we will deal with the conditions 
which most directly weakened or reinforced the slave system, 
manumission (and self purchase), treatment of slaves and 
family life.
In the present state of research on slavery in Spanish 
America, there is no way of estimating the proportion of 
slaves manumitted in a particular period in relation to the 
total slave population in the Spanish colonies. A clue to 
its importance, however, is provided by the proportion of 
free coloured population to the total negroid population 
(over 50$ for most colonies at any particular period). However, 
the first category included not only manumitted slaves and their 
descendants, but also the kin of black slaves and free families 
and maroons and their descendants which makes the relation 
spurious. Nevertheless, some characteristics of the process 
of manumission are known for at least some areas and this 
permits some generalisations. (38)
Manumission was basically an urban phenomenon. The access 
of the slaves to a money economy, knowledge of the avenues 
of emancipation, proximity to the Spanish courts, personal 
contact with their masters, etc, permitted the resourceful 
slave eventually to obtain freedom after litigation, hard 
work or a stroke of good luck. In probably two out of three 
cases the manumission of the slave involved payment of the 
price of the slave to the master, either by the slave him/ 
herself or a third party (usually a relative), or the promise 
of future service for the master or his/her family. Finally, 
the institutionalisation of the practice of self-purchase in 
the 17th and 18th centuries and evidence from some Spanish
American areas indicates that manumission was, for some 
categories of slaves (urban artisans, servants etc) a real 
possibility by the end of the colonial period.
Slave treatment and the possibilities for enjoyment of 
family life depended on the characteristics of the owners and 
the type of work which they were forced to do. Thus, the 
Company of Jesus had a reputation, validated at least by the 
orders given by the superiors to the managers of their 
haciendas, of treating the slaves well (proper food, clothing 
and health care, limited punishment and encouragement of 
family life) while in general the welfare of the slaves was 
considerably lower in rural areas than in the urban areas. 
Historical evidence shows that the state (local government and 
church) acted favourably to the slave when confronted with 
obvious contraventions of the law by the masters, but took 
no active steps to enforce the law through periodic inspections, 
encouragement of the slaves to denounce abuses etc. Slave 
treatment and family life were crucial factors in the bio­
logical reproduction of the slaves and therefore should be 
taken into account as a factor of the expansion or dissolution 
of slave relations of production. Rural enterprises, especially 
big plantations, failed to reproduce their slave labour force 
and had to rely on slave imports to maintain or enlarge it.
Among the reasons for this decrease of the slave population 
are overwork, dietary deficiencies, work and punishment during 
periods of pregnancy and above all the sexual imbalance of 
the slave population. Thus, even in the 18th century Jesuit 
Peruvian haciendas which provided adequate food, clothing, 
health care and stimulated family life, slave deaths, equalled
105
American areas indicates that manumission was, for some 
categories of slaves (urban artisans, servants etc) a real 
possibility by the end of the colonial period.
Slave treatment and the possibilities for enjoyment of 
family life depended on the characteristics of the owners and 
the type of work which they were forced to do. Thus, the 
Company of Jesus had a reputation, validated at least by the 
orders given by the superiors to the managers of their 
haciendas, of treating the slaves well (proper food, clothing 
and health care, limited punishment and encouragement of 
family life) while in general the welfare of the slaves was 
considerably lower in rural areas than in the urban areas. 
Historical evidence shows that the state (local government and 
church) acted favourably to the slave when confronted with 
obvious contraventions of the law by the masters, but took 
no active steps to enforce the law through periodic inspections, 
encouragement of the slaves to denounce abuses etc. Slave 
treatment and family life were crucial factors in the bio­
logical reproduction of the slaves and therefore should be 
taken into account as a factor of the expansion or dissolution 
of slave relations of production. Rural enterprises, especially 
big plantations, failed to reproduce their slave labour force 
and had to rely on slave imports to maintain or enlarge it.
Among the reasons for this decrease of the slave population 
are overwork, dietary deficiencies, work and punishment during 
periods of pregnancy and above all the sexual imbalance of 
the slave population. Thus, even in the 18th century Jesuit 
Peruvian haciendas which provided adequate food, clothing, 
health care and stimulated family life, slave deaths, equalled
106
slave births, and since infant mortality (0-6 year old 
children) accounted for some 40$ of the total mortality 
they had to rely on new purchases. In this case the more 
even male/female ratio was counter-balanced by the scarcity 
of women of child-bearing age. The situation seems to have 
been worse elsewhere in rural Spanish America. Bowser, in a 
sample of slaves owned by rural enterprises in Peru up until 
1650, found over 80$ males and less than 5$ of children 
below the age of eight, a situation which contrasts with the 
sexual parity in Peruvian urban areas. For Mexico Barret's 
analysis of slave labour in the sugar hacienda of Atlacomulco 
between 1535-1800 indicates that the average active life of 
a slave was between 10 and 20 years in different periods, and 
that only half of the slaves used in the haciendas in these 
three centuries were born in the hacienda while the rest 
were purchased at different times. A slightly better situation 
occurred in the sugar hacienda of Xochimancas which belonged 
tothe Jesuits. From 1660 to 1674 the slave population, despite 
parity of the sexes in 1660 and a high proportion of children, 
failed to replace the labour force in 1674 which in fact 
declined by 33$. As we have seen above, 19th century sugar 
plantations were the Spanish epitome of these trends. The 
vidence of the incapacity of the rural slave population to 
reproduce naturally is not conclusive, though, and needs 
qualification and further research. The slave populations of 
he gold placers of the Colombian Choco and some Jesuit cattle 
haciendas in Cordoba (Argentina) exhibited natural reproduction 
the second half of tie 18th century and the same is true 
for some tobacco farms in 18th century Cordoba (Mexico). In
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the case of the Cordoba Jesuit haciendas it seems that the 
purpose was to breed slaves for their other haciendas, but 
for the other two cases, the reasons for what seems to be 
an anomaly remain obscure. (39)
The development and decline of slavery in Spanish 
America was conditioned by a set of political factors which 
stimulated or retarded its expansion. The decline or extinc­
tion of the Indian labour force created, especially in certain 
geographical areas and economic sectors, a high demand for 
and importation of African slaves. The only barrier this 
faced was the incapacity of the Spanish crown to organise the 
trade efficiently and make their fiscal interest and the 
colonists' needs for slave labour compatible. During the 
period of union of the Portuguese and Spanish crowns (late 
17th century to I64.O) this contradiction was partially super­
seded and consequently the trade increased. But it was only 
in the last decades of the 18th century and the 1 9 th century 
that the Spanish slave trade reached a size comparable to
imports of the French, British and Portuguese American 
colonies.
Slavery was in Spanish America a diverse and changing 
institution. A crucial distinction to be made in order to 
characterise slavery in the Indies is that between productive 
and non-productive slavery and, in the former category, between 
small and large scale production. Although statistical series 
are lacking, the predominance of urban dwellers among the 
slave population of Mexico and Peru up to the 1570's and in
UP until the early 19th century suggests that a high 
Proportion of Spanish American slaves developed non-productive
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activities (domestic chores, acting as body-guards and other
services) or were engaged in small scale production (artisans,
construction and manufacturing workers etc). This predominance
of urban settlement amongst the slave population seems to
have changed by the end of the 1 6 th century with more emphasis
on rural production, and for mid-l9th century Cuba statistics
show not only a predominance of rural slavery but also a
concentration of the slaves in big sugar mills, while in
18th century Venezuela and Colombia the majority of the slave
population was engaged in the production of minerals, cacao,
sugar and other crops. Parallel to this urban/rural change
there seems to have been a double process of concentration
of the slave population into large scale production units,
as in 19th century Cuba and Puerto Rico and 18th century
Peru, and of dissolution into servile relations, as in
Venezuela, Colombia and Mexico. The political events of 1808-
25 reinforced these trends. The ruling classes of the faithful
colonies (Cuba and Puerto Rico) profited from a continuation
of the slave trade up until the 1860's and from legal slavery
until its progressive abolition in the 1880's. On the other
hand, the independent new republics more or less successfully
stopped the slave trade, and in most of them 'free womb' laws
had been enacted by 1825 although effective freedom was
restricted by laws of patronage. Abolition was decreed in the 
1 f t  o  n  i  •s in all those countries with a small slave population 
(Chile, Mexico, Central America), but where the slave holders' 
terests were a significant economic and therefore political 
rce (Venezuela, Colombia, Peru, Argentina) slavery remained 
legal until the 1 8 5 0's.
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Given the incapacity of the slave population to 
reproduce naturally, the suppression of the slave trade 
in the first decades of the l9th century in continental 
Spanish America and in mid-l9th century in Cuba and Puerto 
Rico, condemned slavery to a natural but slow death which 
was accelerated in certain areas by legislation, conscription 
for the rebel armies and opportunities for maroonage. However, 
the slave system managed to persist longer in those economic 
sectors where profitability allowed the purchase of new 
slaves internally, despite the high prices. Thus, the concen­
tration of slaves in sugar production in Cuba and Puerto 
Rico and in the gold placers of Colombia, and the imports 
of African slaves from Colombia and Ecuador to coastal Peru, 
permitted the persistence of important slave enclaves as late 
the 1850 s in continental Spanish America and the 1870's 
in the Spanish colonies.
Finally, where the economic conditions for slavery (high 
P ofitability of the exploitation of certain products and the 
lack of cheap labour in the regions concerned) persisted but 
the political conditions did not (international treaties 
ning the African slave trade and its enforcement), the 
slavocracy resorted to the Chinese indentured servant, as in 
the case of the Cuban sugar mills and coastal Peru <'1X  ^ or 
the compulsion of the whole non-proprietary classes to work in 
the plantations, as in Puerto Rico. (¿1)
mated at over 8/ “red servants to coastal Peru are esti
in which S l a v * ’ 000 f?rn^hf Pei'lod 1850-74, precisely at a time
120,000 or mn ^ yn ^ S abollshed (1855). According to Perez the 
°f the °r? Chinese servants imported into Cuba made up 50$
and after thfltf?r+e d« J cii in the sugar industry between 1853-7 
indentured sPTMrfa+6 ’ DesPite bhe different legal status of
indicate i7nr.urVarij • flgur?s relating to the Chinese servants 
black si °rV ? n?itions similar or worse than those of the 
imbala S raoriali'ty and suicide rates, extreme sexual
nee of the population, widespread maroonage etc). (40)
(c) The encomienda system
The encomienda (literally commendation) of Indians was the 
most important mechanism of appropriation of Indian surplus in 
16th century Spanish America. Although there were clear legal 
precedents in Spain, where the encomienda holder (or encomendero 
had civil and criminal jurisdiction and received feudal rents 
from certain territories, the institution had a different 
development in the expanding Spanish dominions. The en­
comienda was born out of the need for the colonists of 
Hispaniola to control the Indian labour force, which until 
then had been only submitted to royal tributes and the informal 
exactions of the Spaniards. The colonists' rebellion of 14-97- 
99 imposed acceptance of the allocation of Indian villages to 
particular settlers,who were entitled to force the Indians to 
work for them,on the representative of the crown (the Adelantado 
Colombus) . The crown did not immediately recognise the 
arrangement and only in 1503 gave legal form to a modified 
procedure. The principle of Indian forced labour (they were 
legally free) was recognised, but Indians had to be paid wages 
which were established and controlled by the royal officials, 
receive religious instruction, and work in the mines for a 
maximum of eight months per year. (4-2 ).
The allocations of Indians to encomenderos during the 
period 1503-14- were temporary ones. The mining economy of the 
island and the interests of the crown demanded an increasing 
gold out-put so Indians were allotted to those colonists with 
the highest return in gold. It was only in the allocation of 
1514 that the right to retain the encomienda for life and for 
1 1 to be inherited for a second generation seems to have been
established. In these conditions (prior to 1514) it is 
understandable that the encomenderos tried to use the Indian 
labour force intensively thus producing a drastic decline in 
the Indian population. This demographic collapse and the 
Indianist campaign of the Dominicans in Hispaniola (see 
Chapter 7) gave rise to the laws of Burgos (1512-13) which 
reiterated previous orders for religious indoctrination and 
established numerous restrictions on the use of the Indian 
labour force. They banned the use of Indians as carriers of 
heavy loads, women over four months pregnant, Indians below 14 
years old and in theory they improved the conditions of work 
of the Indians. They ensured the provision of hammocks, 
garments (to the value of one gold peso per Indian), banned 
corporal punishment for the workers except by the royal 
inspector of each Indian village, and prohibited the removal 
of the Indians from their place of work (the new encomendero 
was supposed to acquire the property of the old one in order 
to use the encomienda labour). The laws also established 
limits on the number of Indians in each encomienda. Each 
was allowed between 40 and 150 Indians, at least a third of 
whom were to be employed in the mines. They granted privileges 
to the Indian chieftains, established a maximum of five months 
of continuous work in the mines, followed by a period of 40 
days of rest etc. (43)
Between 1510-13, the encomienda system was introduced 
into the new territories that had been incorporated into the 
Spanish crown, Puerto Rico, Cuba, Jamaica and the Gulf of 
Darien in Panama. In these islands gold mining and/or 
agriculture for export had fallen to an insignificant level by
1520 while in Darien, the brutal methods of conquest with 
their sequel of Indian resistance and enslavement, resulted 
in an equally drastic decline of the Indian population and 
the resulting limited relevance of the encomienda. The realisa­
tion by the central administration of the short sighted policy 
of colonisation carried out so far and the pressure of the 
Indianists brought about attempts to eliminate the system 
after 1516. The governors of Hispaniola attempted to create 
Indian villages without encomenderos but without success, 
and in 1518-20 orders were sent to Hispaniola and Puerto Rico 
to relieve Indians from encomiendas and charge them with a 
tribute instead but again it was not really implemented.(4.4.)
At the time that the encomienda in the Antilles was dis­
appearing because of the extinction of the Indians the insti­
tution was being introduced in the newly conquered terri­
tories. In Mexico, after the defeat of the Aztecs, Cortes 
hurried to allocate Indians to encomiendas in 1524. Despite 
the royal order against the encomiendas, the conquistador 
confirmed and regulated these allocations by establishing 
the encomendero's rights and duties. Apart from religious 
indoctrination and good treatment of the Indians, the en­
comenderos were to have the necessary military power (men in 
arms, horses etc.) to defend the land in proportion to the 
size of their encomiendas, to reside in Mexico for at least 
eight years and to get married or bring their spouses from 
Spain. Male Indians over 12 years old, were commanded to 
work for the Spaniards for periods of 20 days with intervals 
of 30 days to take care of their own cultivations and for a 
nominal wage. The work was restricted to the area surrounding
the Indian villages and the use of Indian workers in the mines 
was forbidden. Finally the encomiendas were regulated by 
royal judges and involved the ideas of perpetuity and inheri­
tance. The favourable reports about the system given by the 
Mexican colonists and ecclesiastics changed the position of 
the crown from a total rejection of the system in 1523 to a 
total acceptance of it by 1528, its acceptance included a 
promise of perpetuity but was restricted on minor points.
This tendency of the crown to accept the institution began 
to be reversed around 1530, and several restrictions on the 
power of the encomenderos began to be imposed. Firstly, 
from c. 1525 important encomiendas began to fall into the hands 
of the crown (see ^able 6), and in 1530 the local administra­
tion was ordered to establish the post of corregidor (Spanish 
magistrate in charge of the collection of tributes, religious 
and justice duties) in them. They were to be paid from 
the Indian tributes and in the 1550' s the post was extended 
to all encomiendas (royal or private). More importantly, in 
the same period, 1530's - 1550's, several assessments of 
tributes (tasas) to be paid in kind, money or labour to the 
encomendero or the crown were made and enforced bringing to an 
end the unchecked exactions of the primitive encomienda.
During 1535-4-0 a new series of orders which favoured the 
encomenderos were sent by the crown to the colony. They 
included the possibility of commuting tribute in money into 
service in the mines, the concession of the right of inheri­
tance to the holders, permission to interchange encomiendas, 
attempts to raise the rate of Indian tributes etc. (45)
The New Laws of 1542-3 introduced a radical legal develop­
ment that, had it been implemented, would have eliminated
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Table 6: Tributary Indian population in Colonial Snaniah itrerir«. •
Provinces or 
Areas Period
1546-57 1560-70 1597 17th century 18th century Beginning of 
19th century
Valiev of Mexico ( 1 ) n.d. 106,908 n . d . c.25,000 47.080 64,487
t of Indians under 
crown control. 70.1 70.4 76.0
(1692) (1787-94) (1797-1804)
Kev Spain (2) 
l  of Indians under
n . d . 1.051,175 583,917 n.d. 316,099* 763.813 (1807)
crown control 42.5 ** 55.6 63.1
Yucatan (3) 58,144 48,125 36.020 42,147 70,000
t  under the crown 26.0**
(1601)
Guatemala ( ¿ ) n . d . 34,425 53,879 47,780 70,305
f under the crown 40.4**
(1572) (1664) (1778) (1811)
Honduras (5) n.d. 6,100* 4,864
t  under the crown 7.7**
(1571-4) (c . 1590)
El Salvador (6) n . d . n . d . 14,800
Nicaragua ( 1 ) n.d. 6.250 4,716 10.471(c . 1570) (1685)
Costa Rica ( R) n.d. 1,126 400
(1563) (1681)
Colombia (9) 325.400 
c. 1560 39,048
Peru (Lower «nd fill
Ilprerl ------- n . d . 315,335 275,078 231,008 143,130 267,955
(1561) (1591) (1628) (1754)
t  under the crown 2.5**
(1557)
Central S Northern 2.345
(1614)C h i l e - ------- (1777-8)
southern Chile 112,500
(1570)
57,500
(1600)
Argentina n.d. n.d. 56,500 12.994 c.2,400
c.1596 c .1673 (1719)
Paraguay n.d. 7,050 3,783
(1610) (1674)
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Notes to Table 6
« Usually Includes Indian males between 18 and 50 years old 
paying tribute to either the crown or private encomenderos
t” i S a S í V 11 197$: i98’ baS6d °n tributeS and a°tual
(1) Area around Mexico City and included in New Spain. Per- 
centages for 15*8 and 1597 are estimated assuming that the 
population m  the different encomiendas varied in the same 
proportion. Population of 1692 has been rounded up to allow 
for 2 towns without information. (Gibson 196*: 63-?, 1*2-3)?
(2)
(3)
(*)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8) 
(9)
Simpson 1950: 163; Gibson 196*: 1*2-3.
Garcia Bernal 1978: 160; Garcia Bernal 1972: 31. 
Solano 197*: 92, 111, 1 7 *, 182-3.
MacLeod 1973: 59; Solano 197*: 182.
Solano 197*: 53; Solano 197*: 182 
MacLeod 1973:53; Solano 197*: 182.
MacLeod 1973: 332.
For 1560, Colmenares 1978: 90-2. For the early 19th
176 rv^n0Wn b?s?d 0n a? Indian population off l ^  ( lllamarm 1974-2 84.) assuming a dependent population Of 3 people per tributary. ^ F  n
(10) Vicens 197*, III: 336 for 1570, Brito 1973: 126-7 for 1612 
Arcila 1966: 179-92 for 1660-2. For the early l9th centurv ’
nai'd0?11- w ima^ r n ba?ed on the total Indian population wh0Y 
denend+UteS i7?.’59^  glven in Brito 1973:160, assuming a p ndent population of 3 people per tributary. The popula- 
o f°a increase from the mid 17th century to 1800 was a result
Snani^h1^ 0— ratl°5 °f an Increasing number of Indians under panish dominion and as tributaries.
19u 3 ’ U, : 33k for 1561' 1591’ 1628 and 175*. bv addi~ 1799 -  have determined the tributary population 
and tkT  g n 6 tatal Indian population of Lower Peru ( 6 * 8 , 6 1 5 )
WP pper Peru (423,20*) and dividing the total by four. Thus
sume a ratio of tributary to total Indian population of 1:*.
ia+L Jrlbatary population for Chile in 1570 and 1600 has been 
veai! M f n bL o lvidinS the total Indian population in those 
1977- ? °’°9° and 230,000 respectively) by four (Villamarin
MnanJl nAr,,/or Indian tributaries in central Chile in l6l*,
Chila £ 29/i‘ Tributary population for 1777-8 in central
(18 8fn W p21 estimated by dividing the total Indian population J^-o.dOi; by four (Moerner 1970: 296).
(13) Zavala 1935:327-8; Assadourian et al 1972:192-7.
piiL?°PUlabl0n of 1612 estimated by dividing the total Indian 
(Mora 107? ?? Asuncion and its surroundings (28,000) by four, 
do „* • Population of 167* in Mora 197*:59. Figures
include the population of the Jesuit missions.
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in a few years the encomendero class, leaving a thin stratum of 
rentiers paid by the crown and without any control or rights 
over the Indian population. Apart from the classical recommend­
ations of indoctrination and good treatment of the Indians and 
the banning of new Indian enslavements, elimination of the 
tributes paid by the Indians of the Antilles etc., the laws 
commanded: (a) that the encomiendas held by the royal officers
or the church should revert to the crown; (b) similarly 
those encomiendas held without a proper title; (c) reduction 
of all the major encomiendas to a 'moderate and honest' size, 
the rest of the Indians reverting to the crown, part'.of the 
tributes of the latter could be allocated to conquistadores 
without encomiendas; (d) encomenderos responsible for the 
mistreatment of Indians or involved in rebellions should be 
dispossessed of their Indians who would revert to the crown;
(e) royal officials were forbidden to grant new encomiendas 
and all the existing ones were to revert to the crown once the 
present holders died, although the widow or children of the 
holder could receive a rent from the crown, if needed; (f) 
the encomendero should live in the province of the Indies 
where he held Indians, otherwise the encomienda should revert 
to the crown; (g) royal officials were commanded to assess 
the tribute to be paid by the Indians to the encomenderos and 
those exacting more tribute than the established amount should 
dose their encomiendas in favour of the crown. (4-6).
The pressure of the encomenderos, church and officials of 
xico (see Chapter 10) and the rebellion of the Peruvian 
colonists impeded the full enforcement of the New Laws. In 
relation to the encomienda the crucial order of reversion to
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the crown after the death of the present holder was suspended 
in 154-5 and officials in America were authorised to grant new 
encomiendas. However, the crown remained committed to the 
restriction of the power of encomenderos through moderate and 
progressive measures. Thus in 1549, it was ordered that no 
encomienda should include tribute in labour, and in 1551 the 
crown reiterated its order to assess the Indian tribute every­
where in the Indies, recommending that it be smaller than that 
paid to the Indian authorities before the conquest. The 
question of succession of encomiendas remained unresolved but 
with time inheritance to one successor and, in special cases, 
up to four was accepted.
Thus through a long period of vacillating experimentation 
and legislation from 1503 onwards, the main characteristics of 
the encomienda began to be fixed despite the numerous exceptions 
accepted by the crown. The laws relating to the encomienda 
included in the Code of the Indies of 1680 summarise the final 
legal configuration of the institution. It was defined as a 
temporary grant of Indian tributes due to the crown to 
particular people. These tributaries included all Indian 
males between 18 and 50 years old, excluding chieftains, their 
elder sons and some other categories of Indians (e.g. Indians 
Pacifically submitted to the crown for an initial period of 10 
years). Tributes could be in money or kind, but not labour, 
and it was assessed by a Spanish magistrate whose decisions 
could be appealed against by the parties involved (Indians, 
encomenderos or the crown as an encomendero) before the local 
Audiencia. The encomendero was charged with the indoctrina­
tion of the Indians and the defence of the land, for which 
the possession of arms and horses in proportion to the size of
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the encomienda was required. The Indians were in theory not 
allowed to leave their villages, but had full usufruct of 
communal and inheritable personal lands. The encomenderos 
were banned from economically exploiting the villages of 
their encomiendas. The carrying out of this was in charge 
of corregidores, a post which was incompatible with encomiendas, 
as were those of royal officials and ecclesiastics. Finally, 
encomiendas were inalienable on all counts (sale, donation, 
barter etc. )• (4-7)
This legal configuration which defines clearly the norma­
tive framework (or 'ideal' encomienda) which the crown estab­
lished for the majority of the Indian population in the 16th 
century tells us very little about the real development of 
the institution in the different Spanish colonies, thus it is 
necessary to analyse concrete cases in order to evaluate the 
actual productive regime to which the Indians were submitted. 
Before entering into such an analysis we will present a 
quantitative overview of the factors involved in the different 
evolution of the system in Spanish America, these are basically 
the Indian (tributary) population, rentability of the encom­
iendas and the intervention of the state. Table 7 summarises 
statistical information and estimates of the Indian population 
subjected to tribute from the mid 16th century, which as a 
general rule includes male Indians from around 15 to 50 years 
°ld. It does not include Indians in the first stages of 
Ohristianisation (which usually lasted ten years, but some­
times over a century, see Chapter 8), Indians not under 
Spanish control, or those who had escaped from their villages 
to evade tribute or forced labour and worked in Spanish
economic units or lived in towns or villages other than
their own. In some cases we present the proportion of 
Indians paying tributes to encomenderos or to the crown.
Table 7: Rentability of the Indian tribute in Spanish
America in 1¿31 as estimated by a contemporary 
royal official (in ducats of 375 maravedíes). *
%
Peru 419,000 48.1 Tribute changed to every 
tributary 4 pesos (1591J 
(l) 7 - 1 0  pesos in 
Upper Peru 1799.
Colombia 74,000 8.5 6 pesos (1635 onwards)(3)
Venezuela 30,000 3.4 13 pe s o s  (1687) (4)
New Spain 150,000 17.2 1 - 3  pesos (mid 18th 
century)(5)
Yucatan 100,000 i—1 i—1
Guatemala 50,000 5.7
Rio de la Plata 30,000 3.5
Paraguay 6,000 0.7
Chile 12,000 1.4 9.5 - 10.5 pesos (1620) 
(6)
Total 871,000 100.0
* Source: Zavala 1935: 329 and notes below.
(1) Average calculated from Zavala 1935:325.
(2) Sanchez Albornoz 1978:62.
(3) Colmenares 1978:154-5*
U) Arcila 1966:267.
(5) Semo 1975:88.
(6) Korth 1968:111.
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economic units or lived in towns or villages other than 
their own. In some cases we present the proportion of 
Indians paying tributes to encomenderos or to the crown
Table 7: Rentability of the Indian tribute in Spanish
.America in 1631 as estimated by a contemporary 
royal official (in ducats of 375 maravedíes). #
%
Peru -419,000 -48.1 Tribute changed to every 
tributary -4 pesos (1591; 
(l) 7 - 10 pesos in 
Upper Peru 1799.
Colombia 7-4,000 8.5 6 pesos (1635 onwards)(3)
Venezuela 30,000 3.-4 13 pesos (l687)(-4)
New Spain 150,000 17.2 1 - 3  pesos (mid 18th 
century)(5)
Yucatan 100,000 11.5
Guatemala 50,000 5.7
Rio de la Plata 30,000 3.5
Paraguay 6,000 0.7
Chile 12,000 1.-4 9.5 - 10.5 pesos (1620) 
(6)
Total 871,000 100.0
* Source: Zavala 1935: 329 and notes below.
(1) Average calculated from Zavala 1935:325.
(2) Sanchez Albornoz 1978:62.
(3) Colmenares 1978:15-4-5.
(A) Arcila 1966:267.
(5) Semo 1975:88.
(6) Korth 1968:111.
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Table 8 presents an estimation of the Indian tributes in 
1631 in each colony and some information on the amount of 
tributes paid per tributary. It appears clear from the 
reading of these tables that both financially and demo- 
graphically, and as a consequence politically, Peru, Upper 
Peru and New Spain played a key role in the Spanish empire
Table 8: Average Indian tributaries per encomienda in
selected Spanish American colonies (encomiendas 
held by the crown excluded.)
Colony or area Average number of Number of encomie
tr
Valley of Mexico (1560)(l)
New Spain (1560-70) (2)
Guatemala (154.8) (3)
Peru (1561) U)
Paraguay (l688) (5)
Venezuela (1660-2) (6)
Central and Northern 
Chile (1612) (7)
Rio de la Plata- 
Tucuman (1673) (8)
(1) Gibson 1964.: 64.
(2) Total number of tributaries from Simpson 1950:163. Number 
of encomiendas in 1560 from Zavala 1935:313.
(3) Solano 1974:32-5, 83.
(4) Zavala 1935:323-4. Includes 50 encomiendas under the 
crown or vacant.
(5) Villamarin 1975:109.
(6) Arc ila 1966:179-92.
(7) Moerner 1970:294.
(8) Zavala 1935:327-8.
ibutaries
1,216.5 26
1,171.0 480
274.0 84832 477
10.3 30521.6 97
78.1 30
51.7 251
We shall see that in both areas the crown endeavoured more or 
less successfully to exert a firm control over the Indians and 
encomenderos, through escheatment of encomiendas to the crown, 
tribute assessments, elimination of personal services for the
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encomendero and direct control of the Indian communities 
through the corregidores. In these two administrative units, 
after a severe demographic contraction of the tributary 
population, a result of the exactions of the encomienda and 
then the repartimiento system, miscegenation, escapes from 
the Indian villages, etc., the communities managed to recover 
and expand demographically during the last part of the colonial 
period. On the contrary in colonies which lacked a dense 
and politically organised population (Paraguay, Venezuela,
Chile etc.) the Indian communities did not survive the impact 
of the encomienda system and they suffered (missionary terri­
tories apart) a double process of physical extinction and 
biological and cultural miscegenation. This was the result 
of the continuation throughout most of the colonial period of 
conditions of unchecked exploitation which in New Spain and 
Peru had been mitigated by 1600. In the colonies of scarce 
population, it was impossible to reward the Spanish settlers 
according to their expectations without suspending the enforce­
ment of the royal legislation on Indian encomiendas and allow­
ing the encomenderos higher rates of exploitation of the 
Indians than were allowed in Mexico or Peru. As can be seen 
m  Table 8, the average size of encomiendas in New Spain and 
Peru permitted the commutation of labour tributes to payments 
in money or kind, leaving the encomendero with a handsome 
income, equal if not superior to the minimum salary of a 
hj-shop in 16th century Spanish America (1,853 pesos). On the 
contrary, the commutation of tributes in the colonies of less 
demographic potential would have meant a rent for the 
encomendero well below subsistence level or an enormous money 
tribute to be paid by the tributaries. The latter actually
happened in Venezuela when labour tribute was abolished in 
1687. Royal officials estimated that the value of the labour 
paid by the Indians was 33 pesos per tributary per annum which 
the crown considered too high and so reduced it to 13 pesos, 
which was still a very high rate compared with the tributes 
in Mexico and Peru.(48)
The case of New Spain (central-south Mexico) is the 
closest to the ideal type of encomienda defined by the royal 
legislation on encomiendas. The early escheatment of 
encomiendas to the crown (see Table 6), the rapid development 
of state institutions and the economic development of New 
Spain and Mexico, made possible a more strict enforcement of 
the law. During the 1550's and 1560's royal officials re­
assessed tributes, Indian communities were able to reduce the 
amount of tribute to be paid, abolition of personal services 
(forced labour for the encomendero) was effectively enforced 
and Indian tribute was fixed at a rate of one peso and half 
a fanega (c. 12 gallons) of maize per tributary, with some 
local variations. This, plus the intervention of the corre­
gidores, who were in permanent contact with and had juris­
diction over the Indians, meant the effective displacement of 
the encomendero class as an overwhelming economic and political 
force before the 1550's into a dwindling rentier class by the 
end of the 16th century. Parallel to this transformation was 
the transformation of the Mexican economy. Diligent encomen­
deros invested the tributes received in the most varied 
economic enterprises, mining, livestock raising, agriculture, 
commerce etc. The discovery and exploitation of silver mines 
the centre north of Mexico was a powerful stimulus to 
commerce and Spanish enterprises which were producing for the
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mines and markets in the major urban centres, eventually- 
creating a small stratum of free Indian mine workers. The 
important markets thus created in Mexico city and the mining 
towns permitted an easy commutation of labour tribute to 
tribute in kind (realisable by the encomenderos in these 
markets) or money, while the shortages of labour for the 
enterprises of the encomenderos were at least partially solved 
by the repartimiento system, free or semi-free labour and 
African slaves* (4-9)
In Peru the process of institutionalisation of the en­
comienda according to royal legislation, was slower. The 
civil wars of 1537-48 impeded all attempts at assessment of 
Indian tributes, the establishment of a loyal civil bureau­
cracy and the enforcement of the law. President La Gasea in 
charge of pacifying the colony resorted in 1549 to re­
allocating the encomiendas to loyal subjects and ordered the 
first assessment of Indian tributes. This seems to have 
diminished the amount paid by the Indians by a third but 
personal services were retained and the communities and the 
crown itself still considered it too high. The situation was 
not altered until the late 1550's when assessments eliminating 
personal services in the newly allocated encomiendas were 
carried out. It was only in 1570-75 that a general reassess­
ment of tributes was carried out. It eliminated personal 
services in the majority of cases but at the same time estab­
lished harsh measures which in the long run involved an 
increasing burden for the Indian communities. Firstly, the 
tribute was fixed for each community and not for the individual 
tributary, so any demographic loss (emigration, deaths not 
compensated for by births etc.) resulted in the increase of
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tribute for each of the remaining commoners. To cope with this 
extra burden, community funds (cajas de comunidad) from the 
profits of communal enterprises or other incomes were estab­
lished and they were liable to be appropriated by the crown 
when the need arose. Finally tribute was extended to other 
categories of Indians who were not included in former tribu­
tary rolls (yanaconas, mitimaes, mitayos and the Indians 
working for the Spaniards), and the responsibility of collect­
ing the tribute was given to the corregidores .(50)
A series of factors weakened the economic and political 
power of the Peruvian encomenderos. Apart from the sup­
pression of personal service, the assessment of tributes, the 
intervention of the corregidores and escheatment of encomiendas 
to the crown(which was far slower than in Mexico), the en­
comienda income was taxed at 20$ by 1591 and at a third from 
1619. The decline of the Indian population affected the 
whole of the Peruvian economy but especially the encomenderos, 
since the tributaries ran away from the communities in order to 
avoid tribute payments and found employment in the haciendas 
or mines of the Spanish entrepreneurs. Sanchez-Albornoz has 
calculated the magnitude of these tributary evasions for some 
areas of Upper Peru between 1573 (time of the general assessment) 
and 1683. In these areas the tributary population diminished 
from 34,601 to 14,858 tributaries (or a decrease of 57$).
However in the same areas another 12,138 'forastero' Indians 
lived. These Indians were males who did not belong to the 
communities and who were not affected by tribute payments or 
repartimiento drafts. The natural outcome of this process was 
the weakening of the communities and the decrease of the value 
°f the encomiendas, until in 1734 forasteros were forced to
make payments of tribute again. By 1600 only a few Peruvian 
encomiendas provided an income superior to the salary of a 
royal judge (oidor) of Lima of ¿,875 pesos, while the con­
cession of major encomiendas to holders resident in Spain 
further diminished the importance of encomenderos as a class. 
Although retaining social prestige, the encomendero class was 
overwhelmed by, or fused with, the more dynamic entrepreneurs 
who had to rely, as their Mexican counter-parts, on reparti­
miento Indians, black slaves or free or semi-free labourers.(51) 
This process of fusion and suppression of the encomendero 
class, all powerful up until the 1570's, must be understood 
against the background of the social fabric of the colony.
While the Indian population shrank and the number of encomenderos 
remained around 500 for the whole of the 16th century and 
beyond, the total Spanish population expanded from some 2,000 
m  1536 to 8,000 in 1556 and to over 1¿,000 in 1628. Rich 
silver mines, especially in Potosi, provided from the 15¿0's 
onwards, opportunities to gain sudden wealth for both encomen­
deros and non-encomenderos either in association or separately. 
This created a large market in Lima and Potosi and gave value 
to their hinterlands through the stimulation provided by high 
prices and demand for agricultural products, livestock, manu­
factured goods, etc. The suppression of personal service, 
the establishment of the repartimiento system and the enfeoff­
ment of Indians separated from the communities in the 1570's 
diminished the power of encomenderos, encouraged mining (vital 
from the fiscal point of view) and consolidated the economic 
situation of the non-encomendero entrepreneurs•(52)
The moderation of the encomienda exactions in late 16th 
entury Mexico and Peru was implemented with far less effec-
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tiveness in other colonies. In the Audiencia of Guatemala 
(Central America north of Panama) a tribute assessment which 
excluded personal service was carried out around 1550. The 
enforcement of the assessment was however not very strict 
since in Costa Rica, Nicaragua and Honduras personal service 
was included in the Indian tribute as late as 1600. There 
the decline of the power of the encomenderos was mainly 
brought about by the decline of the tributary population, the 
concession of major encomiendas to holders living outside 
the Audiencia, the burden of fiscal and ecclesiastical levies 
on encomienda income and the escape of tributaries to nearby 
haciendas. In the Bogota savannah, suppression of personal 
service and the establishment of corregimientos occurred 
around 1600, but personal services continued to be exacted in 
other Colombian areas which were not so close to the adminis­
trative centre (Audiencia of Santa Fe de Bogota) until the 
mid 17th century. In Venezuela, personal service was only 
abolished in 1687, while in Chile, Argentina and Paraguay 
personal services continued well into the 18th century (53).
The regional differences in the encomienda system could 
be extended ad infinitum if we consider the categories of 
Indians submitted to encomiendas (sex and ages), the types of 
work which the Indians were allowed to perform (they worked 
ns carriers, agriculturalists, miners etc.), the period of 
time to be worked for the encomendero, etc. The crucial 
issue in characterising the encomienda system is, however, 
the presence or not of personal service to the encomendero, 
the exaction of which the crown repeatedly tried to abolish 
(1549, 1573, 1595, 1601 etc.). Without personal service the 
ncomendero became a simple rentier, the receiver of a
decreasing tribute expressed in kind or money with fewer possi­
bilities for exactions beyond the tribute assessment than in 
the case of personal service. In this slow transformation of 
Indian tribute, regional government had an important role in 
enforcing or suspending the execution of royal orders. Trapped 
between the demands of the crown to reduce the power of the 
encomenderos, and, at the same time, force the Indians to work 
in the context of the colonial economy and the pressure of the 
colonists to retain their rights over Indian labour, local 
government gave way to compromise and so did the crown. The 
defeat and killing of Viceroy Nunez, who tried to suppress 
Peruvian encomiendas in 154-6, was a lesson quickly learned by 
royal officialdom. Thus President La Gasea, Nunez1s suc­
cessor, had to ensure the loyalty of Peruvian Spaniards by 
granting them new encomiendas. The suspension of the order 
of escheatment of encomiendas to the crown after the death of 
the present holder, which had been commanded by the New Laws, 
and a flexible ru]e of escheatment of encomiendas after two or 
more generations was another step in that direction. It 
permitted the division of the encomendero class into those 
threatened immediately and those threatened in the future 
with the loss of their encomiendas, and ensured the loyalty 
of the former through the hope of a renewal, or the concession 
°f appointments as corregidores, pensions, and in some colonies 
grants of repartimiento Indians. This compromising attitude 
was expressed in those colonies with less economic and demo­
graphic potential by the suspension of royal legislation 
dealing with the protection of the Indians and especially with 
that suppressing the personal services. The relatively 
scarce and politically unorganised Indian population, in
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combination with the lack of mineral wealth or other export­
able products of high value, which could have improved the 
conditions of the colonists and created a sizeable market 
economy, seem important causes for the retention of personal 
service. Thus Arcila explains the acceptance of the sup­
pression of personal service in 1687 by the authorities and 
colonists of Venezuela, after the suspension of several previous 
orders in the same direction, by the expansion of cacao produc­
tion and export in the mid 17th century, at first with enco­
mienda labour and later with African slaves. Likewise in 
Paraguay the lack of marketable products and the retention of 
a subsistence economy throughout the colonial period made 
the transition from labour tribute to tribute in kind or 
money impossible. In Chile and Argentina a situation of 
commercial isolation, ameliorated by exports to Peru and 
Upper Peru, prevailed until the 18th century. The small 
size of the encomiendas combined with the 'open frontier' 
character of these colonies, with a sequal of military expen­
diture, Indian slavery, loss of property by the Spaniards and 
the consequent poverty of the colonists, impeded enforcement 
of the suppression of personal service. (54-)
The encomienda was, then, a powerful mechanism to reward 
and settle the Spanish colonists in the Indies. Its evolution 
shows the adjustment between the expectation of the conquista­
dores, the socio-economic potential of the Indian communities 
and the long-term interest of the crown. Where large and 
Politically organised Indian communities existed conquistadores 
allocated encomiendas to their retinues, settled a Spanish 
population, created the rudiments of the Spanish state, 
eüminated Indian slavery, developed diversified economies, 
aPpropriated from their communities and, under an increasing
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controlling capacity of* the crownf had to give up their direct 
control of the Indian labour force which had been granted by 
the primitive encomienda. In the colonies of scarce and 
politically unorganised communities the worst conditions of 
exploitation of the Indians predominated during, virtually, the 
whole colonial period; i.e. Indian slavery and personal 
service. This same scarcity of Indian populations and the 
lack of sizeable market production prevented the commutation 
of labour tribute into tribute in money or kind and impeded or 
retarded the introduction of African slavery. For the Indian 
communities the elimination of personal service meant a check 
on their disintegration and permitted the retention of many of 
their own cultural and economic patterns. On the contrary 
the continuation of personal service exactions tended to break 
up the pre-hispanic structures more rapidly, uprooting the 
Indians from their villages for periods of time, stimulating 
escapes, miscegenation and acculturation. From the state 
viewpoint, the moderation of the encomienda exactions, apart 
from the political aim of limiting the power of encomenderos, 
signified a secure source of income where the communities were 
vigorous.
Thus in 16th century New Spain, Indian tribute was the 
roajor source of income for the crown, in the first half of the 
18th century it represented between 14. and 17$, and even in 
1803 more than 8$, despite the enormous increase of silver 
production and the taxes derived from them. In Upper Peru 
Indian tribute represented in 1820-25, some 33$ of the royal 
income of the colony, while in 18th century Guatemala it 
varied from 36 to 81$ of the total fiscal income.(55)
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(d) The Repartimiento
The repartimiento (literally allotment) of Indians was a 
mechanism devised by the royal bureaucracy to compel Indians 
not affected by personal service through encomiendas to work 
for the colonists, the church or the government for a nominal 
wage in enterprises beneficial to the 'common weal' for fixed 
periods of time. It was, then, a continuation of the forced 
labour of the primitive encomienda which was now totally 
separated from the control of the encomendero and favoured a 
wider range of colonists. Although it had a common and 
contemporary historical basis to the encomienda, the reparti­
miento system only began to take shape immediately after the 
suppression of personal service to the encomendero and was 
only implemented in those colonies which effectively enforced 
this suppression, (New Spain, Central America, Colombia and 
Peru). In general the repartimiento consisted of a forced 
drafting by a royal magistrate (with the help of the Indian 
authorities) of a variable proportion of the tributary popula­
tion of the communities for a period of time, usually allocated 
to the Spanish colonists at the discretion of the local 
bureaucrats. Once that period was over new tributaries in 
the same proportion and from the same communities were drafted 
and allotted.
In New Spain the first repartimiento of Indians quickly 
followed the 154-9 royal order to compel the Indians to work for 
the Spaniards and the abolition of the encomiendas' personal 
services. Thus in 1550, repartimientos for agricultural 
enterprises were conceded to the colonists in the Valley of 
Mexico and by the early 1560's some 2,-400 Indians were allotted 
every week to ll-4 employers (note that at the time the number
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of encomenderos in the valley was only 25). Repartimientos 
in other parts of New Spain and in other economic sectors 
(mining, manufacture, public works etc.) soon followed. By 
1575 probably all the Indian communities of New Spain were 
involved in repartimiento tasks, providing a variable percent­
age (according to the season) of their tributaries at one time. 
With the decline of the Indian population the proportions of 
the tributary population drafted for repartimiento rose drama­
tically. For instance, the original maximum of 2% of the 
tributaries established for the agricultural repartimiento of 
the Valley of Mexico had risen to 10% in the 1590's (56).
The heavy burden imposed on a shrinking tributary popula­
tion through the repartimiento system was soon condemned by 
the royal bureaucracy and the church and in 1601 the crown 
attempted to eliminate the system for all types of enterprises 
except mining. The frauds committed by the colonists and 
bureaucrats alike rendered the measure ineffective. Realising 
its failure the crown established in 1609 ordinances which 
would gradually eliminate the repartimientos. They were 
banned in sugar mills, pearl fishing and tasks of carriage 
and only partially permitted, at the discretion of the viceroy, 
for cloth mills. They were permitted in the mines (provided tha 
they were profitable), cattle ranches and agriculture. The 
draft was not to exceed a seventh of the Indians, work was to 
be performed in places close to the community, Indians were to 
be paid in cash, etc. Finally in 1632 the viceroy abolished 
aH  repartimientos except those for mining, public works and 
he church. As might be expected the enforcement of the 
rder was not rigid and repartimiento labour continued to be 
used in agriculture in some regions of New Spain up until the
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second half of the 18th century (e.g., Oaxaca). However, 
from the early 17th century repartimiento labour played a 
declining role in the economy of New Spain. More than the 
royal orders of 1601, 1609 and 1632, economic circumstances 
made repartimiento labour unimportant for the private entre­
preneurs in the first decades of the 17th century. Hacienda 
and cloth mills owners were, from the late 16th century 
depending increasingly on salaried or indebted workers, tenants 
paying for the land in labour etc. For them the reparti­
miento drafts affecting their workers had become, by the early 
1630's, a disruptive diversion of their labour force to other 
entrepreneurs and they welcomed its abolition. In the case 
of mining, the labour force was by the end of the 16th century, 
composed mainly of free Indian workers (61%) and repartimiento 
Indians accounted only for 22% of it, the rest being black 
slaves. By the 18th century, repartimiento for mining was 
still levied on certain communities but was clearly insignific­
ant. The richness of the silver mines permitted the owners 
to attract free Indians through the payment of wages and 
bonuses several times higher than those usual in agriculture.(57) 
In Peru from 1553 onwards, a series of administrative 
orders established the repartimiento in agriculture, stock 
herding, domestic service etc., and later on in the mines.
The latter was the most exacting and painful service of all and 
due to its importance for the interests of the crown, was 
enforced rigorously up until 1812, despite the numerous protests 
°f royal officials, churchmen and the Indians themselves. Two 
raines were pivotal for the fiscal interests of the crown: the 
rich silver mines of Potosi and the mercury mine of Huancavelica. 
In the latter 620 to 3,280 repartimiento Indians were drafted
t
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from a radius of ¿0 miles around the mine. Although it was 
an unhealthy and exacting job it only involved a small pro­
portion of the Peruvian population recruited locally. The 
case of Potosi was different. Its repartimiento included at 
its inception (1570's) 16 provinces stretching from Cuzco 
(southern Peru) to Tarija (southern Bolivia) and affecting
81,000 tributaries or roughly a fourth of the whole Peruvian 
tributary population. These provinces sent to Potosi every 
year 13,500 male Indians between 18 and 50 years old, who 
worked in the mines under the repartimiento system for one 
out of three weeks and provided the miners with a total 
available labour force of 4» 500 who were payed at a very low 
wage. During the two weeks of rest the repartimiento Indians 
could be employed freely in the same mines but now they sold 
their labour power at the market price. This flood of cheap 
labour combined with the technological improvements derived 
from the introduction of the amalgamation process using mercury, 
brought about a three or four-fold increase of silver pro­
duction in Potosi from the 1570's to the end of the century. 
Extremely bad working conditions, low wages and long distances 
from the place of origin (in some cases 600 miles) made this 
repartimiento a heavy burden for the communities affected.
Many tributaries resorted to escape from the communities or 
preferred to pay cash for their exemption from the reparti­
miento draft. These factors caused a sharp decline in the 
tributary population of the provinces affected by the levy (see 
Table 9) and indirectly contributed to the constant decline 
°f Potosi silver output from the beginning of the 17th century 
0 the 1720's. The extreme social cost that the system meant
mz
134. -
Tributary popula- 
Year tion in the pro­
vinces affected
81,000
4-1.115
16,000
10,633
* Sources: Konetzke 1976: 
150-1; Arze 1979, 229 ff.
Indians
drafted
every
year
13,500
9,300
4,200
2,008
Repartimiento Percentage of
effective 
labour force 
in the mines
4,500
3,100
1,400 
c. 1,840
tributary pop­
ulation 
drafted every 
year
39.5
186; Sanchez-Albornoz 1978: 70,
1 °nly 14 provinces. The number of Indians drafted
had diminished but according to the document reproduced by 
Arze repartimiento Indians were forced to work (for low 
wages) virtually the whole year through.
for the communities made royal officials attempt to reform or 
abolish the Potosi repartimiento in 1659, 1670, 1690's etc. 
However, fiscal reasons necessitated the continuation of the 
repartimiento in Potosi, Huancavelica and other mines until 
the end of the colonial period and, it seems, in a more brutal 
way. On the one hand the crown could not do without the 
income provided by the production of Potosi (more than a third 
°f ^he Peruvian silver output in its worst periods), which
was taxed initially at 20$ and in the 18th century at 10$ of 
its total production. The Potosi miners on the other hand had 
to be subsidised with cheap labour which was compelled to work 
by the state in order to maintain the exploitation of 
increasingly unproductive mines (17th and 18th centuries). (58) 
The development of the repartimiento system in the Audiencia 
°T Guatemala and the Colombian highlands combined in specific
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ways the characteristics of the institution in New Spain and 
Peru on which vice-royalties they respectively depended. In 
the Colombian highlands repartimiento was established around 
1600 and involved agriculture, urban work and especially 
mining. By the late 1620's some 2,000 tributaries were sent 
yearly to the silver mines although this number greatly 
decreased later on. The 'Mariquita' silver mines however 
retained an important repartimiento labour force throughout 
the 17th century. Established in 1606, this repartimiento 
affected the 30,000 tributaries of Tunja and Bogota which 
provided 600 (or 2% ) tributaries annually. By the last 
decade of the 17th century, the number of Indians sent to the 
mines yearly had been drastically reduced to an average of 
216 per annum, but the period of service in the mines had been 
increased, so miners were still provided with an average 
annual number of Indians close to 500. This was a reflection 
of the decline of the Indian population which suffered heavy 
demographic losses because of the repartimiento, a high 
mortality rate in the mines (6% per annum during the last 
three decades of the 17th century) and especially the escape 
of the drafted Indians away from the mines and the communities 
(20$ per annum in the same period). This process, plus the 
declining yields of the silver mines, the interest of the 
crown to retain a sizeable population in the communities with 
the consequent tributes, and the pressure of the hacienda 
owners to retain the labour force diverted to the mines for 
their own enterprises, gave rise to the abolition of the 
ining repartimiento in 1729. Later on in the 174-0's the 
Ural repartimientos which drafted a fourth of the tributary 
Population of Colombia for the local landowner (usually an
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encomendero) and the already unimportant urban repartimiento 
were abolished.
In Central America repartimientos were established in the 
1550's but reached overwhelming importance only in the period 
1570 s - 1630. Only Indians under the crown were drafted and 
mining, sugar, indigo and cloth mills were excluded from the 
grants of repartimientos, although mill owners or miners 
received them by posing as agriculturalists or used these 
Indians by renting them from the 'legitimate' holder. Despite 
the attempts of the royal bureaucracy to abolish the system in 
1671, and the pressure of the hacienda owners who were more 
interested in retaining the Indian workers through debt peonage 
than relying on the local bureaucrats for the concession of a
repartimiento, it persisted at least until the end of the 18th 
century.(59)
The preceding institutional and regional analysis permits 
us to summarise the initial trends of development of the appro­
priation of the labour power of the submitted peoples by the 
Spaniards in the Indies. It must be born in mind that the 
scheme of slavery/encomienda/repartimiento in no way exhausts 
the variety of the relations of production existing in Spanish 
colonial America. As far as the Indian population is concerned 
these also included the missionary system (see Chapter 8) and 
many production relations which the hacienda and urban 
centres developed (debt peonage, enfeoffment, free work, 
ndependent artisans, etc.). However, the triad slavery/ 
ncomienda/repartimiento had an overwhelming predominance 
uring Spanish America's formative period (l6th and early 17th 
ntury), when relations of production which essentially 
xcluded extra-economic coercion were just beginning to develop
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and the population was predominantly Indian (both racially and 
culturally). The early Spanish colonists compelled the Indian 
population to work in their enterprises, with the acceptance 
and regulation of the state, in the continuum slavery/encomienda/ 
repartimiento which gave way slowly to enfeoffment and free 
labour. The rapidity of the development of the cycle or the 
absence of the extreme links of the triad were basically an 
effect of the level of socio-political organisation and demo­
graphic density of the aboriginal populations and the presence/ 
absence of abundant mineral wealth or highly valuable products 
which were marketable either internally or in the world 
economy. Thus in New Spain and Peru and, to a lesser extent, 
Guatemala and the Colombian highlands the exaction of surplus 
from the communities in pre-Colombian times as a form of 
tribute for a centralised state, the existence of a dense 
population and a developed economic infrastructure, permitted 
a rapid replacement of the pre-conquest social structure by 
the colonial order, which was organised at the economic level 
m  terms of encomiendas and later on repartimientos; this took 
Place without enslaving significant sectors of the aboriginal 
population. This rapid transition from encomienda to re­
partimiento and then to non-coercive economic mechanisms was 
boosted by the mineral wealth of New Spain and Peru, which 
created vast local markets and the conditions for the commuta­
tion of tributes, the transference of tributes from encomenderos 
the crown and the creation of a dynamic no n-encomendero 
entrepreneurial class which escaped the cycle encomienda/ 
repartimiento and relied on black slaves, enfeoffment and free 
bour. In contrast, the colonists of territories inhabited 
by nomads and primitive agriculturalists who had limited
K
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political organisation and were not used to tribute practices, 
relied on slavery as a form of accumulation and provision of 
labour power, and the encomienda persisted as a form of forced 
labour for the encomendero despite the attempts of the crown 
to suppress it. African slavery represented, during the 
colonial period, a heavy investment which only a few colonies 
could afford in significant numbers. The wasteful character 
of slavery as a relation of production (high mortality rates, 
escapes and so forth), heavy taxation on slave imports and the 
lack of dynamism of the Spanish commercial bourgeoisie who 
were incapable of obtaining a share of the Atlantic slave 
trade, did not permit the participation of the Spanish colonies 
in the trade in significant proportions until the late 18th 
century. Only the richest colonies (Mexico and Peru) could 
afford the purchase of significant numbers of black slaves at 
the time of the massive decline of the Indian population (16th 
century). The rest of the colonies had to resort to contra­
band slaves or wait for the creation of the necessary conditions 
for the development of an export economy whose products were 
valuable enough to make profitable the enormous investment 
represented by the purchase of slaves in the absence of other 
sources of labour power (exemption of taxes, freedom to engage 
in the trade, capital accumulation etc.).
In this chapter we have dealt with those forms of exploita­
tion of the Indian and black labour force in which the state 
Played an important role. In the following chapter we will 
study the types of agrarian production and the methods of 
appropriation and concentration of land by the Spaniards in 
four representative areas of colonial Spanish America.
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ChaPter Agriculture 1: The Azarian Stricture of Colonel 
Spanish America
The conquest and settlement of America by the Spaniards 
brought about a slow but radical transformation and, in many 
cases,destruction of the aboriginal agriculture. The expro­
priation of surpluses in the form of labour, in kind or as 
money weakened the demographic and political power of the 
communities, as did the expropriation of lands, royal and 
ecclesiastical control of the communities and the participation 
of the Indians in the wars of conquest. Aboriginal agri­
culture had been basically a subsistence one based on indigenous 
crops (maize, potatoes, beans, etc.) and in the absence of 
draft animals it relied almost exclusively on labour power.
After the conquest the encomenderos, recipients of large 
tributes in kind or labour, commercialised these surpluses in 
the incipient Spanish markets and introduced new products and 
technology (livestock, wheat, sugar, etc.). Later on, Indian 
communities, liberated from tributes in labour, had to compete 
with the Spanish entrepreneurs by selling their products on 
the market to pay their tributes or seek employment with them 
to obtain the needed cash. Thus directly or indirectly 
Indian communities or individual Indians began to participate 
in commodity production. At the same time Spanish entre­
preneurs were increasingly controlling the natural and human 
resources (land and water and Indians and slaves), depriving 
the communities of their economic basis and reducing them to 
real reservoirs of labour power. As we shall see, this 
Process had a different tempo and intensity in the various 
regions of Spanish America and, in many of them, the Indian 
c°mmunities successfully survived the attack of the Spanish
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economy up until independence and beyond. Ihe over simplified scheme 
presented above needs to be elaborated, taking into account the 
political and economic struggle between Indian communities and 
landowners and their respective allies inside and outside the 
state apparatuses, the increase of commercial agriculture in 
certain areas due to temporary booms or long term expansions 
and its consequence for the social structure and so on. In 
the first part of this chapter we will describe the legal 
framework within which the colonial structure was formed and 
its changes over time. In the second part we will analyse in 
some detail the expansion of Spanish agriculture and the con­
crete formation of the colonial agrarian structure in four 
areas of Spanish America.
A. Legal Framework
As a result of the conquest the land, water rights, sub­
soil, mountains, etc., in the Indies belonged to the crown 
unless specific royal grants had been made to individuals, 
Spanish towns or Indian communities.. Si order to reward the 
discoverers and conquistadores the crown granted.lands in the settled 
(or to be settled) territories to the leaders and members of 
the expeditions (before or after the conquest) through a formal 
contract or 'capitulación'. The discoverer or conqueror 
was usually granted vast land rights and the right to allot 
additional land to the rest of the settlers on the condition 
that they lived in the territory for a certain period of time, 
usually between four to eight years. These rights gave no 
jurisdiction over the aboriginal population of the settled 
territories and in theory left untouched the property of the
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Indians
The initial variety of land rights granted to the settlers 
tended to become homogenised in the legal texts as the 1 6 th 
century progressed. Thus in the ordinances of discovery of 
1573 they reached a quasi-definitive form, and were incor­
porated, with minor changes, into the Code of the Indies of 
1680. According to these ordinances every new settlement in 
the Indies would be granted 16 square leagues of land (or 
c. 1 10 square miles). From this a part was to be converted 
into common land for the villagers and sites for their houses 
while the rest was to be divided into four equal parts, one 
for the leader of the settlement ('adelantado') and the other 
three to be divided among the rest of the settlers. Each 
settlement had to have at least 30 citizens ('vecinos'), and 
the land allotted to each particular settler was contracted 
between the adelantado and the settlers and was not to exceed 
3 ' caballerías '/^ ^  (2 )
Apart from the capitulaciones contracted between the king 
or the governor of a territory in the king's name with the 
purpose of settlement of new areas, the king or his representa­
tives could grant lands up to three caballerías in areas 
already settled as a reward for past or future services to the 
In both cases (capitulaciones and grants), the 
efinitive title to the land was subjected to a royal confirma­
tion within a short period. As land had little value
abouth+ L the requirement' of 1514 and later, the 'Ordinances 
oonquistadores í**eatment the Indians' of 1526 ordered the 
they submitted to Snaín In?lan g°odf and Property provided that 1573 insisted on +SP h  rule. The 'Ordinances of Discovery' of 
hibition or d *5® Same PrlnclPle, now enhanced by the pro- 
(ii) Th» °f,yaff.of °o»quest by the discoverers, (l) P
ally it din nn+tl0í¡ °f a caballeria was quite vague since initi- 
(the land refer to physical measures but to productivity
ture neopq«! +Sary cultlvate x measures of grain...the pas- 
Table 5 to raisf y heads of livestock, etc.). See however
1 the extension of a caballeria as fixed for New Spain.
I
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The initial variety of land rights granted to the settlers 
tended to become homogenised in the legal texts as the 16th 
century progressed. Thus in the ordinances of discovery of 
1573 they reached a quasi-definitive form, and were incor­
porated, with minor changes, into the Code of the Indies of 
1680. According to these ordinances every new settlement in 
the Indies would be granted 16 square leagues of land (or 
c. 110 square miles). From this a part was to be converted 
into common land for the villagers and sites for their houses 
while the rest was to be divided into four equal parts, one 
for the leader of the settlement ('adelantado') and the other 
three to be divided among the rest of the settlers. Each 
settlement had to have at least 30 citizens ('vecinos'), and 
the land allotted to each particular settler was contracted 
between the adelantado and the settlers and was not to exceed 
3 ' caballerías '.^^(2)
Apart from the capitulaciones contracted between the king 
or the governor of a territory in the king's name with the 
purpose of settlement of new areas, the king or his representa­
tives could grant lands up to three caballerías in areas 
already settled as a reward for past or future services to the 
crown. in both cases (capitulaciones and grants), the 
efimtive title to the land was subjected to a royal confirma­
tion within a short period. As land had little value
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ally it dirt n + ti02 0fxa caballeria was quite vague since initi- 
(the °_not refer to physical measures but to productivitylanri f
ture necessa^eSfary cultlvate x measures of grain...the pas- e 5 +y to raise y heads of livestock, etc.). See howeve 
•tor the extension of a caballeria as fixed for New Spain
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and the cost and time involved in these confirmations was high, 
the colonists did not apply for them and remained for decades 
as simple possessors of their lands.
The expansion of Spanish agricultural enterprises, the 
growth of the Spanish population, the consolidation of markets 
and the consequent increase in the price of land, made the 
crown consider a new land policy. Up until the end of the 
16th century, land allotments and grants were an important 
incentive for the Spaniards to settle in the Indies. Both 
were free and involved at least in theory an obligation on the 
grantee to live in the new settlement for a period of time and/ 
or to actually use the land for agricultural production within 
a certain period after the concession. After 1591 the land 
grant became mainly a financial mechanism to obtain additional 
revenues for the crown. All properties without a proper title 
were to revert to the crown and would eventually be 'granted' 
(actually sold) to another colonist or otherwise subjected to 
a financial arrangement ('composición') which cleared the 
title. The properties subjected to composición or eventual 
confiscation were those whose grant had not been confirmed by 
the royal authority, grants made by unauthorised bodies or 
encroachment on lands of a third party, (the crown, Indian or 
Spanish town's lands). The composiciones therefore provided 
a legitimate title to these on condition that a fee was paid, 
whether or not they were occupied legally. The land rights of 
the Indian communities and Spanish towns damaged by these com­
posiciones were considered in the light of what they could 
cultivate in the case of the former, and according to the 
estimations of the viceroy or governor as to what was conveni­
ent in the latter case. The laws of 1591 were slowly enforced
in the Indies and free grants were issued up until the 18th 
century in some poor colonies. In the same way colonists 
with faulty titles were able to avoid the payment of compo­
siciones for a similar period in these areas. The crown, 
always short of cash, reiterated these orders on several 
occassions (notably 1631 and 1754) and each time the land- 
owners of new territories were charged with the payments of 
composiciones. (3)
The concrete development of the process of clearance 
of land titles and the formation of the colonial agrarian 
structure needs separate, regional treatment and we will 
deal with it in part two of this chapter. To round off this 
section however a short comment is necessary in relation to 
the encomiendas and their relation with landed property.
The land grant was, in theory, a concession totally separated 
from the rights granted through encomiendas of Indians. The 
legal figure of the encomienda did not include property 
rights to the lands of the Indian communities given in the 
encomiendas and, conversely, no rights over Indians were 
bestowed through land grants. However, encomienda holders 
could acquire lands belonging to their encomienda Indians 
through a separate land grant, by purchasing it from the 
Indians or indeed, illegally/111  ^ Thus, juridically the
!íÍ!\TjÍSnÍS P03-11^  of view of Zavala, which is generally
. p;?d • Gongora, recognising the absolute validity of the 
for tv,1011 i'°r P e r i o d  after the conquest, shows that at least 
w 6 c a f e o3> e a r l y colonial Chile, encomienda and land grants 
of q conceded through the same document, thus implying a right 
n . ei®1:®-u,ry over lands and Indians. The Mexican conquistador, 
es’ by then Marquis of the Valley, claimed in the 1530's
at+pm +y r3-ght,s °ver the lands of his encomienda Indians. This 
him cons3s^ec3 of transforming the personal tribute owed to 
 ^ r y ,e Indians of his encomienda into an emphyteutic rent 
thro6 "k? ^3m ^  the Indians. The Marquis' attempt failed
Ch"]U^  3n3'erven'bion of the Mexican Audiencia. Similarly in
1 e the Audiencia of Lima discontinued the practice. (4)
^ubjection of the Indians to their Spanish encomenderos was 
not mediated by land property relations but consisted of a 
direct personal dependence regulated by the state. A form 
of dependence of the Indians on the Spaniards, mediated by 
the land rights of the latter appeared legally in the case of 
the Peruvian 'yanaconas' (see below) and de facto elsewhere 
in Spanish America. But in these cases the constitution of a 
serf-like relation was precisely a way of overcoming the 
limitations imposed by the encomienda institution and its 
derivatives (the repartimiento system and tributes).
B. The Formation of the Colonial Agrarian Structure in
Some Areas of Spanish America
In this section we will analyse the expansion of Spanish 
agriculture and the formation of the agrarian structure in 
four macro-regions of Spanish America: Mexico, Peru, New 
Granada and Chile. These have been chosen because of the 
availability of relevant data. At the same time they are 
fairiy representative since the two former regions contained 
over half of the population of the whole of Spanish America 
throughout the colonial period and, within their limits, 
different physical environments, population densities, 
degrees of economic development, etc. New Granada and 
especially Chile present a contrast with the two former in the 
sense that they were relatively backward as political and 
economic centres and this makes the sample more representative. 
Finally, some aspects of Cuban and Venezuelan agriculture have 
Been dealt with in Chapter 3.
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In each of the four cases to be studied we will start 
by describing the types of agricultural production in the 
colony and give an idea of its importance within the context 
of the agricultural sector of the economy in general. We 
will then proceed to analyse the mechanisms of approp­
riation and concentration of land by the Spaniards and 
finally we will give quantitative data related to this 
process for specific regions within the colony. The method 
of exposition of this chapter might seem repetitive given 
the similarities of the development of some aspects of the 
Spanish American agrarian structure, but it is the only way
to grasp the specific character of these developments in each 
colony.
(a) Mexico
Although allotment of lands to the Spaniards started with 
the conquest itself, cultivation under direct Spanish manage­
ment did not occur on a significant scale until the mid-l6th 
century. In the interim Spaniards obtained their grain 
(especially wheat) from Spain, from tribute in kind from 
the encomiendas (especially maize) and from the few Spanish 
enterprises established around Mexico City and Puebla. Wheat 
Production, a basic item in the Spanish diet, was constantly 
encouraged by the viceroys, through land grants, repartimiento 
°f Indians, etc, and thus wheat production increased steadily 
hroughout the 16th century. This expansion was reflected in 
wheat prices in Mexico City which decreased from c. 1530 to 
mid-1540's when, they became comparable with prices in 
pnin. in the 1550's the expansion of silver mining in northern
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Mexico and the labour shortages brought about by the limi­
tation of the use of Indian forced labour around 1550 
again created scarcity and high prices of wheat and food­
stuffs in general, especially in the mining districts. From 
around 1560 to the 17th century prices stabilised within a 
moderately rising trend with occasional sharp increases due 
to crop failures, which were aggravated by famines and the 
consequent shortages of labour. The higher prices in the 
mining areas continued but in turn they generated an agric­
ultural expansion to the north and reinforced the development 
of central areas like the Puebla and Mexico City hinterlands. (5) 
Maize was the staple food of the Mexican Indians before 
and during the colonial period. After the conquest it became 
integrated into the Spanish economy as food for Indian slaves, 
animals and, in times of scarcity, for the Spaniards themselves. 
The expansion of Spanish enterprises (mining, ranching, farming, 
trade) using a dependent Indian labour force and large numbers 
of draft animals increased the value of maize and transformed 
it slowly into a cash crop subjected to speculation and widely 
cultivated in the Spanish enterprises. According to Gibson, in 
the Valley of Mexico the process of gaining control of the 
maize supply by the Spaniards took 50 years (1580-1630). By 
the latter date th.e city of Mexico was totally supplied with 
maize by Spanish entrepreneurs, while Indian maize agriculture 
had been relegated to the subsistence level. This was an 
early case but the.trend was the same in almost every urban 
hinterland: Merida de Yucatan, Guadalajara, the Bajio, etc. In 
the far north, the scattered nature of Indian settlement and 
therefore the lack of maize as tribute, made the Spaniards 
enter the maize supply business as a complement to their mining
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or ranching endeavours or as an enterprise in its own right.
Thus by the 18th century most of the Spanish haciendas grew 
maize either for internal consumption or for the market. (6)
The expansion, of livestock raising preceded that of wheat 
cultivation and the control of maize production by the Spaniards. 
The pigs and sheep the Spaniards brought during the conquest 
or imported immediately afterwards multiplied very quickly 
but the numbers of cattle and horses increased at a slower 
rate. In the late 1530's, 1540's and 1550's a sudden increase 
in the number of cattle and horses occurred (see Table 1).
Herds of cattle, sometimes in a semi-wild state, spread to 
the plains and areas of Indian cultivation in central Mexico 
and then into the south and especially the far north where 
their numbers increased very rapidly. As a result the price 
of beef in Mexico City fell from 17.5 maravedies per pound in 
1532 to 1 maravedi per pound in 1540 picking up again towards 
the end of the century (2 maravedies per pound in 1575 and 
4.25 in 1622). By the beginning of the 17th century livestock 
expansion had reached a ceiling and stabilised for the rest 
of the century. During the 18th century complaints about the 
scarcity of cattle to be slaughtered were numerous in central 
Mexico. However, this seems to reflect a situation of increasing 
population, the switching of ranching estates to cultivation 
and the displacement of the herds to the north rather than an 
absolute fall in the number of cattle in Mexico as a whole.
Thus the Intendancy of Guadalajara alone had over two million 
head of cattle and an even higher number of sheep at the 
beginning of the 19th century. (7)
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Table 1: Estimates of numbers of head of cattle. sheen 
and goats in New Spain in the lbth century ( m  thousands) ( * ) -------- - -■*-
Year Cattle Sheep and Goats
1536
1550
1560
1570
1580
15901600
1610
1620
1520
100
220
400
600
800
980
1,000
500
600
1,100
2,100
3,100
4,600
6,000
7.000
8.000
m ^ ^ B ,^lmPSon, 'Exploitation of land in Central
Mexico in the 16th Century', Berkeley 1952, as re­
produced in Chaunu 1959, VIII, 1; 720
Apart from stock raising and grain production a series 
of other agricultural items acquired importance at some stage 
in colonial Mexico. Although they cannot be compared with 
grain production or stock raising from the point of view of 
the number of workers engaged in their production, the acreage 
used, etc, they deserve attention because their production, 
by being almost totally commercialised, constituted a large 
share of the total commodity production. We will refer below 
to cacao, silk, dyestuffs, sugar and pulque.
In prehispanic Mesoamerica cacao was reserved for the 
consumption of the Aztec upper class. The conquest and the 
end of restrictions on its use by the commoners, increased 
the demand and provided the encomenderos of the producing 
regions with handsome profits. By the mid-l6th century severe 
labour shortages, which were the product of the demographic 
crisis of the post-conquest, had put the cacao plantations 
°f Colima and Tabasco practically out of business. By that
time the demand
ice
was increasing because of the addiction 
of the creoles to the beverage and increasing cacao i.ports 
fro. Guatemala, Quito and Venezuela „ere necessary to supply 
the Mexican market. Equally ephemeral „as silk production 
in Mexico. It started gradually in the 1530's and reached a 
certain level of i.portance after the .id-16th century, „hen 
it „as exported to Peru and Sevile and its .anufacturing infra­
structure „as developing. However, the start of the trade 
between Acapulco and. Manila and the i.ports of cheap Chinese 
silk almost eliminated Mexican silk production in a few 
decades. (8)
Dyestuffs had on the contrary a more sustained important 
Mexican colonial economy. The expansion and sophis­
tication of the textile industry in Europe and Mexico during 
the period provided .excellent markets for Mexican cochineal, 
indigo and other dyestuffs. Cochineal was produced by pre- 
hispanic Aztecs and Mexico retained a virtual monopoly over 
its production throughout the colonial period. The care and 
techniques cochineal production required made it impossible 
for Spaniards and other Europeans to expand its production 
beyond the area of prehispanic production (Mexico and certain 
areas of the Audiencia of Guatemala) during the colonial 
Period. Cochineal exporta to Spain started in the mid-l6th 
century and reached a considerable volume by the beginning of 
17th century, when its value was second only to Mexican 
silver exports. After the mid-17th century cochineal exports 
drastically and did not recover until the early 18th 
century (see Table 2). By the beginning of the 19th century, 
and probably during the last decades of the 18th century as
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a)Oa)
( 2 )(3)(3)(4)(5)
Cochineal
Period Total Value
1561-95
1601-101611-20
1650-991717-361748-7817861796-1820
8,270,216
3,229,9336,369,74688,52121,031,686
65,533,6093,757,21932,090,300
Annual
Average
236,292
322,939636,9741,770
955,9852.048,550
3,757,2191,283,612
Logwood
Total Value
74,633206,1673.361,087
588,999
Annual
Average
1.4929,371108,422
588,999
(*) The
( 1)
( 2 )
+Wo*i1£ereS for a11 periods, except 1796-1820 are tn 4 e?P°rte Troi Mexican and non-Mexican ports
Chaunu 1959, VII, ii:980-l.
estimated^ t alM 6n^ f S+198^ : 331. 337. The value has been _®^ rj,ate° ^king into account the price of first class cochineal or 37,100 maravediec ( 1 1 % / rL.i.i class
(510"maravedies^per^quintal^"“‘»talfSSd^MB
years 1747!7e!i logwood in Seville during the
(4) Hamnett 1971b: 1 7 4 .
(5) Ortiz de la Tabla 1978: 253.
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well, cochineal was again the Mexican agricultural export 
par excellence and constituted 60$ of Mexican export other 
than silver. Production was entirely in the control of the 
Indians but its commercialisation was dominated by the local 
bureaucrats and their partners, the local merchants. The latter 
benefited from the difference between the price at which the 
Indians were forced to sell cochineal to them and its market 
price; this difference was sometimes as great as 100$. Despite 
this, some of the prosperity of the cochineal trade seems to 
have reached Indian communities and especially Indian chief­
tains. Thus the Indians of Tlaxcala were reputed to be 
earning 100,000 ducats (135,000 pesos) per annum during the 
I550'8, and the Indian government sought to ban cochineal 
production believing that it was bringing too much money 
to the Indians and disrupting the social hierarchy of the 
communities. In 18th century Oaxaca, Indian chieftains' lands 
were profitably employed in cochineal production. (9)
Indi£o_was also in high demand in the European and 
Spanish American textile industry but in this case Mexican 
production met effective competition from other regions in 
the Spanish Indies and East Indies. Cultivated and manufactured 
since the 1550*s in Yucatan, indigo production expanded there 
ntil around 1580. By that time entrepreneurial encomenderos 
ad set up 4.8 indigo mills at a total cost of some 120,000 
Pesos and were producing around. 15,000 pounds of indigo per 
annum. Thereafter indigo production in Yucatan and other 
xican regions (notably Michoacan) diminished to the level 
of the internal demand. The royal order of 1581 banning the 
USS °f Indian labour in the indigo mills probably had some
I
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effect on this decline but a much greater influence was the 
competition of the Central American dyestuff. The production 
of Yucatecan logwood, in competition with the production of 
English logwood cutters and subjected to monopolistic res­
trictions by the crown, did not reach importance as an export 
until the 18th century, when these restrictions were lifted 
and tax exemptions granted. (1 0 )
Sugar was a product of continuing importance in Mexico. 
Its cultivation started in the 1530's and expanded continu­
ously throughout the colonial period. However, within this 
continuity several changes occurred. In the first place 
sugar production became concentrated in the area which is 
today the state of Morelos and it accounted for over half of 
the Mexican sugar production. Secondly there was a concen­
tration of production in fewer mills with higher capacity 
and finally there was a dramatic increase over time in the 
output per worker (see Table 3). Thus the semi-domestic 
character of the industry in 16th century Mexico changed into 
one dominated by large scale, efficient mills comparable to 
the ones in existence in the sugar islands of the Caribbean 
at the time. In terms of value, the annual sales of Morelos' 
sugar in Mexico City (virtually its sole market) represented 
around 1,000,000 pesos in the early 1790's. This figure 
probably increased substantially by the early 1800's to 
1-5 million or more as, during that decade, Morelos' produc­
tion increased by almost 50$ and sugar prices were rising.
By that time the town of Cordoba was producing 200,000 
arrobas of sugar or a value of 500,000 pesos per annum and 
the bishopric of Michoacan levied 21,000 pesos on the sugar 
tithe (4$ 0f the production) which represented a production
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of 525,000 pesos. Finally in relation to the external 
market sugar ranked high in the agricultural exports (1 4 .5* 
during the period 1796-1820) with an average value of
728,000 pesos per year from 1796 to 1804, although this 
decreased in the following ye ars.(iv^(1 1 )
Table 3: Sugar Production and Exports in Colonial
Mexico Morelos
No of 
Mills Export p.a. (tonnes) Mo of Mills
ProductionCapacityp.a.
No of 
Workers
Priceper
Tonne
c. 1600 50-60(1) C. 9(2) 13(5) 2*0(5) 1.300
(pesos) 
688.9 (7)e. 1700 n.d. 0.018(3) 13(5) 1.000(5) 3.110 206.7 (7)c. 1800 n.d. c. 651 (*) 37(6) 6.263(6) 10,899 206.7 (7)
(1) Chevalier 1963: 78.
ill lloo!!6 f°r the Peri°d 1568-1616, Chaunu 1959. VI. 
197efV253®e f°r the period 1796-180*. Ortit de la Tabla
U) Garcia Fuentes I960: 3*7. Average for the period 1690-9.
(5) Floreacano (ed) 1975: 152-3.
(6) Altman et al (ede) 1976: 163.
(7) Florescano (ed) 1975: 565.
Pulque 
in its 
aged.
like cacao was a prehispanic Aztec beverage limited 
use to a certain stratum of society, in this case the 
With the relaxation of morals and psychological trauma
Pen arroba atl°£ based on a price of 20 reales or 2.5 pesos 
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of 525,000 pesos. Finally in relation to the external 
market sugar ranked high in the agricultural exports ( U . 5 %  
during the period 1796-1820) with an average value of
728,000 pesos per year from 1796 to 1804, although this
decreased in the following years. (iv) (11)
Table 3: Suear Pr°ducti0E and Exporte in Colonial Mexico
Mexico Morelos
No of 
Mills Export p.a. (tonnes) No of Mills
ProductionCapacityp.a.
No of 
Workers
1600 50-60(1) c. 9(2) 13(5) 240(5) 1.300
1700 n.d. 0.018(3) 43(5) 1.000(5) 3 » ¿10
1800 n.d. c. 651 U ) 37(6) 6.263(6) 10,899
Price per Tonne (pesos)
688.9 (7)
206.7 (7)
206.7 (7)
(1) Chevalier 1963: 78.ill aT55**e f0r the peri°d 1568-1616. Chaunu 1959. VI,
Í978?V2?3e.e f0r the peri0d 1796-180^ . Ortir de la Tabla
U) Garcia Fuentes 1980: 347. Average for the period 1690-9.
(5) Florescano (ed) 1975: 1 5 2 -3 .
(6) Altman et al (eds) 1976: 163.
(7) Florescano (ed) 1975: 565.
Pulque, lxke cacao was a prehispanic Aztec beverage limited 
ln ltS USe t0 a ^rtain stratum of society, in this 
aged. With the relaxation of morals and psychological t
case the 
rauma
Per)aríobamatl° L baSed °n a price of 20 reales or 2.5 pesos 
reales per‘arroba o f J ^ r  in Michoacan was 21
Was c. 18 5 realea Uring 1792-8, while in Morelos its price 
estimation of S e J n  ar£°ba ln 1800 ■ For an (inflated) 1800 see Tabled 1 °f sugar produced in Mexico around
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produced by the conquest, the alcoholic drink became widely 
consumed by the Mexican Indians. Until the 18th century, its 
production and commercialisation remained almost entirely in 
Indian hands. Later, Spanish landowners moved into the pulque 
business participating increasingly in its production. By the 
end of the 18th century Spanish hacendados controlled the major 
part of the production and distribution of the pulque consumed 
in Mexico City, although in Oaxaca and Puebla, the two other 
major centres of pulque consumption, Indian producers and 
traders were still in control. The crown started taxing the 
pulque that was introduced into major cities in 1668 and in 
1803 the tax was producing for New Spain's treasury 800,000 
pesos annually or 1% of its annual revenue. The figure given in 
Table 4 (p.156) fv,r the value of pulque corresponds to 1791 and, 
as it was estimated at its retail price, includes the margin 
pocketed by the bar owners, taxes and the cost of processing 
the maguey plant into pulque. However many of the maguey 
producers were also involved in pulque production and commer­
cialisation. An illustration of the profits derived from 
pulque production is provided by the Jesuit hacienda of Santa 
Lucia which entered the pulque business in the early 1740's.
By the mid 1760's it was the second major producer for the 
Mexico City market accounting for 18% of the pulque legally sold. 
Its net income derived from pulque increased from 5,883 pesos 
Per year in the early 1740's to 32,000 pesos p.a. in the mid 
I '60 s, despite the fact that they did not participate in its
c o m m e r c i a l i s a t i o n * (12)
To round off this overview of the agrarian production of 
colonial Mexico, we present in table 4 a rough contemporary 
estimation of the colony's economic production at the beginning
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of the 19th century. This shows a clear predominance of 
agriculture over mining and industry and within agriculture, 
internal consumption over exports. In the internal sector 
livestock and its by-products predominated while grains and 
orchard products constituted over two thirds of the farming 
sector. These figures would change substantially if we 
consider only commodity production, since a part of the grains 
produced (especially maize) was consumed directly on the 
hacienda and subsistence farms. The same happened, probably 
to a larger extent, with orchard products and livestock.
Conversely cash crops like tobacco, cacao, sugar, etc., would 
increase their relative importance in the total market production.
Appropriation of land by the Spaniards. During the 16th 
century three main ways of acquisition of lands were available 
to Spanish settlers in Mexico: land grants, purchase of lands 
from Indians, Spaniards or the crown, and the use of power 
associated with officialdom or encomendero status. Most of 
these practices were in principle illegal but became tacitly 
accepted by the crown, were incorporated into the legislation
as lawful practices or were banned when the mechanism fell into 
disuse.
Harvest land grants were assigned very early in colonial 
Mexico but did not reach numerical importance until the mid 16th 
ntury. The early economy of Mexico, based primarily on 
encomienda tribute left little space for agrarian enterprises 
except around Mexico City and Puebla. From the 1550's onwards, 
the expansion of mining in the north brought about an increase 
ln the demand for agricultural products and a series of colonisa­
tion projects in the Bajio and the far north. Due to the risks
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Table 4: Rough estimates of annual Mexican economic produet
around lbUO (in pesos ) (*)----------------
1. Agriculture
a) Internal consumption 
i. Farming
Maize and wheat 
Barley
Vegetables and seeds 
Fruit
Vegetable oil
Cotton
Tobacco
Sugar and sugar cane by-products 
Pulque
Other alcoholic drinks 
Hemp, cacao, wild wax, etc.
24.000. 000
945.000
12.000. 000
4.650.000
500.000 
731,250 
626,319
9,000,000
3,784,931
1.800.000 
1,700,000
Total farming
li- Livestock and its by-products
Poultry and eggs 
Cattle (including hides, milk 
and cheese)
Sheep and goats (including 
hides and wool)
Hogs
Tallow
Horses, mules and donkeys 
Total livestock
iii. Other products
Hunting
Fishing
Wood, charcoal, etc.
Total
6• Agricultural exports
Cochineal
Sugar
Other exports from New Spain 
Cacao from Tabasco 
Other exports from Tabasco 
Exports from Campeche (logwood, 
salt etc.)
Total agricultural export
Total agricultural sector
2. Industry
3. Transport 
4 • Mining
59 ,737 OO
9,000 ,000
30 ,000 ,000
11 ,325 ,000
13 ,000 ,000
11 ,403 , 125
1 ,187 ,000
75 ,915 , 125
100 ,000
150,,000
7,> 350,,000
7,,600,,000
1,.525, 000
533, 818
1, 523, 517
287, 500
96, 820
1, 021, 00 H
U f 988, 496
148, 2 4 1,1 2 1
43, 411, 618
6,400,000
29,301,000
65.2
19.12.8
12.9
Grand Total 227,353,739 100.0
(*) Source Quiros 1973 (1817): passim, especially 261-4. Not 
all the figures presented have the same value since the criteria 
of estimation are not uniform. In some cases (i.e. cattle) 
he estimates^Mexican production by extrapolating per capita 
consumption in Mexico City to the whole colony, including there­
fore commodity production as well as production of the sub­
sistence economy, and the non-marketed production of the 
haciendas. In others (i.e. pulque), only the legally marketed 
production at retail prices is included. In still other cases 
(i.e. tobacco; the value indicated corresponds to that received 
by the planters and not the retail price which was several 
times higher. The many shortcomings of his estimations have 
been pointed out in Ladd 1976:26 and Florescano (et al) 1980: 175-8.
involved in these settlements because of the existence of 
hostile Indians in the areas and the private character of the 
colonisation schemes, land grants were generously distributed. 
The allotment of harvest land grants was nothing but chaotic.
The official in charge of government was in theory the only 
one to issue these grants, but municipal councils established 
the custom of granting lands by themselves and, in isolated 
areas, the practice continued until the end of the 16th century.
The first move towards rationalisation of land grants 
was made in the mid 1530's by viceroy Mendoza who standardised 
the units of measurement in which land grants were to be allot­
ted (see Table 5). Mendoza also settled the problem of land 
ln respect to herding by establishing pasture grants which 
involved clear property rights over the soil. So far,and in 
accordance with peninsular practices, no property rights had 
been granted for livestock raising purposes,and herds were 
allowed to graze on the crown lands (i.e. common land) and the 
lands of the farmers after the harvest. Grants were made to 
specific ranchers to build huts and pens in an area and for­
bidding other ranchers to establish their herds within a
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radius of 1 league (2.6 miles), although farmers could estab­
lish their crops and fence fields inside that circle. The 
fact that municipal councils had already granted property 
rights over pasture lands and the need for a stimulus to a 
growing and necessary activity was probably in the mind of the 
viceroy. Moreover the pasture grants issued from around 
154-0 onwards merely gave a legal status, precarious as it was 
since it did not have the crown's approval, to a de facto 
situation; the occupation of lands by the ranchers five or 
ten years prior to the grant. Although herds continued to 
be allowed to graze on crown lands and the common land of the 
villages, ownership of land became a condition for ranchers to 
operate, since Spaniards were forbidden to have herds without 
possessing estancias (pasture lands). To protect Indian 
cultivation from the damage produced by the herds, grants 
were made from the late 1540's with the approval of local 
justices, chieftains and encomenderos and, later on in 1567, 
the viceroy commanded that grazing lands could not be less 
than half a mile from Indian villages or a quarter of a mile 
from crop lands. These arrangements did not however solve 
the contradiction between ranches and Indian communities who 
were both interested in expanding or preserving their land 
possessions, and these conflicts brought about constant liti­
gation and encroachment throughout the colonial period. (13)
Encomenderos and royal officials. The more dynamic 
encomenderos (as opposed to simple rentiers) acquired lands 
in the same way as any other colonist, through land grants, 
purchases or simple encroachments into Indian lands, both 
inside and outside the territories of the communities under
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their control. These practices, recognised by the local 
authorities, were increased by the right to forbid other 
Spaniards to acquire lands within the boundaries of their 
encomienda villages. From the mid 16th century, however, 
lands in the encomiendas' territory began to be granted to 
Spaniards other than the local encomendero and the acquisition 
of land by them was restricted. Finally in 1631 encomenderos 
were forbidden to have lands within the limits of their 
encomiendas. By that time however the political and economic 
power of the encomenderos had been severely eroded by the 
escheatment of encomiendas to the crown, taxation and the 
introduction of local judges (corregidores) into the Indian 
villages. (14.)
Together with encomenderos high officials, like viceroys, 
judges of the Audiencia, governors, etc., were in an excellent 
position in early colonial Mexico to acquire vast areas of 
land due to their status and income, which was second only to 
major encomenderos. Although forbidden to become entre­
preneurs in 1549 many high officials engaged in ranching, 
agriculture and other ventures. Some officials bought land 
on the market but others were granted land through proxies 
and at least one 16th century Mexico judge participated in 
the encroachment of Indian lands. A more discreet way of 
gaining power and prestige was the concession of grants to 
immediate dependents. For instance, Viceroy Velasco (1549- 
64) probably the most righteous viceroy of 16th century 
Mexico, granted around 100,000 acres to 22 of his servants.(15)
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Table 5: Land grant measures in colonial Mexico si ring the
1530's (*1-----------------------
Grant Va ras de Castilla sq miles acres
1. Estancia de ganado 
mayor (for cattle
and horses) 5,000 x 5,000 6.78 4,338
2. Estancia de ganado 
menor (sheep raising) 3,333 x 3,333 3.01 1,928
3. Caballeria
(harvest land grant) 1,104 x 552 0.17 105
(*) Source, Gibson 1964:276
Land sales. Recipients of estancias were able to sell 
their lands almost at once and many poor Spaniards did so.
At the same time influential patrons used their power to 
obtain grants for their proteges who transferred the lands 
thus acquired to their patrons. When caballerias were 
involved the grant title forbade its sale for a certain 
period (usually 4 - 6  years), but many grantees felt free to 
alienate their lands all the same and in the 1580's the 
viceroys themselves began to make dispensations in certain 
cases. Finally, during the 17th century these grants were 
issued with specific clauses permitting immediate sale. The 
alienation of Indian lands was submitted to several restric­
tions which Spaniards slowly eroded during the colonial 
period. Lands belonging to the community of the office of 
chieftain were considered inalienable; this applied in 
particular to the town site (fundo legal) which was equiva­
lent to around 250 acres. Indian land sales, when permitted, 
were to be performed in such a way as to ensure that the 
Indians were selling of their own free will and at fair prices. 
This protective legislation became increasingly meaningless as
I6l
the communities became eroded demographically and politically, 
the trend towards agricultural enterprises increased and the 
colonial state compromised with the Spanish landowners'interests 
through the mechanism of composición. Inside the native 
communities chieftains and nobles (principales) were able to 
sell their lands thus weakening the position of the whole 
community by admitting Spanish property rights within their 
boundaries and exposing themselves to future encroachments.
At the same time chieftains were able to appropriate community 
lands for themselves and sell them to Spaniards. The drastic 
demographic decline of the Indian communities helped in many 
ways to erode their landed patrimony. Firstly Indian municipal 
councils unable to pay tributes due to the diminishing number 
tributaries, felt compelled to sell unoccupied community 
lands to meet the tributary requirements. Secondly, the con­
gregation system or forced resettlement of scattered Indian 
hamlets in bigger units, with the consequent new allocation of 
lands according to the needs of a dwindling Indian population, 
diminished the acreage of community lands and opened new space 
for Spanish farmers. Finally even the town site was liable to 
alienation if the Indian villages lost their status through 
population losses or dependence on nearby haciendas. (16).
The sale of crown lands, ordered by the cédula of 1591 (see 
above), was enforced only slowly. During the first decade of 
the 17th century the first sales began to take place although 
free grants continued to be issued. In the next two decades 
the process became generalised and produced a significant 
income for the treasury. The payments of fees for the régu­
larisation of property titles (composiciones) was even slower 
and orders had to be reiterated by the crown in the 1630's.
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The first composiciones started to appear later that decade and 
continued throughout the century. In New Spain (central 
Mexico) the process had been completed by the 1670's and in 
New Galicia by the late 1690's. Sparsely populated frontier 
provinces did not complete the composición process until later, 
but by around 1700 all major estates throughout Mexico had final 
title deeds. (17)
The preceding description of the lines of agricultural pro­
duction and the mechanisms of formation of Spanish landed 
property in Mexico provide a qualitative framework within which 
we can analyse the role of the big landed estates (haciendas) in 
the following chapter. Before this we will survey the degree 
of control of agricultural areas by non-Indians in general and 
haciendas in particular. In the absence of statistics or even 
estimates for the whole colony we include below estimates of 
Hispanic/lndian land control for some regions for which data is 
available. We have divided the regions to be studied into 
three macro-regions: southern, central and northern Mexico.
^  Southern Mexico. Recent research has suggested that the 
Indians of Yucatan, Chiapas and Oaxaca retained a substantial 
degree of land control throughout the colonial period. The 
hacienda, which tended to control both land and labour in other 
regions of Mexico, grew slowly and late in the period in the 
south and seriously affected the land rights of the Indian 
towns only in the hinterlands of two or three major urban 
centres. Far from being left untouched by the Spaniards, the 
Indian economic surplus was appropriated by Spanish encomenderos, 
roerchants and bureaucrats through higher tributary rates than 
n rest of Mexico (Chiapas, Yucatan), forced commerce with
- 163 -
the Spanish authorities and its associates, the merchants, 
(Oaxaca, Chiapas) and, eventually, labour repartimientos 
(Oaxaca). This weakness of the hacienda in the south seems to 
have been due to the lack of important mineral resources or 
highly marketable crops suitable for a plantation type of ex­
ploitation, and the relative isolation of the area from the 
main trade routes which resulted in a sparse Spanish population 
and a consequent lack of significant markets.
The Indian population of Yucatan was concentrated in the 
districts of Valladolid and Merida where the administrative 
centre was located. The Spanish population was concentrated 
m  Merida and Campeche. The district of Valladolid isolated 
from the commercial route between Merida and its port, Campeche, 
remained virtually untouched by Spanish land encroachments, 
purchases or grants throughout the period. Around Merida and 
on the route to Campeche, big Spanish landed estates tended to 
develop. By the second half of the 17th century a belt of 
20 to 30 miles of cattle haciendas surrounded the city of
ida. By the 18th century maize haciendas were beginning to 
displace the traditional suppliers of the grain, the Indian 
munities. This indicates a degree of land appropriation by 
the Spaniards sufficient to create a landless Indian labour 
force, a process which does not seem to have occurred in the 
district of Valladolid. In Chiapas the Indian population 
emained in full control of the landed resources throughout the 
colonial period, although they were subjected to the extortions 
°f the local bureaucrats through forced commerce (repartos).
P nsion of haciendas on a significant level only occurred at 
beginning of the 19th century and again centred around the 
®ain urban centre, Ciudad Real. (18)
I
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For the Valley of Oaxaca in the intendancy of the same 
name more concrete data is available. In the valley, Indians 
remained the owners of over half of the lands, including the 
best farm land, until independence. They also owned more head 
of livestock than the Spaniards. This did not represent a 
fair distribution of land since Indians represented around 80$ of 
the total population and an even higher percentage if we include 
only the rural population. However by the end of the colonial 
period only three or four villages (out of well over 50) were 
forced to seek employment in Spanish haciendas due to lack of 
land, and a few others had to engage in a share cropping arrange­
ment with haciendas for the same reason. Villages with scarce 
land resources were located, as would be expected, around 
Antequera, the administrative centre and the most fertile 
part of the valley. As in Chiapas the lack of substantial 
control over the land and labour by the Spaniards was compensa­
ted for by the 1reparto' trade in cochineal and other commodities. 
The most profitable repartos practised by the Alcaldes Mayores 
(Indian justices) in New Spain were those of the intendancy of 
Oaxaca at least one of which was within the limits of the 
valley.(19)
The centre. Within this region there was a variety of 
patterns of Spanish settlement and land appropriation, some of 
which were similar to those of the other regions. Demographic, 
geographical and political traits specific to this region, 
however, made the appropriation of a significant amount of 
Indian land and its direct exploitation the dominant pattern.
The area comprises, apart from coastal areas and semi-tropical 
valleys, the central high plateau which was the core of the 
Aztec political system and the most densely populated region
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in Mexico. This obviously accounts for the concentration of 
the Spanish population there as they needed to be close to 
their sources of tribute and later the labour supply for their 
haciendas, industries, businesses and their personal comfort. 
Another factor reinforcing the preference of the Spaniards to 
settle in central Mexico was the relative fertility of the 
soil and the closeness of the mining centres in the north 
which, lacking sufficient agricultural production, had to 
rely on the centre for an important part of the foodstuffs it 
required. We will study six regions for which pertinent 
data is available. Although the sample is small it seems to 
be representative since it includes regions of different ec­
ology, Indian population density and economic interest for the 
Spaniards.
1) The Indians of the Valley of Mexico were the ones most 
affected by Spanish appropriation of lands in 16th century 
Mexico. Gibson has estimated Indian land losses as o w  half 
of the total land area and some three quarters of the arable 
land resources of the valley between 1520-1620. As demogra­
phic losses during that period were even higher no immediate 
carcity of lands for the Indian communities occurred. The 
demographic recovery of the late 17th and 18th centuries 
accompanied by still further minor land losses created, by the 
end of the 18th century, a sizeable stratum of peasants with­
out enough land resources for subsistence. It also brought 
about, from the mid 17th century onwards, a series of legal 
illegal confrontations between the hacienda owners and the 
eighbouring Indian villages. The prevailing situation of the 
Indian communities of the valley at the end of the 18th century 
characterised by Tutino as one in which 'a sizeable minority
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held nothing more than their house lots; half of the com­
munity or a little more had additional agricultural plots, but 
insufficient to produce subsistence for the average family; 
another minority enjoyed generally adequate subsistence 
holdings; and a tiny elite had extensive lands' . There was 
then, a sizeable surplus population able to supply labour to 
the haciendas both on a permanent or a seasonal basis. This 
was the effect of a growing Indian population faced with 
limited land resources and productivity, a situation which 
forced the Indians to take up employment in the haciendas or 
to emigrate to Mexico City or the far north.(20)
2) The city of Puebla was founded in 1531 in a virtually un­
inhabited place with the purpose of avoiding conflicts with 
the Indian communities and creating a stratum of Spanish 
farmers without encomiendas. This expanded rapidly due to the 
favourable geographical situation in between Mexico City and 
Veracruz, the main port of the colony, and the services of 
Indians of the surrounding areas, especially Tlaxcala, granted 
in an early form of repartimiento. Understandably little or 
no appropriation of Indian lands occurred in the jurisdiction 
of Puebla. However Puebla settlers rapidly incorporated 
lands of neighbouring jurisdiction of dense Indian population 
to their patrimonies (notably Atrisco and Cholula) and 
established wheat and livestock haciendas which entered into 
conflict with the Indian communities. Within Puebla itself, 
the settlement of a sizeable number of poor Spaniards with 
land grants ranging from one to two caballerías and the non 
existence of encomiendas limited the expansion of the lati- 
fundia in the jurisdiction. Poor Spaniards successfully 
opposed the acquisition of vast land grants by a few powerful
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individuals, a process which was very common in 16th century 
Mexico. On the other hand, the lack of encomiendas and the 
relatively democratic character of the allocations of reparti­
miento Indians among the settlers, seem to have given strength 
to these small farmers throughout the period. This was 
facilitated by the favourable location of the jurisdiction and 
the early establishment of commerce and industry there, which 
created a good market for Puebla's agricultural products and, 
m  turn, raised the price of land making its concentration in 
a few hands difficult. (21)
3) The province of Tlaxcala, only a few miles to the north of 
Puebla was, like the valley of Mexico, densely populated at 
the time of the conquest. Unlike the Indian states of the 
Valley of Mexico,they fought on the side of the Spaniards and, 
as a former ally, obtained a number of concessions from the 
crown, among them exemption from encomiendas and from land 
grants to Spaniards within their territory; the latter was 
not strictly enforced. In the 1550's infiltration of 
Spaniards into Tlaxcala society, including acquisition of 
lands was in progress and it seems to have reached its peak 
m  the early 17th century at the time the Indian population 
reached its lowest level for the whole colonial period.
Tlaxcalan Indian government legally fought this infiltration 
but to no avail, since Tlaxcalans themselves were selling land 
bo the Spaniards and were keeping enough for their subsistence 
needs. We do not know the extent of land appropriation by the 
Spaniards in the 18th century but it must have been significant 
since in 1791 there were 243 haciendas and wheat farms and 
the non-Indian population stood at 19,175 (3/7 of whom were 
Spaniards) or 27$ of the total in 1777. (22)
i  \
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4) In Meztitlan some 100 miles north east of Mexico City, 
Spanish land appropriation followed a pattern similar to that 
in the Valley of Mexico, although the pace was slower and its 
extent more limited. During the 16th century Spanish acqui­
sition of land was modest but it accelerated rapidly during
the early 17th century, a period of drastic Indian depopulation. 
In the 1630's Indian litigation to retain lands which had been 
encroached by the Spaniards started and many of their claims 
were favoured by the royal judges, although a bias towards the 
Spaniards was always present. By the end of the 18th century 
Indians retained little over half of Meztitlan's lands. Of 
this only about 6$ was of high agricultural value, an additional 
36$ was pasture and marginal farming land and the rest was of 
little economic value. Osborn's estimation of the agricul­
tural product available per Indian in the 18th century indi­
cates that it reached or surpassed the minimal subsistence 
requirements. However as Indian population increased (by 
65$ between 1753-1803), the balance between arable land and 
Indian population became increasingly critical. This lias 
expressed towards the end of the 18th century in disputes over 
the distribution of land within the communities and in the 
proportion of Indian tributaries permanently employed by the 
haciendas which reached 6.6$ (or 232 tributaries) in 1803.
The latter figure although not indicative of a total depend­
ence of the Indians on the hacienda resources reflects a 
higher degree of dependence than in the rest of central Mexico 
where the proportion was only 2.8$ (see table 7). (23)
5) As in other Mexican regions large haciendas sprang up in 
the intendancy of Michoacan at the beginning of the 17th
century after the reduction of Indians to towns and population
losses left free spaces for the Spanish haciendas. By 
around 1800, the 260 Indian villages of the intendancy con­
trolled some 60,000 acres or more which were made up of their 
'fundos legales' or minimum legal land allocation, 250 acres 
per village, some 1,100 acres in small plots, 16 orchards 
and just over 2,000 sq miles of pastures. Indian communities 
also owned 18 out of ¿26 haciendas (or 2? of the intendance 
haciendas) and 353 ranchos (small size landed estates) out 
of the 1,243 in the intendancy (or 28 .U% of the total). As 
the size of these haciendas and ranchos is not known it is 
impossible to determine the percentage of lands available to 
the Indian villages on average or the acreage available per 
Indian. However the totals for irrigated land and its 
distribution are known and this gives us a clue to the land 
structure of the intendancy. Of a total of 24,599 irrigated 
fanegas (a fanega is on average 10.9 acres), 5,754 or 23.4? 
were controlled by 51 communities and the rest by 110 haciendas. 
The absence of irrigated lands for over 200 Indian villages 
points to an inequality between the communities themselves, 
not to mention the contrast between the Indian and the 
hacienda sectors. This is confirmed by data on the fundo 
legal lands. Forty eight villages (18.4?) lacked part of 
the 250 acres defined by the crown as the minimum subsistence 
requirement of an Indian village. The average number of 
acres missing from the fundo legal in these communities was 
79 but in two of these villages the proportion missing from 
the fundo legal was over 50?. Most of these communities with 
scarce land resources were located in the area around the 
administrative centre and ecclesiastical see of Valladolid 
where cereal haciendas had developed more quickly. A
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comparison between two micro-regions within Michoacan can 
illustrate this imbalance further. The 8 communities surround­
ing the city of Valladolid in the high plateau had a total of 
1,014- acres and 1 rancho. Leaving aside the latter they lacked 
996 acres to complete the fundo legal requirements. On the 
other hand in the lowlands of Tepalc atepec in Tacintaro, the 
ten Indian communities had full access to their 'fundos legales', 
owned 3 haciendas, 4.1 ranchos and some pasture land and house 
plots. Despite this favourable situation the villages of 
Tejalcatepec had lost over a third of their original lands by 
the beginning of the 18th century and in the well watered 
areas this amounted to over three quarters of the land. These 
land losses were accompanied by population decline in the 16th 
and 17th centuries with no demographic recovery in the 18th 
century. As a result of this the sugar haciendas of the micro­
region had to rely on African slaves and their mulatto off­
spring for the supply of labour.
This pattern of development of the agrarian structure was 
probably common to the whole of lowland southern Michoacan 
(Motines, Cinagua, Xiquilpa) where sugar, indigo, cacao and 
cattle haciendas imported large numbers of negro slaves after 
the demographic decline of the 16th and 17th centuries. The 
37 communities of these three jurisdictions had almost full 
fundo legal allocations and only three of them lacked land.
They also controlled five haciendas, 56 ranchos, 178 acres of 
arable land plus around 4-50 sq miles of pastures. In contrast 
to this in the northern highlands the Indian demographic 
increase and the expansion of the cereal haciendas created a
Plus population of vagabonds and laborios (hacienda workers)
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which by 1800 accounted for 23.K% of the Indian tributaries, 
the highest proportion in the whole central region (see Table 
7). (24)
6) Unfortunately we know little about the land structure of 
the sugar producing area of Morelos. The available information 
indicates that during the reduction of Indians to villages in 
the 1550's and 1560's and in 1600-5 former Indian lands became 
available for sugar growing and livestock haciendas. Most 
land grants to Spaniards were given in the early 17th century 
and definitive titles arranged by the composiciones of lands 
m  the 1640's. Drastic Indian population decline during the 
first century of colonisation permitted the process of approp­
riation of land by the Spaniards to proceed relatively smoothly. 
However the Indian recovery of the 18th century accompanied by 
an expansion of the sugar haciendas by the end of the century 
had created a shortage of lands for the communities close to 
the sugar producing areas. This was reflected in the increase 
of litigation over land from the 1780's. With respect to the 
control of the labour force of the region, haciendas employed, 
on either a temporary or permanent basis, around 12% of the 
population and this percentage would increase if we considered 
only the population able to work. Since the Indian population 
was only 66$ of the total, we cannot arrive at any conclusion 
in regard to the degree of dependence of the Indians on the 
hacienda land resources. However the difficulties encountered 
hy the haciendas in obtaining seasonal labour and the coercive 
methods used to procure it point to a relative sufficiency of 
land resources for the communities. (25)
The north. Probably the main characteristic of this macro- 
region during the colonial period was the scarcity of the pre-
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híspanle Indian settlements, their lack of political organisa­
tion and their hostility towards the Spanish conquistadores.
A second feature retarding Spanish settlement was the aridity 
of the region. Lack of moisture, except round the river 
basins, made agriculture difficult although pastures were 
plentiful during the rainy season and permitted the raising of 
huge herds of livestock. Finally the rich silver mines of 
Zacatecas, Sombrerete, Parral, etc., constituted a powerful 
attraction for the Spanish settlers despite the difficulties 
created by the two other factors mentioned. In the absence of 
organised, sedentary communities, except in Guadalajara, the 
tributary mechanism of the encomienda had little success and 
the appropriation of Indian labour took on a more brutal 
aspect. Indian slavery and forms akin to it were practised 
where the hostility of the Indians legitimised it or the 
colonists had a free hand to practise it. Jesuit and Fran­
ciscan missions on the other hand permitted a more pacific 
acculturation of the Indian tribes and their settlement in 
villages which occasionally provided labour power and food­
stuffs to the neighbouring Spanish settlements. Indian 
communities from the centre of Mexico also helped in the 
acculturation of the northern tribes, thus providing agricul­
tural surpluses and labour for the Spanish settlements and 
securing the frontiers of the empire. (26)
The sparseness of the Indian population permitted a rapid 
and virtually unchallenged legal appropriation of land by the 
Spaniards. Actual possession and exploitation was a different 
matter since landed estates and towns in the north were 
constantly threatened by warlike Chichimecs, Apaches and other 
tribes and suffered from shortages of labour. The private
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character of the conquest in the far north (Nueva Vizcaya and 
Nuevo Leon) enhanced the possibilities for the Spaniards to 
acquire big landed estates. Successive governors financed 
and led small private armies and slowly settled the kingdoms 
of the far north. They allotted generous grants to the 
settlers, entrepreneurs of central Mexico and themselves. In 
Nuevo Leon normal land grants consisted of 40 to 50 sheep 
estancias (or 120 to 150 sq miles) and they could be as large 
as 70 estancias. After approximately a quarter of a century 
of colonisation (1625-50) the best agricultural regions of 
Nuevo Leon had been granted to a few rich sheepmen. In New 
Vizcaya, although land grants seem to have been smaller, 
governors managed to carve out large estates for themselves. 
Outstanding among them was the governor Francisco de Urdinola 
(1603-12 or 15) who amassed a latifundium of 16,626,850 acres 
or over 18,000 sq miles in Coahuila. His descendants through 
marital alliances and purchases increased this area to over
22,000 sq miles by the mid 18th century. Other latifundia in 
18th century Coahuila included the Vazquez Borrego estate 
which amounted to over 2,000 sq miles, the Jesuit -hacienda 
de los homos' with over 1,000 sq miles and the Garza Falcon 
estate which controlled 714 sq miles . (27)
In the rest of the macro-region (New Galicia and the 
Bejio) landed estates were of a more moderate size. Thus in 
the Bajio no single hacienda seems to have covered more than the 
Sq miles reached by the -Corralejo' hacienda by the early 
18th century, while in the Guadalajara hinterland the biggest 
estate, -Cuisillos', covered only 78 sq miles in the 18th 
century. More important from the point of view of its 
Production and value, was the -Cienaga de Mata- estate which
extended over 1,341 sq miles of more fertile land and was 
located in a more central position in the north of the intendancy 
of Guadalajara. As can be seen in map 2, the capacity for 
accumulation of land was in inverse proportion to the proximity 
of the administrative and economic centres (Mexico City, 
Guadalajara, Guanajuato). This relation becomes more complex, 
however, if we consider the provision of labour, Indian 
settlements, Indian land retention and other variables. We 
will outline such questions by analysing three areas within 
the macro-region for which pertinent data is available: the 
Bajio, the Guadalajara hinterland and eastern San Luis de 
Potosi. (28)
1) The Bajio. This region was composed of the intendancy of 
Guanajuato and the southern part of the jurisdiction of 
Queretaro and it lay just outside the limits of the pre- 
hispanic Aztec settlement. In contrast with other northern 
areas inhabited mainly by hostile Indians it was made up of 
fertile lands which soon became the granary of the mining 
north. Local silver mining in Guanajuato and textile in­
dustries in Queretaro, Leon and so on increased the market for 
the agricultural products of the area. Since only small 
pockets of sedentary Indians existed during the conquest the 
importance of encomiendas was virtually nil. The Spanish 
settlement of the region began in the second half of the 16th 
century. The Indian labour force was provided by Tlaxcalan 
Otomi, Tarascan and Mexican Indians brought from the south as 
part of a planned colonisation scheme and individual Indians who 
followed later. Indian villages and Spanish towns were
P vided with land, in the latter case individual allotments
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seem to have been between 2 and U caballerías per citizen and 
in the case of Indian villages they were far more modest. As 
in Puebla a stratum of small farmers emerged and maintained 
independent production (either as proprietors or tenants) until 
the end of the colonial period although an important process 
of land concentration seems to have occurred in the 18th 
century. Away from the Spanish and Indian towns, however, 
accumulation of land through generous grants started around 
1600 and land occupation was completed by the 1790's. At 
time almost all of the 52 Indian communities of the 
intendancy of Guanajuato had lost most of their lands and 
depended on the haciendas for subsistence in the form of 
peonage, tenancy or seasonal employment. In the absence of 
concrete data on land occupation, the list of Indian tribu­
taries of c. 1800 (see Table 7) permits us to infer the degree 
of land deprivation in the Guanajuato intendancy. According
to this over two thirds of the Indian tributaries (which with 
their families represented around 278,000 individuals) were 
vagabonds or laboríos employed by the haciendas. The enormous 
amount of surplus population that this figure represents can 
be explained by at least three factors. Firstly the small 
size of the original allocation of lands for the Indian 
illages of San Miguel and Coecillo received 367 acres each 
(or around 3.5 caballerías) while at the same time the Spanish 
town of Leon got the lion's share, 22,000 acres, each citizen 
ing entitled to 3¿ caballerías. Secondly an impressive 
growth of the Indian population in the Bajio during the late
I  ry i  ,
and 18th centuries, especially before the mid 18th 
ntury.was due in part to immigration from central Mexico.
Él
4 *
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Finally the even higher Increase in the non-Indian population 
(Spanish, mestizoes and mulattoes), which comprised more 
than 55% of the total population in 1793, and the profitability 
of agriculture in the area left little space for the Indian 
villages to subsist, let alone e x p a n d . (29)
2* —  Guadala,jara Hinterland Before the conquest this 
region belonged to the area of influence of the Aztecs and 
its population shared with them basic cultural traits, the 
practice of sedentary agriculture and a high degree of poli­
tical organisation. The region was situated on the north­
west borders of the central high plateau and geographically 
as well as historically belonged to central Mexico rather than 
the north. We have included it in the northern macro-region 
because its urban centre (Guadalajara) extended its judicial 
authority, commercial and financial influence and diocesan 
jurisdiction towards the north, reaching in some cases the 
northernmost frontiers of the empire. Data on population 
and encomienda are scarce, but they suggest a less dense 
original population than in the core of central Mexico and a 
relatively low importance of the encomienda system. However, 
compared with the Bajio and the rest of the macro-region 
population density was high. (30)
The patterns of land distribution within the region 
indicate the retention of sufficient land resources by the 
Indians throughout the colonial period and that only a few
(v) See Ghapt 
of the Indian
production.
er 4. below for an explanation of the vulnerabili 
village in a situation of dominant commodity ty
Indian communities suffered severe shortages of lands by 
the end of the 18th century. However, it is clear that by 
that time the resources for the subsistence of the communities 
(water, wood, etc) were severely restricted by the hacienda 
owners, and that communities who had rights to free access to 
these resources had to do without them or pay for them. As 
in other Mexican regions Indian population decline and the 
reductions of Indians to towns in the 17th century preceded 
a series of land grants to the Spaniards and, in the late 
17th century, a process of composiciones. By around 1700, 
ownership of large landed estates had been consolidated and, 
subsequently only minor changes occurred. These involved 
partition of small landed estates among heirs, encroachment 
of some Indian arable land by the haciendas, disputes among 
Indian communities over land and so on. As might be expected 
scarcity of land for the Indian communities occurred around 
Guadalajara city and especially towards the fertile lands of 
the south and east. Data for the intendancy of Guadalajara 
as a whole (Table 7) confirm the relative sufficiency of land 
resources for the Indian communities. Only 12% of the Indian 
population had to depend mainly on resources other than the 
communities' for their subsistence.(31)
^' Sastern San Luis de Potosi Before the conquest the 
territory was occupied by the Pame Indians, a branch of the 
Chichimecs who were also hunters and gatherers but less 
bellicose than the other Chichimec tribes. From around 1600 
Indians from the south, livestock owners from Queretaro and 
Franciscan friars established Indian towns, haciendas and 
missions. Indian towns and Spanish settlers were given land 
grants, and Pames and other Chichimecs were settled among
the southern Indian towns, and were rapidly assimilated by 
them. The case of the Indian town of Rio Verde suggests that 
by the 1680's the Indian population of the area had severely 
declined. By the end of the 18th century, however, the 
Alcaldia Mayor of San Luis de Potosi (east and west) was 
expanding its Indian population which almost doubled between 
1743-4 and 1800 and this must have put pressure on Indian land 
and water resources. Thus the Indian pattern of residence 
(see Table 6) shows a clear dependence of the Indian population 
on the Spanish estates. Almost half of the Indians lived and 
worked on Spanish estates. The rest lived in 9 Indian towns, 
each of which seem to have been allocated 4 sq leagues of 
land (6.76 sq miles or 4,326 acres).(vi) it is worth noting 
that the biggest estates were concentrated in the most fertile 
area of Rio Verde and that there almost two thirds (63.7?) 
of the Indian population lived in the haciendas. In the other 
two areas only around a third of the Indians depended on the 
resources of the haciendas. (3 3)
The previous analysis permits us to discern the patterns 
of Indian land retention/Spanish appropriation in Mexico. Table 
7, which divides the Indian tributary population between 
community Indians, vagabonds and hacienda workers, allows us 
to check our case analysis against a more general background.
The southern Indian communities retained enough land to provide 
for their subsistence needs and the appropriation of Indian
g r a n t - » ¿ as ti16 Case of the town of Ri0 Verde whose initial L in ?! 3° aq leaguea was reduced to 4 sq leagues after its
S r e S  i101\ decline’ The 'fund0 leSa1' in new Galicia was iur-iad’ +• Sq leagues. In New Spain, however, whose
was only 2?S a c r e s ? ^ )  ^  fUnd° legal
180
Table 6: Towr, and Hacienda Population inCuis de ? otosi■ 1800 (*)
Sub-Regions
1. Valle del Maiz 2 towns 15 estates Total
Non- , 
Indians *
1.138 31.8 
2.135 62.2 3,273 100.0
Indians
1,070
HI1,181
72.1
27.9100.0
Total
2,208
2,5191,757
*
16.153.6100.0
Average
1,101170
2. Rio 
Verde 3 towns 18 estates Total
3,286
6,89110,177
32.367.7100.0
2,8595,0097,868
36.363.7100.0
6,11311,900
18,013
31.066.0 100.0
2,018661
3. High­lands ¿towns13 estates Total
1,1162,108
3,551
10.7
59.3100.0
3,3221.3101,632
71.728.3100.0
1,7683.1188,186
58.211.8100.0
1,192263
Combinedsub-regions 9 towns ¿6 estates Total
5,870
11.13117,001
31.565.5 100.0
7,2516,73313,981
51.918.1
100.0
13,12117,86730,986
12.357.7100.0
1# ¿57 388
(*) Source!S Frost et al (eds) 1979: 318.
surplus labour operated through tribute, repartos and 
repartimientos and not directly through the monopoly of land 
property by the hacendados. In areas of some development of 
the hacienda system (Merida, Antequera) a landless peasantry 
was emerging but its weight within the context of the whole 
macro-region was insignificant (less than 1 % ). In central 
Mexico the proportion of landless Indians was hardly higher 
(2.8$) but two trends in operation in this macro-region 
suggest that the limitation of land resources of the Indian 
communities was higher than this percentage indicates. Firstly, 
the constant emigration of Indians of the area towards the 
north to work in the mines and haciendas diminished the burden 
°f“ an increasing population on constant land resources. Secondly 
the need to supplement the income from their own lands with 
payment obtained through seasonal work in the nearby haciendas 
indicates that the communities were in an unstable situation,
181
constantly threatened by famines and epidemics. In the north, 
the reliance of the Indians on the haciendas was considerable. 
Only 59.3% of the tributary Indians of the macro-region lived 
in the communities and this proportion would diminish to about 
50$ if we excluded Guadalajara where conditions similar to 
central Mexico prevailed. In the rest of the intendancies, 
Arizpe excluded, the haciendas had by 1805 severely reduced 
the land and water rights of the Indian communities and created 
m  the far north coercive mechanisms to retain Indians in 
their domains (debt peonage, slavery, congregations, etc).
In the more fertile areas (the Bajio, southern San Luis), 
land rentals and better wages attracted Indian immigrants 
from the centre and the surplus population of the local 
communities.
(b) Peru
As in Mexico the encomienda system in the first years 
of colonisation provided the Spanish colonists with the food­
stuffs necessary for survival and surpluses to barter for 
bullion or coin and spend on luxurious consumption or invest­
ment. Thus aboriginal crops and animals (maize, potatoes, llamas, 
etc) were integrated rapidly into the circulation network 
established by the Spaniards and headed by the encomenderos.
The cultural dependence of the Spanish population on the 
consumption of wheat, beef and other European items which were 
expensive imports in this early period, and the formation of 
incipient markets in Lima and, later on, in the mining town
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Table 7: Tributary Population in Mexico around 1805 («)
Intendancy Indians
Northern Mexico (1) Living in Communi ties t Laborios and Vagabonds t TotalIndians FreeNegroids Total
Arizpe 1.841 100.0 0 0 . 0 1,841 2 . 2 1 4 4,055
San Luis 12,415 64.8 6,742 3 5 . 2 19,157 1 0 , 5 4 4 29,701
Zacatecas 5,900 64.5 3,246 3 5 . 5 9,146 12,786 21,932
Guanajuato 15,961 32.0 33.865 6 8 . 0 49,826 10,930 58,896
Guadalajara 26,285 98.8 351 1 . 2 28,636 15,217 43,853
Total N. Mexico 64,402 59.3 44,204 4 0 . 7 108,606 51,691 158,437
Central Mexico ( 2)
Mexico 223,720 98.5 3.332 1 . 5 227,052 10,94e 238,000
Puebla 100,776 99.3 728 0 . 7 101,504 2,496 1 0 4 , 0 0 0
Michoacan 26,372 81.5 5.971 18.5 32,343 12,892 45,235
Veracruz 29,016 96.3 1,100 3.7 30,118 1,321 31,439
Total C. 
Mexico 379,886 97.2 11,131 2.8 391,017 27,657 418,674
Southern Mexico f 3)
Oaxaca 83,139 99.3 611 0.7 83,750 3,489 87,239
Yucatan 69,300 99.0 700 1.0 70,000
TotalMexico 596,727 91.3 5 6 , 6 4 6 8.7 6 5 3 , 3 7 3
(*) Source: Cook and Borah 1971: 283-4* 290, 269.
(1) It does not include the intendancy of Durango which had no tributaries. Also excluded are the areas of Coahuila Nuevo Leon and Texas which fell under the jurisdiction of San Luis de Pofosi.
(2) We have included the whole intendency of Veracruz in the centre 
since we do not have separate data for centrpl and southern Veracruz•
(3) Excludes Chiapas. For Yucatan the percentages were calculated on the total population and therefore we assume that the ratio tributary/total population was the same in the communities
and outside them. Total estimated tributary population in 
Yucatan in Bernal 1972: 31.
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Table 7: Tributary Population in Mexico around 1805 («)
Intendancy Indians
Northern Mexico (1) Living in Communi ties t Laborios and Vagabonds t TotalIndians FreeNegroids Total
Arizpe 1.841 1 0 0 . 0 0 0.0 >—* oo M 2.214 4,055
San Luis 12.415 6 4 . 8 6,742 35.2 19,157 10.544 29,701
Zacatecas 5.900 6 4 . 5 3,246 35.5 9.146 12,786 21,932
Guanajuato 15,961 3 2 . 0 33.865 68.0 49,826 10,930 58,896
Guadalajara 28,285 98.8 351 1.2 28,636 15,217 43,853
Total N. Mexico 64,402 59.3 44,204 40.7 108,606 51.691 158,437
Central Mexico (2)
Mexico 223,720 98.5 3.332 1.5 227,052 10,948 238,000
Puebla 100,776 99.3 728 0.7 101,504 2,496 1 0 4 , 0 0 0
Michoacan 26,372 81.5 5,971 18.5 32.343 12,892 45,235
Veracruz 29,016 96.3 1,100 3.7 30,118 1,321 31,439
Total C. Mexico 379,886 97.2 11,131 2.8 391,017 27,657 418,674
Southern Mexico (3)
Oaxaca 83.139 99.3 611 0.7 83.750 3,489 87,239
Yucatan 69,300 99.0 700 1.0 70,000
TotalMexico 596,727 91.3 56,646 8.7 653,373
(*:) Source: Cook and Borah 1971: 283-4, 290, 269.
(1) It does not include the intendancy of Durango which had no tributaries. Also excluded are the areas of Coahuila Nuevo Leon and Texas which fell under the jurisdiction of San Luis de Potosi.
(2) We have included the whole intendency of Veracruz in the centre 
since we do not have separate data for centrpl and southern 
Veracruz•
(3) Excludes Chiapas. For Yucatan the percentages were calculated on the total population and therefore we assume that the ratio tributary/total population was the same in the communities
and outside them. Total estimated tributary population in 
Yucatan in Bernal 1972: 31.
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of Potos!, stimulated the production of European livestock 
and crops on an increasing scale from the late 1540's. The 
formation of these markets was the result of a combination of 
factors which included: the growth of the Spanish and his- 
panised population (blacks, mulattos and mestiZos), who were 
either non-direct producers or workers without means of pro­
duction, the drastic demographic decline, which led to a 
decrease in the surplus received by the encomenderos as 
tributes, and the development of silver mining, which created 
a significant mass of landless consumers and, at the same 
time, the means of payment for commercial transactions and 
the financing of non-productive activities (government, 
church, services, etc). A corollary of the formation of an 
agricultural market was the increase in the value of land 
and the interest of the colonists in land appropriation through 
different mechanisms which we will analyse below. (3 5)
Old world livestock arrived in Peru with the conquis­
tadores in the early 1530-s or soon afterwards. However, it 
was only after c 1 5 5 0 that livestock raising acquired impor­
tance when encomenderos, other farmers and Indians became 
involved in ranching. This was reflected in the falling prices 
of livestock and its by-products shown in Table 8. Initially 
livestock raising was concentrated in the coastal valleys 
close to Lima but later it was displaced to the sierra and the 
tropical valleys of the north by the more profitable intensive 
agriculture. The lack of vast pastures suitable for livestock 
grazing combined with the increase of demand for livestock 
and its by-product s created a deficit in its supply which,
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from the late 16th century, had to be made up with cattle 
brought from Ecuador and later Argentina, tallow and hide 
from Chu.e and mules, which replaced the native llamas as 
pack animals, from Argentina. It is only with respect to 
sheep that the area seems to have been self-sufficient 
providing wool for the numerous textile mills.
Wheat, the staple food of the Spaniards, was cultivated 
in Peru where climatic conditions and local demand permitted. 
Difficulties of transport and the relatively low price of the 
grain impeded mass production, although the markets of Lima 
and Potosi generated an important amount of wheat production. 
The valleys surrounding Potosi and the valleys of Cochabamba, 
despite their remoteness provided Potosi with over 100,000 
bushels of wheat p.a. in the early 17th century and the 
farmers with high returns. Lima, with a higher demand for 
wheat, had a hinterland which was suitable for wheat culti­
vation but had to import over half of it from other coastal 
valleys in central and northern Peru. Here, relatively cheap 
maritime transport allowed the grain easily to reach Lima and 
eventually Panama and Ecuador. After the 1687 earthquake and 
the consequent smut epidemic, wheat farmers in the coastal 
valleys switched to sugar cane or other crops which were not 
affected. From then until the end of the colonial period the 
Lima market heavily depended on imports of Chilean wheat to 
cover its shortfall. (36)
Sugar and wine production in colonial Peru were capital 
intensive and profitable enterprises which provided the only 
significant agricultural export of the colony. The high 
prices commanded in 16th century Peru by Spanish wines and the
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Table 8: Livestock. Beef and Wheat Prites in 16th
Horses Mules Beef Wheat Bread
Year Average Trices Average Prices (in pesos) (in pesos) (in Mara­vedíes (in Mara- vedies
1535 900 per lb) per lb)15371540 590 6241548 350 341550
15541556
1570's
165 470
294170
21.24 9.713.6
4.25
(*) Source: Mellafe 1969: 23-4: Keith 1976: 60, 66, 69.
suitability of the southern coastal valleys for their production 
. lnduced many sma11 and medium sized farmers to engage in wine 
production in the late 16th century. The privileged location 
of the valleys close to the Lima and Potosi markets, the lack 
of competition in Spanish America (Chile excepted) and the 
quality reached by the product ensured the profitability and 
expansion of production. Thus during the first half of the 
17th century probably one million jars of wine of around 3 
gallons each with a total value of 3 .5 million pesos were 
produced annually in Peru. We do not have production figures 
for the 18th century but the information available suggests a 
state of constant overproduction, which the Peruvian producers 
tried to overcome by snuggling wine into the Mexican and 
Central American markets which were reserved by the crown for 
Spanish wine from 1 7 1 4  to 1774.
Sugar production was concentrated in the coastal valleys 
north of Lima and to a lesser extent in other coastal valleys 
and the warm valleys around Cuzco. Production in the latter was
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orientated towards Potosi and Upper Peru in general while the
coastal valleys supplied mainly Lima but also reached Chile
and Ecuador. The increase of the areas under cultivation along
the northern coast during the late 17th century saturated the
existing markets and put the profitability of the crop in the
coastal valleys at risk by lowering the sugar prices. The
response of the big sugar haciendas was to increase production
in order to retain their levels of income thus depressing
prices still further. Thus the price of an arroba (25 lb)
of sugar in Lima fell from ¿.6 pesos in the early 1690's
to 3.3 pesos in the next four or five decades and to 1 . 7
pesos in the 1750's and early 1760-s. During the last 50 years
of the colonial period sugar prices seem to have risen again,
(i.e. 2.5 pesos per arroba before 1818), transforming the crop
into the most profitable in Peruvian agriculture. (38)
Potatoes and maize were the basic staples of Indian
agriculture in Peru. Before and after the conquest potatoes
dominated the agriculture of the high plateaux where it was
almost impossible to grow other crops, while maize was grown
in the warm coastal and Andean valleys. Both continued to be
mainly Indian food throughout the colonial period. They were
despised by the Spaniards as nourishment but valued as a source
of income in the form of Indian tribute or as commodities to
be traded or even produced. The geography of maize in Peru was
y similar to that of wheat. Coastal valleys produced basically
or the Lima market and the Andean valleys for that of Potosi.
Its , (market was wider however and covered the sierra and high 
Plateau areas where Indian communities, deprived of their 
olonies in the warm valleys in the course of the colonial 
P riod, had to import the grain through the market mechanism.
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The degree of commercialisation of potatoes was more restricted, 
probably due to their accessibility and low status even among 
Indians. They reached the main valleys of the high plateau 
and the coast but the main markets were the mining centres of 
the high plateau. A third native crop, quickly adopted and 
commercialised by the encomenderos and later hacendados, was 
coca. In prehispanic times it was reserved for the Inca 
hierarchy, chieftains and fighting armies, but under Spanish 
rule it became widely consumed by the Indian masses as a 
stimulant and hunger suppressant. Despite moral condemnation 
of the use of coca leaves by the church, by the 15 6 0's the 
crown had to accept the participation of Spanish entrepreneurs 
in the profitable business of coca production. This had 
previously been limited to a few communities whose encomenderos 
enjoyed a tribute of enormous value given their monopoly over 
the stimulant. The dimensions of the trade can be appreciated 
if we consider that in 1603 Potosi alone consumed 60,000 
sacks of coca at 6 pesos each. Two centuries later consumption 
in Potosi amounted to a value of only 160,000 pesos but other 
mining centres made up for that loss. According to the 
estimates of Klein this represented only c. 10$ of the annual 
production of Upper Peru to which it is necessary to add the 
coca production of lower Peru (Cuzco, Huamanga, etc.). (38)
Formation of the agrarian structure. The distribution of 
land grants among the settlers began with the interest of 
Spaniards in commercial agriculture in the late 154-0's.
Governors and viceroys who were entitled to issue land grants, 
and also municipal councils who were not, allocated land 
grants to encomenderos and other settlers. The process of 
distribution of land grants to the Spaniards seems to have been
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m°re ° ^ anised i» the coastal areas which were better con­
trolled and where Indian depopulation, far more drastic than 
in the sierra and high plateau, had left many areas un­
cultivated. After the creation of Spanish towns in the 
coastal valleys (Caneto, Santa, lea, etc.), measures were 
taken to ensure the provision of enough cultivable land for 
the Indian population. We do not know the amount of land 
reserved for Indian families but an indication is given by 
the fact that in the valley of Huara in the early 18th century 
Indian families were supposed to have access to around 22 
acres (one third of it for communal use). Spanish settlers 
on the contrary were entitled, on the foundation of new 
towns to around 300 acres of land each and repartimiento 
labour from the nearby communities. As in Mexico therefore 
it was intended that Indians remained small peasants and 
worked for the Spanish landowners. In the Peruvian sierra 
and the high plateau of Upper Peru the access of the Indians 
to cultivable land seems to have been more limited as the 
number of landless Indians suggest. There the issue of land 
grants by the municipal councils which did not respect Indian 
land possession was aggravated by the relatively slow decline 
Indian population and the migratory process started by 
the repartimiento drafts of Potosi. (39)
During the early decades of colonisation lands were 
alueless unless they were equipped with buildings, irrigation 
works, etc., provided with labour and situated close to a major 
The development of urban centres and their markets and 
the exhaustion of free sources of land appropriation (land 
grants) m  their hinterlands created, around 1570, an incipient
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land market In Peru. Land sales between Spaniards presented 
little problem and permitted the concentration of several land 
grants into one hand or the provision of lands to newcomers. 
Indians had a free hand to sell their lands to Spaniards up 
until the 1570's. After that period they had to have the 
permission of the royal officials to sell their lands and 
usually had to auction them to ensure that they received a 
fair deal. Finally after 1591 uncultivated Indian lands 
started to be considered vacant and therefore the property of 
the crown. The sale of vacant lands by the crown was 
accompanied, as the decree of 1 5 9 1 commanded, by a revision of 
the titles of all proprietors in order to obtain cash for the 
royal treasury through composiciones. This was inevitably a 
long and continuous process since it involved a virtual 
agrarian census, litigation and negotiations between the 
parties involved (Indians, Spaniards and royal officials) and 
revisions of the land possessions of the Indian communities 
up until the 18th century. Still in the early 18th century a 
major public auction of Indian lands seems to have taken place 
in Peru when the Indian population was at its lowest. The 
population recovery of the late 18th century occurred at a 
time of full occupation of the land in most of Peru and this 
stimulated new migratory waves towards unsettled areas and 
created a landless labour force for the Spanish haciendas. (¿0) 
Apart from land grants and purchases the Spaniards managed 
to appropriate Indian land in Peru by other devices, marriages 
with Indian heiresses, renting or mere occupation of Indian 
lands which were later claimed as property and recognised by 
the crown through composiciones, etc. (4-1) The process of 
aPpropriation of Indian lands by the Spaniards should be put
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in the wider context of the colonial pressures which militated 
against the survival of the communities and which have been 
analysed in detail elsewhere (Chapter 3). Firstly the forced 
resettlement (reductions) in the 1570's of many Indian hamlets 
into bigger villages with fewer land resources, a process which 
made space for the land grants to the Spaniards, secondly 
the Indian population decline was aggravated by tributary and 
repartimiento obligations which induced the Indians to emi­
grate to Spanish towns or haciendas leaving the community 
further weakened. This left no alternative for the commun­
ities but to dispose of their lands by means of rentals or 
sales to pay the tributes. Thirdly the 'reparto' or forced 
commerce with the corregidores compelled the Indians to seek 
employment in the Spanish haciendas or dispose of their lands 
in order to pay the required cash. Finally Indian chief­
tains themselves used their powers in order to appropriate 
the lands of the community or individual commoners to sell, 
rent or cultivate on their own behalf. (4.2)
It is difficult to evaluate the process of land appropria­
tion by the Spaniards without solid statistical data on land 
property in the different Peruvian regions at different stages 
of their development. However a rough estimation of the 
number of landed and landless Indians can be derived from the 
fiscal categories of Indians existing in Peru. We will use 
such data to complement the limited data on landed property 
when dealing with specific Peruvian regions and for an over­
view of access to land by the Indians in the mid 18th century 
(see Table 9).
The category of 'originario' (native of the community) 
included the descendants of the Indians who were assigned
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Table 9: Originarlo and Forastero Indian tributará *  in
Peru c. 175¿ pH _
Ecclesiastic
jurisdiction
Originarios % Forasteros % Total
Upper Peru
Mizque 3,182 86.3 506 13.7 3,688
Chuquisaca ( + ) 11,589 43.0 15,359 57.0 26,948
La Paz (+) 10,550 43.6 13,644 56.4 24,194
Lower Peru
Cuzco (+) 20,711 63.2 12,053 36.8 32,764
Arequipa 3,083 82.2 667 17.8 3,750
Huamanga 8,587 81.6 1,933 18.4 10,520
Lima 17,720 76.7 5,371 23.3 23,091
Trujillo 12,788 70.4 5,387 29.6 18,175
Total 88,210 6l. 6 54,920 38.4 143,130
(*) Source Sanchez Albornoz 1978:52.
(+) Affected by the mining repartimiento of Potosi.
lands by viceroy Toledo in the inspections of the 1570's and 
continued to live in their original communities. 'Forasteros' 
(aliens) included several sub-categories: yanaconas (serfs) 
or Indians working on Spanish haciendas, 'agregados' (attached) 
Indians living in the communities but with no rights over the 
land of the community since they or their ancestors had arrived 
in the community after the 1570's inspections, 'vagos' (vaga­
bonds), etc. The correlation between land possession and the 
fiscal categories of forastero and originario is not perfect 
but is close enough for our purposes. Thus landless origin­
arios did occur but were the exception. Equally forasteros 
oould buy or rent lands from the Indian communities but they
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suffered fierce competition from the Spanish entrepreneurs, 
so most remained landless. As can be seen all regions of 
Peru had substantial numbers of forasteros who averaged 38% 
of the population. They were particularly in evidence in the 
southern Peruvian sierra (Cuzco) and the western jurisdictions 
of Upper Peru (La Paz and Chuquisaca), all three were subjected 
to the Potosi repartimiento drafts. This would indicate that 
the labour drafts were a major factor in the Indian migration 
process but, as we shall see below, does not deny the im­
portance of the other factors which produced the migration/ 
landlessness phenomenon. (4.3)
To maKe our analysis of the Peruvian colonial agrarian 
structure more specific we turn now to the analysis of this 
process in three regions for which we have pertinent data.
The regions covered represent most of the Peruvian areas of 
economic importance during the colonial period: the coastal 
valleys, the high plateau and sierra areas and their adjacent 
warm valleys. All these regions were relatively integrated 
into the Peruvian economy and its main markets. Finally their
Indian populations represented over a third of the total 
population of Peru.
Coastal Peru. Two main factors characterised the valleys 
of coastal Peru during the colonial period, the drastic demo­
graphic decline of the Indian communities and the suitability 
of their soil and climate to products in high demand in the 
Lima market. Both factors created the need for imports of 
African slaves while the former created favourable conditions 
for the Spaniards to appropriate lands with relatively
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little damage to the dwindling Indian communities. In the 
various coastal valleys however the agrarian structure had a 
different evolution and without comprehensive data it is 
difficult to arrive at definitive conclusions. It seems 
that in the prosperous southern valleys a 'democratic' pattern 
of land distribution prevailed while in the depressed northern 
valleys concentration of land in a few hands was the norm.
In the latter whole valleys were almost totally controlled by 
only one owner. Thus the Viru and Jaquetepeque valleys were 
virtually owned in the 18th century by the Marquises of 
Bellavista and the Augustinians respectively. In the south, 
although large estates existed, the small or medium size farm 
predominated. Finally in the central coastal region a mixture 
of communal land, small Spanish farms and sizeable haciendas 
was present. Table 10 presents estimates of land distribution
Table 1 0 : Estimated land
Owner type
Spaniards 
J esuits
370-1556 acres 
30-198 acres
Indians (c. 350 tributarie 
family plots 
community land
Total
distribution in the Huara valley 
c. 1700 (*T~^
acres %
8,210 37.3
3,791 17.3
2 ,2 10 10 .0
5,187 23.6
2,593 1 1 . 8
21,991 100 .0
(*) Source Cushner 1980: 3 4.
in the central coastal valley of Huara which is probably rep­
resentative of this whole area. In this valley big landowners 
concentrated 54■% of the land, small farmer s an additional 
10$ and Indian communities the rest. (44)
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little damage to the dwindling Indian communities. In the 
various coastal valleys however the agrarian structure had a 
different evolution and without comprehensive data it is 
difficult to arrive at definitive conclusions. It seems 
that in the prosperous southern valleys a 'democratic' pattern 
of land distribution prevailed while in the depressed northern 
valleys concentration of land in a few hands was the norm.
In the latter whole valleys were almost totally controlled by 
only one owner. Thus the Viru and Jaquetepeque valleys were 
virtually owned in the 18th century by the Marquises of 
Bellavista and the Augustinians respectively. In the south, 
although large estates existed, the small or medium size farm 
predominated. Finally in the central coastal region a mixture 
of communal land, small Spanish farms and sizeable haciendas 
was present. Table 10 presents estimates of land distribution
Table 10: Estimated land distribution in the Huara valley
c. 1700 (*1-----------------
Owner type
Spaniards 
Jesuits 
370-1556 acres 
30-198 acres
Indians (c. 350 
family plots 
community land
Total
tributaries
acres G! /0
8,210 37.3
3,791 17.3
2 ,2 10 10 .0
5,187 23.6
2,593 1 1 . 8
21,991 100 .0
(*) Source Cushner 19 8 0: 3 4.
ln central coastal valley of Huara which is probably rep­
resentative of this whole area. In this valley big landowners 
concentrated 54$ of the land, small farmers an additional 
10% anc* Indian communities the rest. (4-4-)
b) Cuzco. From 1591 to the land inspection of 1657 probably 
the majority of Spanish land possessions were regularised 
through composiciones. By 1689 the area of the intendancy 
of Cuzco, created in 1784, had a rural population of 106,229 
Indians of which at least 12,383 or 11.6% lived in haciendas 
(see Table 1 1 ); this indicates a high Spanish control over 
Cuzco lands. In 1786 the Indian population of rural Cuzco 
had increased to 14,234 but the number of haciendas had 
fallen to 647. At that time Indian tributaries (adult males) 
classified as forasteros and therefore landless were 6,386 
or 8.9% of the total male population of rural Cuzco (some 
71,750) and made up a far higher percentage if compared to 
the total tributary population. The different nature of the 
categories used by the censuses of 1689 and 1786 does not 
permit a comparison which would make it possible to establish 
the trends of development of the haciendas and Indian 
communities in relation to land. However, partial information 
derived from these censuses and qualitative information allow 
us to discern some other changes occurring in rural Cuzco at 
the time. Firstly, a concentration of haciendas around the 
'royal road' which connected Lima and Upper Peru, occurred. 
Secondly the floating forastero population of the 17th century 
tended to acquire the status of yanacona or serf on the 
haciendas and they were paid with a token salary and the 
usufruct of a plot of land. Thirdly a different pattern of 
demographic growth occurred in the parishes, this depended 
on the presence or absence of haciendas. In the parishes 
without haciendas demographic growth was strong, while in 
those with haciendas, especially sugar estates, population 
growth was weak or actually negative. Finally, at least in
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the late 18th century, some Indian communities participated 
actively in the production of wheat which was geared to the 
Spanish markets. (4.5)
Table 11: Indian population and haciendas in rural Cuzco -
1689 (*) - --------
Indian
population
Indians 
living in 
haciendas
% No of ha­
ciendas
Average 
Indians 
per ha­
cienda
Parishes with 
data (25) 29,766 12,383 41.6 315 39.3
Parishes without
data (69) 76,463 n.d. n.d. 390 n.d.
Total parishes 
(94) 106,229 705
(*) Source, Moerner 1978: 19,46-7. City of Cuzco excluded.
e) La Paz. By the end of the 18th century the intendancy 
of La Paz was comprised of five districts: Omasuyos and 
Pacajes in the high plateau, Sica-Sica and Larecaja still in 
the high plateau but in an area containing warm valleys and, 
finally, Chulumani an area of tropical valleys. The agri­
cultural production of these two ecological levels (valleys 
and high plateau) before the conquest was different but 
complementary. The potatoes, quinoa and llamas produced in 
the high plateau were exchanged with the coca and maize of 
the warm valleys. The integration of the 2 ecological levels 
was forged through kinship and political ties which were 
slowly eroded during the colonial period. The many ethnic 
colonies working in the valleys but depending politically on 
'kingdoms' or communities with their bases in the high plateau
c9uired autonomy from their centres. This was achieved in 
Larecaja in the 17th century as a result of the pressure of the
-  196 -
Spanish farmers, who needed the labour power of the valley 
Indians. The attraction exerted by Spanish haciendas and 
farms which liberated the commoners from tributes and reparti­
miento corvees was reinforced in both valleys and high plateau 
by the tendency of the Indian chieftains to appropriate the 
lands of the community or of the commoners and rent or sell 
them to the Spaniards or establish their own haciendas. 3y 
the end of the 17th century this process was well under way 
and yanaconas and forasteros doubled the number of landed 
originarios in Sica-Sica and trebled them in Chul.umani. The 
situation of the Indian labour force in relation to haciendas 
and communities at the end of the 18th century is shown in 
Table 12. All but one of the districts had a third or more
Table 1 2 : Haciendas and Indian population in the intendancy
of La Paz c. 1790 T^H----------------- L
District
Chulumani 
Larecaj a 
Sica-Sica 
Omasuyos 
Pacajes
Total
(*) £
Date of No. of No. of % Yana­ Foras­ Totalinfor­ hacien - yana­ conas teros in Indianmation das conas per the com­ popula­haci­ munities tionenda (1 )
1786 336 18,786 60.6 55.9 22 31,004370 14,669 36.7 54.3 15 29,946206 17,190 41.4 83.4 16 41,542I69 2 0,487 47.6 1 2 1 . 2 39 43,075
Paz
91 9,071 20.3 99.7 33 44,777
) 28 2,4-58 35.0 87.8 n. d . 7,025
1 , 1 0 0 82,661 39.7 75.1 --- 207,369
, Klein 1980: 1 9 8.
(l)_ As a percentage of the total Indian population. Date 
erived from Klein 1975: 217. Omasuyos' percentage is based on 
ributary population and not total population.
°f its Indian population working on the haciendas as yanaconas, 
while a further fraction of the Indian population was alien to 
the community and generally landless. The high percentage of
yanaconas in Chulumani is explained by the fact that it was a 
region which had recently been converted to coca production 
(18th century) and which attracted many Indian immigrants.
Thus between 1683 and 1786 the originario population increased 
by 127$ while the total population increased by 251$, a 
difference which cannot be attributed to a higher fertility 
among the originario population since the opposite was the 
case. At the other extreme Pacajes with its traditional 
Indian crops did not attract many prospective Spanish entre­
preneurs and their communities retained almost 80$ of the 
population. The other 3 districts of La Paz had an inter­
mediate position of a large but not predominant yanacona 
population. In Larecaja and Sica-Sica Spanish interest was 
justified by the suitability of the land for the production of 
commercial crops. The strange case of Omasuyos which was 
ecologically similar to Pacajes but had a higher percentage 
of yanaconas, is attributed by Klein to its accessibility and 
proximity to the city of La Paz.
Within the hacendado class of La Paz two main criteria 
can be used to analyse the information provided by the 
tributary censuses: the types of hacienda owners to be found 
and the concentration or dispersion of yanaconas among these 
owners. Table 1 3 provides information for the categories of 
owners which occurred. The number of haciendas owned by 
Indian chieftains or communities and the number of yanaconas 
controlled is in this context insignificant (19 haciendas and 
2.5$ of the total of yanaconas). It is worth noting however 
that of the 16 haciendas which belonged to the communities, 9 
°f them were owned by three communities including a yanacona 
population of 1,275 of all ages. One of these communities,
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Table 13: Categories
in ^j_hacienda owners and number cf yanaconas the intendancy of La Paz c. 1790 (*)------
Category No of No of ha- 
owners ciendas
Average 
of yana­
conas per 
hacienda
Total
yana­
conas
%
Spanish hacendados 
Church
Indian chieftain 
Indian communities 
Unknown
654
27
1
1 1
26
980
75
3
16
26
71.1
114.4
62.3
115.9
88.7
69,729
8,583
187
1,855
2,307
8^,3 ¡94.7 
1 0 .4;
0.2) . 
2.3) 2-5 
2.8
Total 719 1 , 1 0 0 75.1 82,661 100.0
(*) Source, Klein 1980: 209.
Table 14: Number of yanaconas in La Paz1s haciendas. (*)
No of yana­ No of ha­ No ofconas per cendados hacien­hacendado das
1000 or more 5 62
500-999 14 82
300-499 36 117
200-299 50 108100-199 143 22450-99 159 18120-49 184 196
10-19 70 711-9 58 59
Total 719 1 , 100
(*) Source Klein, 1980: 200.
Total ya- % Total tri-
naconas butaries
7,664 9.3 1.542
10,195 12.3 2,16514,137 17.1 2,876
11,822 14.3 2,372
20,001 24.2 4,445
11,391 1 3 .8 2,3326,128 7.4 1,401
1,024 1 . 2 300
299 0.4 1 10
82,661 100.0 17.543
Jesus de Machaca in the province of Pacajes, presents a para­
doxical case since it combined a large proportion of landless 
agregados living in the community (more than a third of it) 
with the ownership of two large haciendas in the province of 
Larecajas. Here the ownership of haciendas and the exploita­
tion of agregados created a favourable situation with respect
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Table 13: Categories of hacienda owners and number of
xn the intendancy of La Paz c. 1790 {*)
Category No of No of ha- 
owners ciendas
Average 
of yana­
conas per 
hacienda
Total
yana­
conas
%
Spanish hacendados 
Church
Indian chieftain 
Indian communities 
Unknown
654
27
1
11
26
980
75
3
16
26
71.1
114.4
62.3
115.9
88.7
69,729
8,583
187
1,855
2,307
8/4-,3¡94.7 
10.4;
0.2)
2.3) 2,5 
2.8
Total 719 1,100 75.1 82,661 100.0
(*) Source, Klein 1980: 209.
Table 14: Number of yanaconas in La Paz's haciendas. (#)
No of yana­ No of ha­ No ofconas per cendados hacien­hacendado das
1000 or more 5 62
500-999 14 82
300-499 36 117200-299 50 108100-199 143 22450-99 159 18120-49 184 196
10-19 70 711-9 58 59
Total 719 1,100
(*) Source Klein, 1980: 200.
Total ya- % Total tri-
naconas butaries
7,664 9.3 1,542
10,195 12.3 2,16514,137 17.1 2,876
11,822 14.3 2,372
20,001 24.2 4,44511,391 13.8 2,3326,128 7.4 1,401
1,024 1.2 300
299 0.4 110
82,661 100.0 17,543
Jesus de Machaca in the province of Pacajes, presents a para­
doxical case since it combined a large proportion of landless 
agregados living in the community (more than a third of it) 
with the ownership of two large haciendas in the province of 
Larecajas. Here the ownership of haciendas and the exploita­
tion of agregados created a favourable situation with respect
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to land resources for the originario population (the community 
proper). The means of acquiring these haciendas, which
were owned in fee-simple unlike the other community lands, 
seems to have passed through the device or accidental occur­
ence of purchase or recognition through composiciones of 
lands by the community chieftains. Among the Spanish or 
hispanised hacendados (viz., creoles and mestizos) the landed 
property of the church is conspicuous, not so much because 
of the number of haciendas they owned as the concentration of 
yanaconas within them (10.**). For instance three nunneries 
and monasteries alone owned 37 haciendas with a yanacona 
population of 3,637, ranking first, 6th and 7th among the 
yanacona holders of the whole intendancy of La Paz. Concentra 
tion of yanaconas (and therefore lands) occurred within the 
hacendado class as a whole (see Table 14.). Five large 
hacendados, or less than 1% of the total, controlled almost 
a tenth of the yanaconas or slightly more than the 312 
hacendados with 49 or less yanaconas. (47)
originarios ?xploitabi°n op 'agregados' by the communities of 
th^gio \ SOmewhat relative. The former payed a rent to
bute t ^ t h e ^  tUt as landless Indians they paid a smaller tri- 
Sanchez A ? W n ° W? ^  exemPted from repartimiento drafts,
dancv of w analysis °f the partido of Tapacari (inten-
shit/nmii °°habamba) suggests that this exploitative relation- 
data ?perated at the level of production but his
rent sPecify the type of arrangement used (salaries?
of Jesus d p V ai°Ur ?r kl?dl]- The relative land sufficiency Paca « \ dS ^achaca m  relation to the other 12 communities of 
onlv two ^  bSe? deyived from bhe following facts: a) there wer, vannool! haaiendas (non-Indian) in the area with a total of 270 
haoi on^aS llI1?loin Jesus de Machaca against an average of 7 
b) 6?° yanac°nas per community in the whole province,
ar-ioc. Us,de Machaca had the second largest number of both origin- 
resno„+ ^fegados, c) the performance of this community in both 
cloe! M o o 0, be enhanced if we consider only those communities 
merMoi U0_,km or less) to the city of La Paz which was the com- 
seoor^ . administrative centre of the intendancy and a market 
micrht w°nly t0 Lima and Potosl ln late 18th century Peru. As 
the '°e expecbed Spanish haciendas tended to concentrate near
frL C^ y  of La Paz decreasing in importance as the distance OIn this centre increased. (46)
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Map 3: Agricultural markets and administrative
divisions in colonial Spanish South America 
(c. 1800)
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Although data on the actual distribution of lands 
among Indian and Spaniards in Peru is scarce or indirect, 
some provisional conclusions can be derived from the previous 
analysis.
1. The main characteristic of the Indian population of 
colonial Peru was its lack of participation in the possession 
of land. Forasteros and yanaconas lacked free access to land 
and had to pay a rent for it in labour, in kind or in money 
either to the Spanish hacendados or to the communities of 
originario Indians. Figures for the 18th century presented 
above indicate that over a third of the Indian population
of Peru as a whole was in this situation and a far higher 
proportion of landless Indians was present in Upper Peru.
2. The social forces which compelled the Indians to leave 
their lands were not limited to individual Spaniards wanting 
to acquire rights over them. They also included a full system 
of exactions, organised by the colonial state and supported 
by the colonists and, to some degree, the Indian chieftains, 
which made it preferable to the commoners to give up their 
rights to community land and to emigrate to Spanish haciendas, 
mines or towns or other Indian communities. Among these 
factors we have singled out the mining repartimiento, the 
forced commerce with the corregidores, tribute and informal 
exactions by the chieftains, corregidores and hacendados.
3. The communities of originarios seem to have become an 
alternative to the haciendas. By accepting tenants on their 
lands the communities (or rather their chieftains) behaved 
as the incipient hacendados, but lacking the ownership of 
the land in fee-simple they were subjected, unlike the 
hacendados, to sporadic agrarian reforms.
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c) Colombia
The economy of colonial Colombia was characterised by 
three main features:
1 . isolation of the main areas of settlement from each 
other and, if we exclude Cartagena, from the European markets
2. relatively low density of the Indian population, 
especially towards the end of the colonial period,
3. domination of the economy by the production and export 
of gold.
All three contributed to the relegation of commercial agri­
culture to a second place, the first by preventing the
specialisation of certain areas in agricultural production 
for export to the mining centres or to the world market, the 
other two characteristics by limiting the labour force 
available for agriculture. During the decade 1784-93 Colombia 
exported 1 . 8  million pesos worth of agricultural products, 
compared with 1 9 . 2 million in gold, and in around 1800 the 
tithes of the archbishopric of Bogota produced some 220,000 
pesos annually which indicates that there was an annual 
agricultural production of over two million pesos. These 
figures show that the internal agricultural market was by 
no means unimportant and compared favourably with other
colonies of roughly the same population (Chile and Venezuela)
(ix) Ecclesiastical tithes in Chile in 1800 were 154,000 
pesos and agricultural exports were far higher than Columbia's 
in the late 18th century. Tithes in the see of Caracas amounted 
to an average of 327,000 pesos per year in the last decade of 
the 18th century but agricultural exports 10 or 20 times higher 
than Colombia's certainly reduced the importance of the Venez­
uelan internal market below that of Colombia. (49)
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Spanish interest in the ownership of land developed 
earlier in the areas of large Indian population in the 
Colombian highlands (Bogota, Tunja, Popayan, Pasto). The 
lowlands,where the Indian population was scarce, acquired 
economic importance for as long as gold strikes occurred or 
livestock in a wild state populated a specific area. In the 
highland core areas, land previously cultivated by the 
Indians passed into the control of the colonists by methods 
similar to those used elsewhere in Spanish America: grants of 
lands vacated by the dwindling Indian population, de facto 
usufruct by the encomenderos of the lands of their encomienda 
Indians, which were later recognised in property and, from 
the 1560's, forced reduction of the Indian population to 
towns with the loss of their lands in favour of the Spaniards.
Land grants for Spanish settlers were substantial and 
tended to become concentrated in the hands of a few Spaniards 
by means of successive grants from different governors or 
purchases. The measures used to allocate land grants give us 
an idea of the acreage involved. Before 1585 livestock 
estancias and farming estancias allotted in Bogota amounted 
to 6,276 and 1,570 acres each respectively. After that date 
they were reduced to 808 and 223 acres respectively and to 
similar areas in other towns of New Granada (Eastern Colombia). 
In the governorship of Popayan (Western Colombia) the 'legua' 
of over 4,000 acres and the caballería, of varying dimensions 
but far larger than in New Spain were used. In mining and 
military frontier zones they were far more generous and could 
reach as much as 190 sq miles (57,600 acres). In contrast 
with this, lands allocated to the Indian communities from 1593 
oould not exceed c. 3.7 acres per tributary in New Granada. (50)
The decree of 1591 ordering the regularisation of land 
titles and sale of crown lands was gradually applied in 
Colombia. Land inspections carried out in the 1590's in New 
Granada resulted in the composición of a few large landed 
estates whose owners paid small sums totalling some 19,000 
pesos. In 1633 a new land inspection covered all Colombia 
(Popayan included) and subjected to composición virtually 
all land occupied by the Spanish in the colony. Landed 
estates were evaluated in each town and a fee of 2.5% of 
their value was charged directly to the town which later on 
received a fee from the individual landowners according to the 
value of each property. The amounts paid by each town give 
an idea of their economic importance. New Granada, Tunja and 
Bogota, the major centres of Indian population paid 18,000 
and 12,000 pesos respectively and other towns of New Granada 
paid between 1,000 and 5,500 pesos. In the governorship of 
Popayan land seems to have been less expensive and of the 4 
towns which contracted composiciones with the crown only 
Pasto arranged a payment comparable to those in New Granada 
(7,000 pesos) and the other three were under 3,000 pesos 
each. (51)
During the land inspections carried out from th 1590's 
to the 164.0 's, inspectors were instructed by the crown to 
allocate reservation lands (resguardos) to the Indians. As 
indicated above, lands allocated to the Indian communities 
were just within the limits of subsistence agriculture.
Indian population decline however permitted the communities 
during the 18th century to possess lands in excess of their 
immediate needs and to rent out the surplus land to poor 
whites and mestizos. Eran the l640's up until 1755 no major
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changes occurred in the possession of lands by the communities. 
The resguardos, which were the property of the crown but were 
given in usufruct to the communities, ensured the latter 
their subsistence and the payment of tribute to the crown. 
However, the decline of the Indian population and the increase 
of non-Indian tenants within the community lands created a 
change of policy. From 1755 the Audiencia of Bogota attempted 
to eliminate the growing pressure of non-Indians on land by 
alienating the excess land of the communities and selling it 
to the colonists and, in the case of Indian villages with 
less than 100 Indians, liquidating the whole resguardo and 
transferring these Indians to other villages. The results of 
this attempt seem to have been negligable since it affected 
only 9 villages and only 35,000 pesos were collected through 
the sale of resguardo lands. A more ambitious reform took place 
m  1776-9 when the crown sold the lands of 29 resguardos, 6 
in Bogota and the rest in Tunja, displacing over 5,200 
Indians and ordered the extinction of 21 other resguardos 
although the execution of the latter was suspended by the crown.
The financial results of the reform of the 1770's were 
again unimportant since the crown collected only 60,000 pesos 
through land sales, but its social consequences were not.
Firstly, the reform directly affected around a fifth of the 
Indian population of Tunja (nearly 5,000 Indians out of the 
27,500 counted in 1757) by actually eliminating their 
resguardos, and an even bigger proportion through the accom­
odation of these Indians in other communities whose availa­
bility of lands thus decreased. Secondly the reform which 
aimed at benefitting poor non-Indian farmers was equally 
beneficial to rich entrepreneurs. They bought around half of
the lands of the resguardos which were auctioned thus conso­
lidating the already existing latifundia structure in New 
Granada. Thirdly the transfer of whole communities to other 
villages without sufficient land resources tended to accelerate 
the disintegration of these communities, which was already 
under way due to the acceptance on their lands of non-Indians. 
Finally the discontent over the reform among the Indians who 
were affected contributed to the comunero rebellion of 1781 
which demanded among other things the restoration of the 
resguardos and their property in fee-simple and not as mere 
usufruct. Once the rebellion was defeated the viceroy returned 
to the old policy of keeping Indian resguardos as subsistence 
plots for the Indians with only usufruct rights over the land. 
It was only the independence movement which set in motion 
the final dissolution of the Indian communities by ordering 
the resguardos to be divided among the commoners and to be 
held in fee-simple. (52)
Concrete data is available for two regions of Colombia, 
the savannah of Bogota in the central highlands of New Granada 
and the city of Popayan hinterland in south western Colombia.
A brief analysis of both will permit us to illustrate some of 
the trends outlined above and give us a clue to other trends 
which have not yet become evident. In Bogota a generous con­
cession of land grants, especially before 1 5 8 5, brought about 
the accumulation of vast landed estates in the hands of 
single families through successive land grants and additional 
purchases. The estates of the encomendero Francisco Maldonado 
de Mendoza present an outstanding case. He and his family were
S anted several estancias before and after 1585 and inherited 
several more from v,is father-in-law; he owned at the end of the
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16th century not less than 25 estancias with a total area 
of c. 174 sq miles (or c. 111,200 acres). To legalise the 
titles through composición he paid the relatively modest sum 
of 940 pesos. On the other side of the social scale, the lands 
of the Indians of the Savannah of Bogota had been severely 
reduced during the 16th century to around 10% of the total 
area of the savannah. Their situation deteriorated even 
further when they were concentrated in Indian reductions 
and allocated resguardos in the 1590's. As a result of this 
the Indian communities lost half of their land and were reduced 
to c. 126 sq miles (or c. 8,500 acres) or roughly 5% of the 
area of the savannah. At that time (1593) the tributary popu­
lation of the area was 1 9 , 1 6 1 which indicates an average land- 
holding of 4.2 acres per tributary or slightly more than the 
maximum fixed by the Audiencia. The lands thus spared were 
granted to the colonists from the 1 5 9 0's to 1640. (5 3)
Land grants in the surroundings of the city of Popayan, 
which occurred between the 1570's and 1640, were necessarily 
generous. The lack of a dense Indian population and its 
frontier character limited the bulk of the production of the 
area to livestock raising, for which vast latifundia were 
necessary, until around 1700. The evaluation of tie landed 
properties of Popayan during the composiciones of 1637 permit 
us to discern the structure of Spanish property in the area 
(see Table 15). Slightly more than a fifth of the proprietors 
(8) concentrated c. 6l% of the land value in their hands while 
°ver a half of the more modest landowners were in control of 
Property which was worth 11% of the total. A new land tax applied
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Table 15: Value of Spanish Estates 
in 1637 (in pesos )(*) in Popayan Hinterland
Value No of Estates Total Value $ Average \
120-800 
801-2,000 
2,001-4,000 
4,001 and
20
7
4
8,560
10,000
11,400
1 1 . 2
13.0
14.9
428
1,429
2,850
more 8 46,6oo 60.9 5,825
Total 39 76,560 100 .0
(*) Source: Colmenares 1978 : 241.
Table 1 6 : Value of Soanish Estates in Pooavan Hinterland
Value No of Propri­etors Total Value % Average Value
40-2UO
200-500
501-1,000
1 ,001-2,000
2.001- 4,000
4.001- 6,000 
6,001 or
21
13
7
5
6 
1
2 ,440 
4,980 
5,240 
8,500 
18,260 
4,540
4.8
9.8 
1 0 .4  
1 6 .8  
36.1
9.0
1 1 6
383
749
1,700
3,043
more 1 6,600 13.0
Total 54 50,560 100 .0
(*) Source: Colmenares 1979 : 189 .
ln 17 13 (see "able 1 6 ) permits us to discern the evolution of 
the Spanish agrarian structure in Popayan at the time. In the 
early 18th century the number of Spanish landowners had increased 
slightly due to purchases of small pieces of land from the 
tig landowners but concentration of land among a few landowners 
was still much in evidence. Thus the top 8 landowners controlled 
58$ of the total value of land while the 34 more modest 
Proprietors only controlled lands accounting for a value of 
4.6$ of the total. Data for the later part of the 18th century 
too inconclusive to be able to discern the characteristics
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of the agrarian structure of the Popayan hinterland. However, 
it seems that the trends operating in the 17th century, namely 
the retention of huge landed estates of high value by powerful 
families or institutions and at the same time the increase 
of land proprietors in the category of low value property, 
continued.
Unfortunately we know little about the Indian communities 
of Popayan in relation to land possession. Each community 
controlled in theory the area within a radius of 2 .6 miles 
from its village as resguardos in the 17th century. The 
difficulties created for the colonists by the authorities in 
the appropriation of resguardo lands and the population decline 
after the allocation of resguardos (from 5,000 Indians in 1637 
to c. 2500 in the l660's) permit us to suppose that there 
was a relative self-sufficiency amongst the Indians in land 
resources. The continuation of repartimiento drafts until 174.0 
support this impression although by the end of the 18th 
century Indian vagabonds and Indian workers hired by the day 
were common. This process of dissolution of the Indian commu­
nities seems to have been associated with the tributary pressures 
of the state and encomenderos over them and a l s o  the reten­
tion by the haciendas of repartimiento Indians by force or 
through the concessions of lands in usufruct within the 
hacienda. (54)
d) Chile
The economy of colonial Chile differed from that of Mexico 
and Peru in several respects. Firstly, the aboriginal population 
was relatively scarce especially in the areas o** effective
210
Spanish control (north and centre). Secondly, the Indian 
population south of the river Bio-Bio resisted Spanish 
invasion for almost the whole colonial period creating a 
source of economic and human losses for Chile and to some 
extent Peru. Finally the lack of continuous substantial 
mining activities, which could have created a solid market 
for Chile's agricultural products, impeded the effective 
colonisation of vast areas of the territory. These factors 
conditioned the evolution of the Chilean structure of pro­
duction and brought about the positioning of the colony at 
the bottom of the hierarchy of economic dependence.
Up until c. 1580 gold mining predominated within Spanish 
economic activities and farming and ranching were only 
secondary trades which were needed to feed the Spanish 
population and provide the horses necessary for war. By the 
beginning of the 17th century this situation had changed 
substantially. The northern region was integrated into the 
Peruvian economy through the export of wine, hides and mules 
while the central region (the area bounded by the rivers 
Choapa and Maulé) was beginning to export hides and cordovan 
leather to Lima. By that time, however, the Spanish settle­
ments south of the river Bio-Bio had been wiped out by the 
warlike Mapuche Indians and with them the Spaniards had lost 
the profitable gold placers of southern Chile and about half 
of the encomienda Indians of the whole colony. From then on, 
Spaniards in Chile had to cope with a continuous war on the 
southern frontier, a lack of Indian labour power and scarcity 
°f means of payment for their imports. Several factors per­
mitted the colony to escape the economic mediocrity of the
211
early 17th century. These were a Peruvian military subsidy 
of around 100,000 pesos p.a. during the 17th and first half 
of the 18th centuries, the development of livestock produc­
tion and the export of its by-products in the 17th century 
and the revival of mining in the second half of the 18th 
century. This economic expansion required the demographic 
recovery of the working population and regional special­
isation. (55)
Livestock and agricultural production in Chile for the 
period 1680-1819 have been calculated by Carmagnani and is 
here presented in Table 17. It shows a constant expansion 
punctuated by minor decreases (less than 8?), except in the 
decade 18 10 - 19 when independence wars disrupted the colonial 
economy. Two-thirds of the value of agricultural production 
(ranging from 63-75?) was concentrated in the central region 
(Santiago). The southern region of Concepcion produced 
another fourth of the total value (ranging from 18 to 31?) 
while the northern area of La Serena, with a limited amount 
of arable land, produced the rest (from 4 to 10$). Table 18 
provides us with information about agricultural exports and, 
despite its incompleteness, clearly shows a trend towards 
productive specialisation in the three Chilean regions. Thus 
there is a clear tendency in the central and southern regions 
to switch from livestock to agricultural exports (viz wheat). 
This process was triggered by Peruvian demand from the late 
1680's, and it affected central Chile first and then the 
southern region which was becoming effectively colonised by 
the 18th century. In the northern region agricultural exports 
decreased to virtually nothing by the beginning of the 19th
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Table 17: Value of Agricultural Production in rHl,1680-1819 lin pesosTT7) lAverage per year)
Decades Northern Region (La Serena t)
Central Region (Santiago ) J
Southern Region (Concepcion) t Total
1680-9 13,680 6.2 139,570 62.8 68,820 31.0 222,070
1690-9 23,707 8.6 166,925 60.7 84.579 30.7 275,211
1700-9 29,986 10.1 197,072 66.2 70,540 23.7 297,589
1710-9 28.153 8.6 230,709 70.7 67,650 20.7 326,510
1720-9 31,395 7.0 335,247 75.0 80,381 18.0 447,023
1730-9 29,261 6.4 341,388 75.1 84.304 18.5 454,953
1740-9 39,288 9.2 298,679 70.0 88,846 20.8 426,813
1750-9 44. 377 6.8 427.084 65.4 181,615 27.8 653,076
1760-9 41.409 6.0 461,086 66.6 189,530 27.4 692,025
1770-9 40,055 4.3 621,086 67.2 262,961 28.5 924,102
1780-9 33,543 3.9 551,441 64.5 270,669 31.6 855,653
1790-9 45,198 5.3 556,046 65.8 244,242 28.9 845,486
1800-9 84.296 6.0 885,292 63.5 425,376 30.5 X394.967
1810-9 80,766 8.3 623,877 63.9 271,357 27.8 976,002
(*) Source: Carmagnani 1973: 213» 235» 219. Based on theecclesiastical tithe. Excludes the southern island of Chiloe and Cuyo, now in Argentinian territory.
century despite the increase of the value of its local 
production (Table 17). By that time mining had reached 
overwhelming importance in the La Serena region and mine 
centres represented an important market which was able to 
absorb virtually the whole agricultural product of the 
region and even imports from the central region. (56)
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T a b l e  17 :  V a l u e  of A g r i c u l t u r a l  P r o d u c t s  or, in C h i l e .
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Formation of the agrarian structure The general 
Spanish American policy of rewarding colonists with land 
grants as a way of settling the population and developing 
a European type of agriculture was in Chile more necessary 
than in other colonies. The poverty of the colonists, the 
lack of significant numbers of encomienda Indians, the constant 
state of war in the southern frontier, etc, produced a very 
generous policy of land grants which contrasts with the more 
restrictive ones of coastal Peru or central Mexico. In Chile 
land grants varied between 100 and 1 ,500 cuadras (772 to 
5,790 acres) and although land grants for livestock raising 
purposes were initially issued without giving property rights, 
from 1583 this right was tacitly recognised. That year the 
governor, taking into consideration the concentration of 
lands by a few owners, limited the size of the grants to a 
maximum of 200 cuadras, but in the following decades the gover­
nors issued grants several times larger than this. This 
generosity, or what amounts to the same, the low value of the 
land, is also apparent if we consider the chronological span 
which the distribution of land grants covered. Despite the 
increasing interest of Spaniards in land at the end of the 
16th century, the royal cédula of 1 5 9 1, which commanded the 
sale of crown lands, was not enforced. On the contrary 
(free) land grants were issued more frequently around the city 
of Santiago at the turn of the century and the rest of Chile 
m  the 17th century. Thus in the corregimiento of Maulé, in 
the south of the Santiago region, 115 land grants were issued 
between 1600 and 1665 and another 59 during the rest of the 
17th century. In the frontier region of Concepcion, the 
occupation of the land was even slower and most land grants
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were issued after 1670. This process of free appropriation 
of land which was stopped in the areas of early colonisation 
by the total occupation of the available land, finally came 
to an end in 1709. Since then only newly founded towns were to 
receive free land grants, the rest of the land available was 
to be sold or subjected to composiciones according to the
decree of 1 5 9 1 . (57)
The impact of the Peruvian demand on Chilean agriculture 
spurred the process of occupation and later concentration of 
lands by the Spaniards. This process occurred earlier in the 
areas closer to the main markets (Lima, Santiago) and spread 
slowly to the rest of the territory. In the central region the 
valley of Puangue attracted the interest of the Spaniards very 
early and it was totally occupied by 1621. The valley, some 
500 sq miles, located on the road between Santiago and the main 
Chilean port Valparaiso, offered excellent access to the markets 
and there land increased its value more rapidly than anywhere 
else in the colony. For the rest of the Chilean territory the 
information on land grants and regions subiected to the tithe 
indicates a slow occupation of the land which continued after the 
years of independence, especially in the south. With respect to 
land distribution among the Spaniards a double distinction must 
be made. Firstly between those regions whose agricultural produc­
tion was basically orientated to external markets (central and 
southern regions) and those orientated towards the internal 
arket (northern region). Secondly, within the former, terri­
tories of relatively old must be distinguished from those of new 
settlement. In the northern region (see Table 19) the value of 
land in the hands of small proprietors was significantly higher
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than in the central region (see Table 20). The difference in 
the proportion of the values of the property owned by the lower 
stratum of proprietors in both regions (22.9!? in the northern 
region against only 9.7? in the centre), is even more remar­
kable if we consider the total population of both regions.
Thus the ratio between proprietors and total population was 
1 : 27 m  the northern region while in the centre the ratio 
was 1 : U2. Certainly the internal demand generated by the 
mining activity and the high cost of labour power and land 
limited the expansion of latifundia and created favourable 
conditions for the persistence of independent small peasants.
On the contrary in the central region small owners were a 
minority despite the fact that land was cheaper and arable land 
plentiful. The figures for 'inquilinos' or tenant farmers 
who paid rent at least partially in labour in the 1813 
census confirm this imbalance in the structure of land 
distribution between the two regions at the time. The northern 
had 2 ,346, the central regions of old settlement 1 6 , 1 2 3  and 
those of recent settlement 1,159. In the latter, the properties 
Of low value predominated and no. property worth over 50,000 
pesos occurred. However the low price of land in the area 
(22.5 pesos per cuadra on average) suggests an important 
concentration of land with averages of 35,200 and 1 , 1 0 0  cuadras 
in each category, sizes far superior to the averages in the 
other parts of central Chile and the north. (58)
No comprehensive figures on the agrarian structure of 
southern Chile during the colonial period are available to 
Us< The agrarian census of 1833, however, shows a land distri­
bution which is very similar to that of central Chile. This
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Table 19: Distribut!on of. Land aeons Snani.rH* .. —  a.-
- ltS VaiUe Kertha^n h M l, ir, 1818 (.)
Value
Less than
1 , 0001.000- 2,999
3.000- 9,999 10,000 or moreTotal
No of* Owners
1,399
1157716
t
87.1
7. 14.81 .0
Total Value
249,787
181,496394,566267,000
1,607 100.0 1,092.850Average value of one cuadra = 200 pesos Population in 1813 = 43,449 F
(*) Source: Careagnani 1973: 2 4 4.
22.9
16.6
3 6 . 1
24.4
100.0
Average Value
178.5
1.578.2
5.124.2 16,687.5
23.568.4
T a b l e  2 0 :  d i s t r i b u t i o n  of L a n d  a m o n g  S p a n i a r d s  a c c o r d i ng
to its Value ir. Central Chile in ifelS l in nesosl («)
Areas of Old Settlement(1)Areas (2)of New Settlement
Value No of prop­
erties Value t
No of prop­erties Value It
No of prop­erties Value t
Lessthan3,0003.000-
1,266 573,326 8.9 121 95.500 33.9 1,387 668,826 9.7
9,99910,000- 162 832,827 12.9 30 136,000
00 192 968,826 14.5
49,999
50,000
171 3,629,187 56.4 2 50,000 17.8 173 3,679,187 54.8
or more 21 1,406,000 21.8 0 0 0 . c 21 1,406,000 21.0
Total 1,620 6,441,340 100.0 153 281,500 ooR 1,773 6,722,839 100.0
Population in 1813 = 251,269 (excluding Santiago's hinterland)- 
(*) Source: Carmagnani 1963: 226.
(1) Average value of the cuadra 100 - 200 pesos.
(2) Average value of the cuadra 22.5 pesos.
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shows low values of property In areas of recent settlement 
and higher values, although still lower than in the centre, 
in those of longer settlement. The process of concentration 
of land, together with the effect of Peruvian demand for 
agricultural products, is probably well represented by the 
case of the parish of Perquilauquen in the southern region 
during 1737-54- (Table 21). Although the data is not complete, 
the trends are apparent. Firstly the increase in the total 
amount of land owned by the colonists, secondly a decrease 
in the importance of the medium sized properties (100-999 
cuadras) and an increase in the land owned by the small 
proprietors and the big landowners and, finally, a dramatic 
increase in the number of tenants. (59)
Tal>le 21 ! f f f a r ^ n (^)rUCtUre Ìn the FariEh 0f FerOUll Banner.
No of 
owners
17 3 7 1 7_L_4Strata % Acreage % No of owners % Acreage t
Less than200 cuadra 100-499
500-999 1 » 000 or
s 0 
53 33
0.0 0 
52.0 15,650 32.3 13,400
0.0
33.328.5
107
13925
35.8
46.58.3
4,876
31,19414,063
4.226.712.2more
Total
16
102
15.7 18,000 
100.0 47,050
38.2
100.0
28
299
9.4
100.0
65,700
115,833
56.7
100.0
Tenants 35 227
(*) Source : CarmagnanL 1973: 254.
Indian land possessions in colonial Chile withered away 
due to the same causes which brought about the scarcity of 
Indian lands in Mexico and Peru, but the pace of this process 
was faster due to the lack of administrative control over the
colonists and the low density of the aboriginal population. 
Encomenderos were able to obtain Indian lands (as opposed 
to crown lands) through several mechanisms. These included 
obtaining land grants within the towns of their encomienda 
Indians, the purchase or 'inheritance' of such lands or 
simple encroachment and usufruct of Indian lands. This latter, 
which was even recognised by Chilean legislation from 158/- 
1620, permitted the encomendero total control over Indian 
production. Apart from these direct forms of appropriation of 
Indian lands by the encomenderos, other exactions by the 
encomenderos or the state brought about the weakening of the 
Indian communities and an erosion of their capacity to effec­
tively protect their lands. One of the forms of appropriation 
was the continuation of payment of tribute in labour up until 
the 18th century which gave the encomendero the opportunity to 
uproot Indians from the communities and enserf them as yanaconas 
along with Indian slaves. This process seems to have gained 
momentum around 1700, as an effect of the wheat boom of the 
late 17th century and the resulting interest of the hacendados 
in additional land and labour power, when a series of Indian 
towns were moved to the haciendas of their encomenderos. Indian 
communities were also weakened by the escapes of commoners 
to avoid the payment of tribute, the renting out of communitv 
lands to poor whites and mestizos which increased miscegenation 
and, in the 17/0's, the creation of Spanish towns within the 
limits of the Indian towns which meant the removal of the 
Indians to other places and/or losses of land. (60)
Unfortunatelv only partial or indirect quantitative 
data is available on the land situation of the Chilean Indians. 
This clearly indicates that the practices mentioned above
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Table 22! Land allocations to the Indian villages of th» 
valley of ¿uangue, 17tfa_and 18th centuries (in 
cuadras) () " ~  —
village
1601 1690 1775
Pico 200 nil nil
Pomaire 320 196 196
Pichidegua 380 c.380 I
Melipilla 100 c.1 0 0J
• • • • • 16 ¿\.
Huenchun 9 nil
Total 1,300 c .970 360
(*)
(*)_ Source, Borde et al 1956:79-83, map 1 . A cuadra is 
equivalent to c. 3.9 acres.In 1712 Pichidegua and Melipilla 
were moved to the town of 'El Alto' and allotted 161 cuadras.
were common and that the Indian population shrank severely 
despite the importation of Indians from the south of Chile, 
trans-Andean territories (now Argentina) and even Peru. In 
1611 the northern and central regions had 18 Indian towns and 
2,315 tributary Indians and elders, of these only 696 (or 
29.7%) were living in the Indian towns at the time of the 
census while the rest worked on the estates of their encomen­
deros or had waged work outside the Indian towns. If we add
to them some 1 ,000 yanaconas of working age (out of 2 , 16 2 of all 
ages) who were ex-prisoners of war or runaways from the 
Indian communities, the total number of landless Indians in 
■the region would be a minimum of 1 ,0 00 (or 29.9$) and a 
maximum of 2,619 adult Indians (or 79.1?). The process of 
dispossession of the Indian communities can be illustrated by 
the case of the valley of Puangue, although considering its
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favourable commercial location it might be an extreme case.
The land situation of the 5 Indian towns existing in the area 
is summarised in Table 22. It should be noted that by 1604 
several Indian land possessions had already passed to Spanish 
hands and that the area allocated to the Indians was a tiny 
fraction of the land allocated in the valley. Thus the grants 
of 21 (out of 31) Spanish grantees whose dimensions are known 
represented in 1604 over 10,4-00 cuadras, ranging from 24 to 
1,500 cuadras per individual. The way in which the Indians 
lost at least part of their lands illustrates the pressures 
that the Indian communities were experiencing in central 
Chile. The villages of Huenchun and Pico ceased to exist 
by the mid 17th century. The Indians of both towns seem to 
have been removed to work as yanaconas with their encomenderos 
while the latter appropriated their lands. The town of 
Pomaire was reduced in 1679 to only 196 cuadras as the popu­
lation had almost halved since 1604. Finally the Indians of 
Melipilla and Pichidegua were removed from their original 
lands in 1742 to provide lands for the newly founded Spanish 
town of San Jose de Logrono. By the end of the 18th century, 
the number of Indians in this new village, called 'El Alto', 
had shrunk to some 20 adults and they were renting out 48 
cuadras. (6l)
In this chapter we have discussed the formation of the 
agrarian structure in some areas of Spanish America. In the 
following chapter we will concentrate on similar geographical 
areas but will turn our attention to the economic performance 
of the haciendas and other agrarian enterprises. After that 
discussion we will summarise our findings in relation to 
agriculture as a whole and present our conclusions to both 
chapters.
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Chapter 5: Agriculture II
In this chapter we will concentrate on the study of the 
institution which set the pace of commercialised agricultural 
production in most parts of Spanish America from the 17th 
century onwards, the hacienda. The hacienda's control of 
lands, labour and capital available for agriculture was by no 
means complete by the end of the colonial period, but the long 
term trend operated in that direction. Colonial haciendas 
do not represent per se the whole dynamics of commercial 
agricultural production but through the study of haciendas 
and their connections with other agricultural producers we 
can grasp the main characteristics of the whole colonial 
agrarian structure. This approach is virtually compulsory 
since haciendas have been submitted, unlike small farms and 
Indian communities, to detailed studies of their management, 
profits, labour systems etc. Additional information (agrarian 
and demographic censuses, data on agricultural prices, etc.) 
will illustrate the relationship hacienda-small farmers-Indian 
communities to give us a more comprehensive picture. The 
regional emphasis of this chapter is on Mexican and secondarily 
on Peruvian»Colombian and Chilean haciendas with few refer­
ences outside these regions. This emphasis is inevitable, 
given the present state of the development of hacienda studies 
with emphasis precisely on these colonies. As noted above 
(Chapter 4» 2) this emphasis reflects, in the case of Mexico 
and Peru, the enormous demographic, economic and political 
importance of these colonies. Given the variety of regions 
and agricultural production which they included it might be 
argued that they were representative of colonial Spanish 
American agriculture as a whole.
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We have divided this chapter in 7 major sections. We 
will start by defining the hacienda and other agrarian pro­
ductive units and then we will consider hacienda labour, 
agricultural markets and prices, sources of capital, return 
from capital and hacienda turnover and stability. In the 
final section we will establish our conclusions.
a) Definition
Big landed estates in colonial Spanish America are referred 
to as estancias, haciendas and plantations. The differentia­
tion between the first two was already present in the vocabulary 
of the period. Hacienda meant estate in the sense of pro­
perty, fortune, capital and in relation to land, a rural 
property in which a certain amount of capital had been inves­
ted. Estancia, on the other hand, was the land without 
capital investment and usually dedicated to livestock grazing. 
The distinction between plantation and hacienda has been 
developed by Mintz and Wolf. They define plantation as 
agricultural properties organised to supply a big scale 
market which operates with abundant capital and is oriented 
mainly towards capital accumulation disregarding status 
considerations. On the contrary the hacienda has a small 
scale market, operates with little capital and the economic 
behaviour of the owner takes into consideration aspects of 
social prestige. Unfortunately this typology, based on 19th 
and 20th century cases, is difficult to test against our know­
ledge of colonial haciendas, but there are several indica­
tions that no clear cut distinctions can be made. We will 
consider, therefore, both categories as a continuum under the 
general name of hacienda which was the name used by the
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colonisers. ^ ^  ^
In relation to the difference between the hacienda and 
smaller units we will also adhere to the colonial use which 
included a mixture of acreage and value considerations. In 
general haciendas were larger and more valuable than ranchos 
and labores but in some cases ranchos and labores could 
exceed either the extent or the value of a small or inexpen­
sive hacienda. This can be illustrated by the values and 
acreages of haciendas, ranchos and labores included in Table 1. 
Thus haciendas 1 and 2 had a size comparable or inferior to 
ranchos and labores 5, 6 and 7 but their values were higher.
On the other hand haciendas 3 - 4  had a smaller or comparable 
value to ranchos and labores 5 , 6 and 7 but their acreage was 
far bigger.
(i) For instance, in eighteenth century Mexico a large 
number of haciendas supplying large distant markets (Mexico 
Oity, Guadalajara and Guanajuato) were entailed, that is,
a factor of production (land) was clearly linked to status 
considerations. The correlation between large markets and 
large hacienda capital is also questionable since merchant 
capital can provide the link between small or medium scale 
production and the large distant markets as in the case of 
18th century Oaxacan cochineal, Guatemalan indigo, etc. (l) 
The distinction between estancia-hacienda is pointed out in 
Chevalier 1963:167 for Mexico and well developed in Burga 
1976:106 for Peru. For the contrast hacienda-plantation 
see Wolf and Mintz in Florescano (ed) 1975:493, Keith 1971: 
437 and Moerner 1973:185-6, Liher 1976:527-8.
(ii) The evidence for this paragraph comes from the generous 
sample of haciendas, labores and ranchos of Leon studied by 
Grading and in Taylor's study of the Valley of Oaxaca. For 
other regions of Mexico and Spanish America we have little 
information about acreage, values etc., of smaller agricul­
tural units and therefore our definition remains necessarily 
vague in this respect. (2)
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Table 1: Acreages and values of haciendas, ranchos 
labores in colonial Mexico '
Haciendas Aereare
1 San Jose De Coapa 
(V of Mexico)
1780's
1,050
2 Xochimancas (Morelos) 
168 0's c. 1 ,20 0
3 - A Palma & Palote (Leon) 
Labores and Ranchos
c. 9,000
5 Sardaneta (Leon) 
1798 1,744-
6 Patina (Leon) 
1807 1 ,000 +
7 Cerrito (Leon) 
1820 1 ,000+
Value (in pesos) 
16,¿00
c. 190,000 
9,750
10,887
12,000
5,800
1) Florescano (ed) 1975:234.,239. 
Appendix 3. 3 - 4 )  Brading 1 9 7 8:
6) Brading 1978: 163. 7) Brading
2) Berthes 1966:91, see also 
130-1. 5) Brading 1978:141.
1978:170.
b) Labour
In Chapter 3 we analysed the main forms of forced labour 
practised in colonial Spanish America, slavery, encomiendas and 
repartimiento. It is not necessary to emphasise the import­
ance slavery had in the development of certain agrarian 
enterprises in areas where Indian labour was scarce or its 
use restricted by the colonial authorities. However a word 
or two is necessary to specify the relationships between 
encomienda and repartimiento and the hacienda. Keith 
considers encomienda and hacienda as two successive institu­
tions, which gave 'the upper class control over the supply of 
labour' mediated by a transitional period of wider spread of 
Indian forced labour or repartimiento. This holds true 
basically, for central Mexico and Peru where the beginnings 
°f Spanish agriculture on a significant scale coincided with 
the abolition of personal services in the encomiendas in the
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-id 16th century. H e a v e ,  uhe„  of
service took place later than the beginning of Spanish inter­
est in agricultural production there cvelap „f both
institutions. As the tributary population of the enconiendas 
di-inished in the 16th and 17th centuries and its escheat to 
the crown increased, the use of enco.iend. labour in agri­
culture lost importance while other sources of labour power 
became dominant. Thus forced labour of enco.iend. Indians 
was the ..in source of labour power in tha Venesuelan agrarian 
enterprises up until the .id 17th century. Simllarly ln
Colombia, the supersession of enoo.ienda's personal service
only started in the 1590's when the ..’ S WJlen the formation of latifundia
was well under way.(3)
The repartimiento system was also an effective help to 
the emergent haciendas in the Indies and introduced a more 
rational distribution of Indian labour power among colonists.
Its rotational and compulsive character however made it un­
workable in the long run since farmers and miners retained 
the Indians beyond the stipulated period, and hacendados 
without enough Indian labour induced Indians from the commun­
ities to settle in their estates and avoid the repartimiento 
drafts altogether. The forms of transition from encomienda 
or repartimiento labour to labour controlled by the hacienda 
varied and so were the mechanisms developed by the land 
ners to attract or retain their labourers. The latter can 
he classified into three main types: peonage, legal servitude 
and tenancy (or inquilinaje). Although these types over- 
happed in actual practice, the legal obligations of each
ntegory of workers were different and we will study them 
Separately.
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l) Peonage
In this section we will first define and review the 
development of the institution in Mexico and Spanish America 
and then we will establish the criteria to classify the 
different types of peonage. Finally we will study these types 
as they occurred in the Indies. The types of peonage dis­
covered are temporary and permanent peons (according to the 
time spent on the hacienda by the worker) and debt, credit 
adscripted and free peonage according to the nature of the 
relation of production between the worker and the hacienda.
Peonage was in theory a form of free waged work by which 
land owners ensured the presence of a permanent or seasonal 
labour force in their enterprises. Central Mexico seems to 
have been the region which developed the system earliest. &  
the Valley of Mexico and Puebla there was a significant 
number of peons by the end of the 16th century and, by the 
time of the suppression of the repartimiento system in the 
region (1632), some towns in the Valley of Mexico had as much 
as three quarters of its working population hired by the 
haciendas. Thus royal legislation only sanctioned a pheno­
menon which had already developed in the economy, namely the 
obsolescence of the repartimiento system and the emergence, at 
least formally, of a free waged labour system. In northern 
Mexico the lack of large groups of sedentary Indians deter­
mined the occurrence of forms of wage labour very early (l6th 
century) in agriculture and especially in mining. The high 
price of labour and the special conditions of the area (Indian 
warfare, availability of lands) also permitted the use of 
Indian slaves and semi-slaves as well as tenancy arrangements 
to induce Indians to settle in the hacienda. In southern
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Mexico the slow development of the hacienda certainly kept 
down the absolute number of hacienda workers. Within the 
haciendas however peons seem to have been the main source of 
labour for the haciendas by the 18th century. That at least 
was the case in the Valley of Oaxaca and the more commercialised 
agricultural areas of Yucatan.(4)
Peonage spread to most of the Spanish American colonies 
during the colonial period but its importance does not seem 
to have been as great as in Mexico. Thus in Central America 
peonage was already in existence in the 1580's, but its ex­
pansion was severely limited by the continuation of the reparti­
miento, which was practised systematically until the 1670's 
and more sporadically up until the 19th century, and the use 
of tenant workers. Similarly in Colombia the persistence of 
the repartimiento system until the 1740 's prevented the develop­
ment of peonage as a significant institution. After that date 
the extent of peonage as permanent labour in the haciendas is 
uncertain since major haciendas had a high number of negro 
slaves and t e n a n t s . A s  for seasonal labour, the growth of 
the poor mestizo and white population created a favourable 
labour market for the haciendas. In northern and central 
Chile, the severe decrease in the Indian population and the 
growth of the poor white and mestizo sectors stimulated the 
expansion of peonage and tenancies (especially the latter) and 
the rapid decline of the encomienda system as a source of labour
(iii) The Jesuit haciendas of Colombia and Quito had 1,774 
black slaves and 3,500 'asituados' or tenants in 1767.
Colmenares notes for Popayan in the 1740's a slow transition 
from coercive forms of labour (repartimiento and tribute in 
labour) to paternalistic forms of tenancy. (5)
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power for the haciendas in the 18th century. By 1813 peons 
m  agriculture and other activities were 34,293 or 33.4# of 
the working population in northern and central Chile and only 
second to tenants (35.5? of the working population) as a source 
of labour for the Chilean enterprises. Finally in Peru, 
peonage had been present at least since the 17th century but 
its extent during the period is unknown to us. The existence 
of an important number of legal serfs in the Peruvian sierra 
and high plateau and of black slaves in the coastal areas 
permits us to suppose that peons were not an important source 
of permanent labour for the haciendas. On the other hand, 
the presence of an important sector of landless peasants (see 
table 9, Chapter 4, above) by the second half of the 18th 
century suggests the existence of a vast floating Indian
population which could be temporarily employed on the hacien­
das . (6)
Peonage in colonial Spanish America can be classified 
according to two main criteria: (a) the period of time 
involved in the 'contract' or agreement between the hacienda 
and the worker (i.e., temporary or permanent workers) and (b), 
the nature of the link between the hacienda and the peons 
(i.e. 'purely' voluntary workers, debt peonage etc.). We will 
examine the categories derived from these two criteria separate­
ly although they are linked both internally in the combinations 
which occurred (i.e., permanent debt peonage, temporary debt 
peonage etc.), and externally, since the occurrence of the 
categories of both criteria depended on the population growth, 
development of markets and land distribution in specific areas.
Temporary peons. The relationship between the haciendas 
ln Valley of Mexico and the surrounding Indian communities
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around 1800 has been characterised by Tutino as symbiotic.
He explains that the Indian communities of the area, although 
having a land base which provided them with a substantial part 
of their subsistence requirements, had to supplement their 
incomes with waged labour on the haciendas. On the other 
hand, the haciendas with abundant lands but a scarce resident 
population had to rely on the hiring of seasonal labour from 
the communities. Leaving aside the original appropriation of 
Indian lands by the Spaniards, the long term trend of absorp­
tion of the communities by the haciendas and the unequal ex­
change implicit in waged labour, the characterisation 'symbiotic' 
holds true for many haciendas and their nearby communities.
These communities, faced by the insufficiency of community 
lands, found in temporary work on the haciendas a reasonable 
compromise between their need to retain a demographic base and 
a relative autonomy in their land resources and their need for 
cash for tribute payments or the purchase of additional food.
The equilibrium described above was not always reached, let 
alone conserved, in all areas of colonial Spanish America.
In some areas the abundance of Indian lands permitted the 
Indians to avoid peonage altogether, or to sell their labour 
power at a high price and/or force the hacendados to resort to 
legal or illegal means of coercion or inducement to obtain 
seasonal labour power from the communities. These means inclu­
ded occasional repartimiento drafts, advances of wages to pro­
spective workers, the payment of bribes to priests, Indian 
officials or corregidores to persuade or coerce the Indians to 
work for the haciendas, etc. An alternative way for the
aciendas to obtain labour power consisted in the purchase of 
African slaves or the settlement of service-tenants within the
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haciendas. Obviously this situation implied the availability 
of capital or lands to the haciendas and, in the case of 
purchase of slaves, a market situation which permitted such an 
investment. At the other extreme of the continuum, communities 
with scarce land and/or a growing population created the ideal 
situation for the haciendas by depending to an increasing 
extent on the resources of the landed estates through temporary 
or permanent labour, tenancy, purchase of food and eventually 
the absorption of the community by the hacienda.
Permanent peons. The relation hacienda - community in 
relation to permanent labourers is somewhat different. In 
the early stages of the peonage system, which occurred at a 
time of Indian demographic recession, the incorporation of 
commoners to the haciendas as permanent labour meant the loss 
of tributaries able to perform repartimiento duties and was 
rigorously challenged by the Indian chieftains. The recovery 
of the Indian population in 18th century Mexico and Peru and 
the growth of Spanish and mestizo populations elsewhere made 
the contradiction disappear or become less conspicuous. Then 
the main source of conflict between the hacienda and the Indian 
community, or in general terms hacienda - small peasantry, 
became the control of the means of production (lands, water 
rights etc.). Labour, with less state regulation due to the
(iv) The symbiotic type of relationship hacienda - community 
included, apart from Chaleo, several other micro-regions in 
the Valley of Mexico, such as the Santa Lucia and San Jose de 
Coape haciendas. The situation of scarcity of labour and high 
wages for the temporary workers can be illustrated by the cases 
of the Valley of Oaxaca, coastal Peru and Morelos in the 18th 
and early 1 9th centuries as well as some frontier haciendas 
which hired labour from half 'domesticated' Indian tribes. This
was the case for the Tarahumaras around Parral in northern 
Mexico from the late 17th century onwards and forborne Mapuche 
Indians in southern Chile in the 18th century. Finally the dis­
solution of Indian communities and an abundant floating surplus 
Indian population were especially prevalent in the Mexican 
Bajio, Tlaxcala and Upper Peru. (7)
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abolition of the repartimiento and the relaxation of community 
control, flowed from the communities to the Spanish haciendas, 
mines and towns or other communities which were well provided 
with lands. The growth of the rural population with insuffi­
cient land resources, on the other hand, seems to have changed 
the structure of hired labour within the haciendas. Katz and 
Liher1s impression is that in Mexico (excepting peripheral 
areas) temporary workers were superior in numbers to resident 
peons by the 19th century. Several regional or local studies 
support this hypothesis.^
The nature of agricultural labour demands at the time, 
with increased needs during specific periods (harvest, 
shearing etc.), favoured a labour structure which consisted 
of a core of resident, reliable and skilled workers which
(v) Studies on the Michoacan and Guadalajara regions indicate 
that this trend was apparent from the second half of the 18th 
century. Taylor's impression is that in the Valley of 
Oaxaca in the 18th century the temporary work of the Indians 
was more important than that of the resident peons. The same 
happened in some of the Jesuit haciendas of Puebla. In the 
hacienda San Jose de Coapa (Valley of Mexico) the number of 
temporary workers was far higher than the resident peons and 
according to Tutino this was the general situation in the 
Valley of Toluca and Mexico. In 1852 on the hacienda of 
Bocas (San Luis Potosi) at least 500 temporary workers were 
paid while the resident labour force did not exceed 4.00 peons. 
On the contrary, in the haciendas of the Sanchez Navarro 
family in Coahuila around 1800, around 50 temporary workers 
were employed annually compared to a resident labour force of 
c. 200 peons. In this case the scarcity of temporary labour 
had to be coped with by shifting personnel between different 
haciendas and jobs. Obviously a superior number of temporary 
workers employed in the hacienda does not necessarily mean 
that its participation in the total labour input of the haci­
enda was higher, but it does reflect its importance at 
crucial moments in the cycle of agricultural production 
(harvest, shearing, lambing etc.). Thus for instance, the 
haciendas of Santa Lugarda and La Noria employed in 1781 
c* 153 permanent peons and 144 temporary workers, but the first 
group worked 41*310 man/days (87.7$ of the total) against 
only 5,794 man/davs (or 12.3$ of total) worked by the tem­
porary workers-(8)
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could be supplemented ty seasonal labour as required. This 
system lowered the total cost of labour since the haciendas 
avoided paying the cost of reproduction of the temporary 
labour force. Such costs included, in the ease of permanent 
labour, sufficient wages and/or rations (usually maize) to 
meet the physiological and social needs of the peons and their 
families, all the year round. The preconditions of operation 
of this scheme were the availability of peons to be hired for 
short periods on the haciendas and the availability of the 
capital necessary to pay in cash for the peons. In other 
conditions slavery or tenancy become more rational alternatives 
for the haciendas.
The second criterion of classification (free versus coerced 
peonage) presents more problems for analysis, not only because 
of the paucity of pertinent data but also because of the 
different ways of interpreting those data available to modern 
students. We will concentrate on Mexico, where peonage 
appeared earlier and seems to have dominated the labour 
structure during the late colonial period, and for which 
the data available permits some relatively firm conclusions. 
Macera has demonstrated for Lower Peru that the practice 
of debt peonage existed, that is the advance of wages to 
the peons beyond their ability to repay in the short or 
medium term, thus ensuring their legal obligation to 
continue working on the estate, for both temporary and 
permanent workers. However his analysis does not permit 
us to estimate its importance within Peruvian agriculture or 
to establish comparisons between different regions in order 
to grasp the conditions which permitted its emergence and 
evolution. Similarly, data for Chile and Central America 
indicate that debt peonage was an important mechanism to
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retain the labour force in the haciendas, but its extent and 
evolution is uncertain. For Peru and Chile students have 
suggested that hacendados succeeded in tying the labour force 
to the haciendas through legal serfdom in Peru and service- 
tenancies in Chile after a period of peonage in order to 
reduce the cost of labour. (9)
The difficulties created for haciendas by the repartimiento 
system and later its abolition in central Mexico in 1632 and 
in the rest of Mexico later on, resulted in the design and 
practice of a series of strategies to obtain and/or tie the 
labour force to the haciendas. Leaving aside the tenant 
system, they can all be described as ways of ensuring the 
supply of labour for the haciendas under at least the form of 
wage agreements or peonage. Within the peonage system several 
types can be discussed although the categories sometimes 
overlap and therefore no clear cut distinctions can be made.
Below we will discuss successively debt, 'credit', adscripted 
and free peonage.
l) Debt peonage was the system by which employers 
induced prospective workers to accept an advance of wages 
which was big enough to ensure the continued work of the peon 
in the enterprise until he repaid his debt; this was usually 
for a long period of time. To be operative the system 
required that a) the amounts owed to the entrepreneur were 
substantial, the wage low or the expenses high enough to 
prevent the repayment of the debt in a short period, and b) 
there were mechanisms of coercion which ensured the retention 
of the peon until the debt was repaid. The first condition 
was fulfilled by illegal devices such as the manipulation of 
the accounts of the peons or the refusal to receive the
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repayment and also by a social structure which demanded heavy 
expenditure by the peons. Among the latter were the payment of 
tribute by the Indian workers, the purchase of foods, clothes 
or luxury items at extortionate prices in the hacienda shop and 
especially the payment of religious fees which ensured a con­
stant dependence of the peons on the wage advances made by the 
haciendas. The second condition was fulfilled by the internal 
security system of the hacienda (threat and administration of 
punishment, search for runaways etc.) and/or the local agents of 
the Spanish state. Debts were considered hereditary and sons, 
brothers and other kin were charged with the debt after the 
death of the debtor.
By 1600, with the repartimiento system still in operation, 
debt peonage had already spread significantly in Mexico, 
especially around Mexico City and Puebla. After the abolition 
of the repartimiento system in New Spain (1633), debt peonage 
developed rapidly to become, according to Borah, the main 
source of labour during the 17th and probably the early 18th 
century. By the end of the 18th century, however, debt peon­
age was being superseded in some Mexican regions by free peonage
(see below); this was reflected in the attitutdes of the royal 
bureaucracy of the time. By 1600 a moderate policy of advances
(vi) The characteristics outlined here constitute an ideal 
type of debt peonage which in different times and places was 
not always as extreme as defined here (see below). Indian tri­
bute amounted to c. 5 pesos, the equivalent of over a month's
wages^(which were 3 to 4 pesos per month) of an unskilled peon. 
Keligious fees were more of a burden for the peons. For 
instance in mid 18th century in the Valley of Mexico a wedding 
fee for Indians was c. 11.4 pesos, a burial for an adult Indian 
5.4 pesos, etc. In the northern estate of the Sanchez Navarro 
these fees were slightly lower. (1 0 )
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to the Indian workers (to a maximum of 6 pesos) was accepted 
as a way of recruiting peons and local officials, with the 
tacit approval of the viceregal government, efficiently chased 
the runaway debtors and handed them to the haciendas as a 
matter of routine. Even viceroys in the 17th and early 18th 
centuries set legal precedents favourable to the institution 
by allowing the retention of Indians in the haciendas until the 
debt was repaid, irrespective of its amount. By the end of
the 18th century the bureaucracy seems to have regarded debt 
peonage less favourably. In 1785, for instance, the viceroy 
commanded by law that no debt by peons to the haciendas 
superior to five pesos could be claimed by the estate owners 
and forbade incarceration of workers in the haciendas and 
physical punishment. This law did not mean an improvement 
for the peasants unless local officials were prepared to 
enforce it and/or the prevailing economic conditions had made 
the system obsolete. This was not the case for Coahuila in 
northern Mexico where the dominant labour system was debt 
Peonage, in a form very close to the ideal type described above, 
until at least the mid 19th century. There' an internal penal 
system, wide contacts with other haciendas and local officials 
to trace and return debtors, the transfer of debts to the 
children and debts several times higher than the meximum allowed 
were the rule. Similarly in the Valley of Oaxaca the haciendas 
depended on debt peonage for the provision of permanent workers. 
The debts of 475 peons sampled by Taylor for the 18th and 
early 19th centuries represented an average of around 35 pesos 
°r 1 1  months' wages, although the range of debts was large and 
varied from one day's to several years' wages. The local
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officials obliged the peons to repay debts in labour to the 
hacienda credited with the debt, even if workers recognised 
the debt and promised to repay it by working on another 
estate. v^l1  ^ Data for Michoacan suggests a similar situation. 
A sample of peons in five haciendas in the second half of 
the 18th century shows that 229 workers owed 7,082 pesos 
(or 31 pesos each on average), however on the same haciendas 
88 workers were credited with an average of 12 pesos each. 
Finally in the area of Puebla-Tlaxcala local judges did not 
always respect the 1785 law and tended to force the peons 
to repay debts with labour even if they were higher than the 
maximum of 5 pesos. As in Michoacan debt peonage was only 
one of the mechanisms to retain labourers on the haciendas.(1 2 )
2) 'Credit' peonage seems to have been another of the 
mechanisms used by the landowners to retain the workers on 
the haciendas. It simply consisted of the retention of wages 
by the hacendados in order to keep the workers on the estate. 
The evidence of this system is thin and therefore inconclusive 
m  relation to its extent in colonial Mexico, but it was common 
enough to deserve our attention. In a study of the Jesuit 
haciendas in Mexico, Tovar notes that these estates had not 
only workers in debt to the hacienda but also that they owed
(vii) This situation seems to have changed somehow during the 
government of Oaxaca's Intendant Mora y Peysal (1781-1808) 
who supported Indian claims and restricted debt peonage.
After 1816 however royal bureaucrats reverted to a policy 
°f full support for the haciendas and debt peonage, (ll)
238
another set of workers important sums which the Jesuits 
invested in the haciendas. He also suggests that this credit 
of the peons operated as a means of retaining them. Ewald 
has confirmed the existence of large amounts of credits on 
the haciendas of the Jesuit College of Espiritu Santo in 
Puebla (in the case of some peons about 200 pesos or 5 or 
more years' wages were owed} However, she asserts that the 
non-existence of recorded complaints indicates that there was 
no forced retention of salaries. Nickel, however, has demon­
strated that the Puebla-Tlaxcala haciendas, including the 
Jesuit ones, used credit (i.e. forced) peonage, among other 
methods, for both the retention of the workers and due to 
lack of capital to pay them. Morin suggests for Michoacan the 
use of credit peonage for the less essential workers while 
credit became available in the same hacienda to attract those 
who were more essential. Probably the rundown state of some 
haciendas made it virtually compulsory to retain wages in 
order not to enter into liquidation. This was the case for 
the hacienda of San Juan de Ulapa (north of the Valley of 
Mexico) in the late 1680's and early 1730's and the hacienda 
of Corralejo in the Bajio in 1707, and the general situation 
in Tlaxcala in the 18th century. In the latter case shortages 
of labour and the financial difficulties of the haciendas were 
associated with the emigration of Indians who were attracted 
by better salaries to the Valley of Mexico and the north. In 
this situation, a combination of measures to reduce the 
mobility of the labour force were enforced, debt peonage, 
credit' peonage and adscription .(13)
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3) Ad scripted peonage
Both Borah and Chevalier refer to a category of peons 
who were customarily (but illegally) considered to be attached 
to the land (adscript! ad glebam) in 17th century Mexico.
These were peons, indebted or not, who sometimes were partially 
paid by the right to use a plot of land and whose adscription 
to the hacienda was merely legitimised by custom and the 
connivance of local officials. We have no indication of the 
size of the population considered to be adscripted or the 
development of the institution. Studies for 18th century 
Tlaxcala, however, show that, despite the illegality of the 
practice, adscription was strictly enforced by the local 
authorities. All the peons born in the hacienda (gananes) 
were to remain working there unless serious mistreatment was 
proved. They also tried to enlarge their labour force by 
arguing that temporary peons were in fact born in the hacienda 
and therefore could not leave it. Temporary peons with 
contracts for longer than a year were in special danger of 
being absorbed as gananes and had to register every year with 
the local judge to prove their status as a free member of an 
Indian community. No other evidence of enforcing an illegal 
adscription in 18th century Mexico is known to us. Perhaps the 
proximity of Tlaxcala to major areas of buoyant economic 
conditions (the Valley of Mexico, the Bajio, the mining north) 
and the development of links with the north through coloni­
sation schemes created an especially (geographically) mobile 
peasantry which, in a situation of stagnation, it was only 
possible to retain by adscription. (1 4 )
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4) Free peonage was the labour system which operated 
mainly through economic compulsion and as such it pre­
supposed the existence of a landless peasantry or peasants 
without enough resources to satisfy the subsistence, fiscal 
and social needs of the average peasant (food, tributes, 
religious fees etc). It also presupposed the availability 
of cash (or commodities accepted by the peons in lieu of 
cash) for the haciendas to pay the peons. Empirical evidence 
indicates that by the end of the 18th century free peonage 
was becoming the dominant form of labour in areas of profitable 
commercial agriculture and surplus population. Thus in the 
late 18th century Valley of Mexico and Toluca no extra economic 
coercion seems to have existed to retain the permanent or 
temporary peons in the haciendas. Most of the peons in the 
Valley of Mexico were not in debt to the haciendas and, of 
the remainder, the majority had debts which did not surpass 
the equivalent of three weeks' wages. Similarly debt peonage 
lost its importance during the 18th century.in the Guadalajara 
hinterland. During the latter half of the 18th century, the 
majority of the peons resident on haciendas were not indebted 
and, for the rest, the average levels of indebtedness were 
equivalent to one or two months' wages. The Audiencia of 
Guadalajara forbade corporal punishment and incarceration for 
debts and their inheritance, and allowed the freedom of move­
ment of indebted peons provided that they made arrangements 
to repay the debt. On the side of the haciendas no major 
efforts were made to recover debts since labour had become 
plentiful. Finally, partial data for other M exican regions
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indicates that free peonage predominated among the waged 
forms of labour in Chihuahua, San Luis and Queretaro in the 
late 18th century. In the first case labour seems to have 
been abundant. In the other two the scarcity of labour was 
compensated for by the effects of non-agricultural production 
(mining and industry) in these areas. This attracted migrant 
labour from the south and created a market which permitted 
the haciendas to pay higher wages to attract the labour 
force. (1 5 )
5) Legal serfdom or Yanaconaje
Contrary to the situation in the rest of Spanish America, 
where serfdom was not legally recognised, in the Viceroyalty 
of Peru a prehispanic form of serfdom was adopted, and given 
legal status in the early colonial period. The origins of the 
yanacona system in pre-hispanic and colonial times are obscure. 
Under the Incas it was a labour system by which commoners 
uprooted from their community served for life in a particular 
kinship group. Although a hereditary status, it affected 
only one of the sons and does not seem to have been important 
numerically. After the conquest, Spaniards adopted the practice 
and used yanaconas as military auxiliaries against Indian 
rebellions, as personal servants and, increasingly, in agri­
culture. Up until the 1570's these Indians and agricultural 
entrepreneurs established informal arrangements by which the 
yanaconas worked for their Spanish masters receiving in 
exchange the usufruct of a plot of land, to which they were 
adscribed. In 1572, viceroy Toledo reviewed the conditions of
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these workers but, contrary to earlier royal orders which 
stated the freedom of the Indians, decided to legalise and 
regulate the institution. Toledo confirmed the status of 
yanacona for those Indians already recognised as such and 
allocated Indians not linked to the community to Spanish 
entrepreneurs as yanaconas. But he forbade the future up­
rooting of new yanaconas from the existing communities. In 
relation to rights and duties, Toledo established that yana­
conas should work five days a week for their masters and 
could not leave the estate. They should receive in exchange 
perpetual usufruct of a plot of land, a right which remained 
if the owner sold the hacienda or farm, payment of a tribute 
and religious fees, the loan of oxen and other instruments 
necessary for cultivation one day a week, etc. Despite the 
prohibition of recruiting new yanaconas the institution seems 
to have grown throughout the 17th century, especially in 
Upper Peru. The royal orders to ban all non-free Indian labour 
were not carried out during the first half of the 17th century 
and the Peruvian viceroys limited themselves to forbidding the 
recruitment of new yanaconas. At the beginning of the 18th 
century, a new royal order commanded the freedom of movement of 
the yanaconas (viz, the abolition of serfdom). The order was 
not enforced in Upper Peru where the system was fully entrenched 
ln agricultural production. In Peru proper where the yanacona 
system was not so important it seems to have disappeared as 
a legal institution but it remained as an economic practice. 
Finally in 16th century Chile, Indians living on the Spanish 
estates and having different origins (slaves, yanaconas from 
Peru, encomienda Indians etc) were called yanaconas and
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treated as such by the colonists. However, the regulations 
of the Viceroy of Peru in 1620 decreed that they were free 
to leave the haciendas and therefore not legal serfs. (1 6 )
Data on yanacona population is almost totally absent for 
Lower Peru proper. We know that in the 1570's there were 
1,188 and 514 yanaconas in the cities of Cuzco and Arequipa, 
that is around 20 and 5? respectively of the population of 
these cities in 1628. For Upper Peru quantitative data on 
yanaconas is available. The inspection of Judge Alfaro at 
the beginning of the 17th century established the existence 
of 25,000 yanaconas or probably some 10? of the total Indian 
population. By the end of the colonial period preoccupation 
with the financial state of the treasury produced a series of 
reports on the tributary population which have been preserved. 
According to these reports the yanaconas of Upper Peru 
numbered 73,816 or 17.3% of the total rural Indian population 
in the 1780's and 104,687 (or 24.1?) twenty years later (see 
Table 2). Apart from the growth of the yanacona population,
Table 2 indicates a significant growth of the tenant sector 
and a decisive fall in the number of landless peasants, which 
clearly suggest a process of tying the floating labour force 
to the hacienda as yanaconas. This process was however not 
uniform. Studies for selected areas of the provinces of Larecaja 
and Chulumani, with a populaiton of 16 ,366 yanaconas or 2 2.5% 
of the yanaconas of Upper Peru in 1786, indicate a different 
pattern. In these areas the yanacona population decreased by 
about 20 to 25? during roughly the same period. These areas 
seem to have been affected during the period in question by 
an economic contraction which brought about the emigration of
*
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a great number of yanaconas, either through their dismissal 
by the hacienda or more likely through their escape from it.
This leads us to consider the actual relations of 
production which linked the yanacona and the hacienda. 
According to Santamaria, in late 18th century Upper Peru the 
above characterisation of the yanacona as a legal serf was 
valid, but he adds that haciendas dispossessed the 
yanaconas of the usufruct of lands after they reached the 
age of 50 years, until which time the haciendas paid their 
tributes to the crown. The replacement of the old yanaconas 
by young peasants left the former in a precarious situation 
and, not obliged to pay tributes, they usually felt free to 
leave the haciendas with their families. On the other hand, 
Klein's impression is that no real adscription to the land 
existed in late 18th century Upper Peru and that yanaconas 
were attracted to or gave up lands in the haciendas, which they 
cultivated as share croppers, by purely economic factors, that 
is the possibility of obtaining enough cash from that part 
of the harvest which they kept for themselves. Now Klein bases 
these observations on data from the recently colonised coca 
producing area of Chulumani. It is probable that the cash 
crop type of cultivation practised there and its dependence 
on the unstable market of the mining towns did not encourage 
the adscription of Indians to the haciendas. As for Lower 
Peru, researchers agree that the 18th century saw a slow 
process of enfeoffment of free peons to the land as yanaconas 
by substituting payments in cash or kind with the usufruct of 
a plot of land.
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TABLE 2
Rural Indian Population in Upper Peru at the end of the 
Colonial Period*
Tributary Category 
Landed peasant 
Tenants
Landless peasants
Yanaconas
Uro Indians 
(Ethnic minority)
Other Indians ** 
Total
1785-7
No f
151,978 35.6
9,277 2 .2
184,078 43.1
73,816 17.3
6,004 1.4
1,965 0.4
447,118 100.0
1804-7
No t
164,472 37.8
21,653 5.0
130,013 29.9
104,687 24.1
9,195 1.7
6,544 1.5
434,564 100 .0
Source: Santamaria 1977: 268
Includes community Indians without land, mine 
workers, Indians attached to the church, etc.
In the hypotheses of Mellafe and Spalding this process would 
have become numerically significant with the economic 
contraction of the viceroyalty (mid-17th - mid-18th centuries) 
and was fully supported by the local bureaucracy. (17)
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TABLE 2
ftural Indian Population in Upper Peru at the end of the 
Colonial Period"
1785 -7 I8O4-7
Tributary Category No % No %
Landed peasant 151,978 35.6 164,472 37.8
Tenants 9,277 2 .2 21,653 5.0
Landless peasants 184,078 43.1 130,013 29.9
Yanaconas 73,816 17.3 104,687 24.1
Uro Indians 
(Ethnic minority) 6,004 1.4 9,195 1.7
Other Indians ## 1,965 0.4 6,544 1.5
Total 44-7,118 100.0 434,564 100.0
Source: Santamaria 1977: 268
** Includes community Indians without land, mine 
workers, Indians attached to the church, etc.
In the hypotheses of Mellafe and Spalding this process would 
have become numerically significant with the economic 
contraction of the viceroyalty (mid-17th - mid-18th centuries) 
and was fully supported by the local bureaucracy. (17)
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6) Tenant Workers
As in the case of peonage and the yanacona system, data 
on this group of workers is scarce and its interpretation 
difficult. This derives from the fact that the renting of 
small plots of land was. usually agreed by verbal contracts 
and only by inference can the real relations of production 
expressed in the tenancy agreement be determined. (18) We 
will first establish a theoretical appreciation of this 
category and go on to examine the concrete data and the 
trends of development of the institution in Spanish America.
Tenants can be classified into two or three groups 
according to the amount of rent paid. The first group was 
constituted by large scale tenants who rented whole haciendas, 
or a significant area of one or more haciendas, and used the 
labour of peons and/or sub-tenants for agricultural production. 
At the other end of the social scale there was a mass of modest 
tenants who had. access only to a limited number of acres and 
who paid rent, either in cash, labour or kind or a combination 
of the three. Finally a third group was constituted by the 
downwardly mobile, prosperous small peasants whose scale of 
operation required hired labour. (19) Since large-scale and 
middle tenants.did not participate directly in agricultural 
production, and at most assumed an administrative role in 
their haciendas or ranchos (farms inside or outside the limits 
of a hacienda) they do not concern us here. On the other hand, 
small tenants tended to provide, in one way or another, 
labour for the haciendas and in that respect they can be 
considered an integral part of the labour force of the haciendas.
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Within this group of workers the tenant who paid his rent in 
money resembles the middle and upper strata of tenants and, 
indeed, the stratum of small proprietors. Like them they suffered 
the vicissitudes of agricultural production (droughts, low 
agricultural prices, etc) and the possibilities of upward 
social mobility or indebtedness. In colonial Spanish America 
this section tended to disappear through the commutation of 
money rent into at least partial labour rent or rent in kind 
(see below). Labour rent at least partially eliminated the 
risk involved in independent production by reducing the need 
for cash (necessary for the payment of money rent) and 
reducing dependency on the erratic market to a minimum. Finally, 
rent in kind also avoided the need for commodity production, 
but the peasants who paid it were more dependent on the size 
of the harvest in their private plots than those who paid 
rent in labour. A variant of rent in kind was a share cropping 
arrangement where the direct producer paid an agreed proportion 
of the harvest (usually a half) to the landowner as rent.
Normally the landowner provided the seeds and sometimes the 
use of draft animals, so rent in this arrangement was mixed 
with interest on the capital advanced to the peasant.
We have already referred to tenant workers in dealing 
with other forms of hacienda labour in different regions 
°f Spanish America. Unfortunately with the data available to 
Us it is impossible to trace the origins of the institution 
or to assess its importance in most of these areas. Substantial 
studies on tenant, workers have been done on central and northern 
°olonial Chile which can give us a clue to understanding the 
development of the institution in the rest of Spanish America.
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In Chile the institution appeared in the 17th century in 
the form of 'land loans' to poor Spaniards, mestizos or free 
negroids who had a kinship or friendship relation with the 
landowner. At this early stage the rent was symbolic or non­
existent and the plots lent or rented out (the terms were 
interchangeable) were situated on the borders of the haciendas, 
the loan itself ensuring the right of the hacendado to its 
possession. Slowly some obligations, such as surveillance of 
the hacienda borders and attendance at the rodeos became 
part of the agreement. These obligations tended to increase 
in the second half of the 18th century and included, in some 
cases, the transport of merchandise to the urban markets and 
the provision of a peon, either for a specific purpose on the 
hacienda or permanently and, in general, an increase of the 
ground rent. This process was associated with the growth of 
the mestizo and poor, white population during the 18th century 
and the parallel increase of wheat exports to Peru. During the 
decades after the mid-19th century a second boom of wheat 
exports (and, therefore, rising prices) gave rise to an even 
greater increase in pressure by the haciendas on the service 
tenants (called inquilinos from the late 18th century). This 
sector, which seems to have lost importance in agricultural 
production after independence, became in the second half of 
the 19th century, crucial for the haciendas when more labour 
was extracted from them, Well-off inquilinos were expected
(viii) The number of inquilinos (service tenants) in central 
Chile increased from 17,282 in 1813 to 30,000 in 1865 (the 
estimate is Bauer's and includes what we have called the southern 
region from the Maulé to the Bio-Bio rivers). However their 
participation in the total rural labour force fell from 38 plus 
ho just 1 5 .4$.The rural peon sector, on the contrary, grew from 
457 peons (or less than 48?) to 125*000 (or 64*1? of the 
total number of rural workers). (20)
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to provide two peons (either from the family household or 
hired) and poorer tenants had to provide virtually all the 
available male labour power within the family. In parallel 
to this, a new type of inquilino was recruited from among the 
peons and tenant families. They were given a garden plot of 
around one acre and if necessary a small salary. The increase 
of the importance of inquilinos for Chilean haciendas and 
their increasing exploitation seem to have been the result of 
the need to retain peons (increasingly attracted by the 
better wages in the mines, towns and public works) and the 
possibilities for the landowner to put pressure on a relatively 
well-off sector of the workers. (2 1 )
Relevant data on other Spanish American colones are 
insufficient to reach any conclusions except for some regions 
of Mexico. By the end of the 17th century large haciendas 
leased outlying portions to small renters who were able to 
provide some services and, we are told by Chevalier, rapidly 
multiplied in the 18th century. The extent of this process in 
the different Mexican regions or in Mexico as a whole is not 
specified by Chevalier but data on some of them can be used *
to define this assertion.. The Mexican Bajio fully fits this 
description. Tenant workers were in evidence in the region 
in the second half of the 17th century and they tended to 
increase rapidly during the 18th century. The work arrangements 
seem to have varied from estate to estate but a trend of general 
deterioration of the conditions of work seems to have occurred 
during the late 18th and 1 9 th centuries as a result of the 
increase of population in the area and, later, the exprop- 
riation of the Indian communities. The forms of this deteri-
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oration are not completely clear. In around the 1730's 
rent in labour was replaced in several haciendas by share 
cropping while, at the same time, other haciendas were 
commuting their tenants' rent from purely monetary arrange­
ments to at least some labour rent. In still other haciendas 
a substantial increase in land rents (which usually meant 
the eviction of the tenants) and the obligation to work a 
few days per year on the hacienda for arrimados (relatives 
or friends living in the tenant plots) were enforced. By 
the end of the 18th century tenants controlled a good 
proportion if not most of the land of many haciendas in the 
Bajio, although the proportion of these who had labour 
obligations to the hacienda is not clear.
The importance of tenants in the Bajio region is shown 
m  the following miscellaneous data. In four Bajio haciendas 
(Ibarra, La Griega, Puerto Nieto and Labor de Puerto Nieto) 
tenants formed 39.5% of the total working population (157  
individuals). Six select haciendas of Penjamo had a total of 
133 resident workers and more than four times as many tenants 
(607). In the first decades of the 19th century, three
?rjX „ notes that in mid-1 9 th century the hacienda
oc,5s (in San Luis de Potosi) the landowners or their 
eprasentatives considered that 'all the inhabitants of the 
* perty (hacienda) were potential or real, permanent or 
ccasional peons...and tried to use them according to the needs 
a^rJ?u-*-^ural work' . Obviously not all haciendas had the same 
nception of tenantry, but there is at least a kernel of truth 
X. conception, at. least if we consider family groups rather
g lndividuals. Thus, according to Tutino, on most of the 
lan^°reSta^eS combination within the same family of rentirg
1 st L°m an<^  being paid by the hacienda predominated in the 
'Do? 18 , century. Similarly for the Chihuahua hacienda of 
rel +r^S ’ Benedict asserts that all tenants seem to have been
^  blood or marriage to the permanent peons in the decades around 1800. (22)
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haciendas of Leon received 1 8 . 0 ,  1 1 .rj% and è9% of their 
gross income from tenants, this represented roughly the pro­
portion of lands occupied by the tenants. Finally table 3 
shows the proportion of hacienda production (or rather 
demesne production) in the total production of some districts 
according to the tithes paid by hacienda tenants and small 
proprietors. Two trends are apparent: firstly, the specia­
lisation of demesne production in wheat (the Spanish grain 
par excellence) and tenant and small peasants production on 
Indian crops, and, secondly, the diminishing relative impor­
tance of demesne production, at least in the decades immediately 
after the mid-18th century. (23)
In the Guadalajara hinterland and Michoacan, tenants 
were also important by the end of the 18th century. In these 
regions, however, the development of the institution was 
slower and did not reach the proportions it did in the Bajio.
In both regions, as in the Bajio, the demographic pressure 
increased the ground rent around 1790 making tenure more 
precarious and evictions more likely. By this time a tendency 
to commute money rent to labour rent or share cropping had 
developed. Unfortunately, the dynamics of this process and its 
quantative importance is unknown to us. Data for other regions 
of Mexico are even more fragmentary but provide us with 
important clues to understanding the relation between tenants 
and haciendas. The Jesuits of the College of Espiritu Santo 
of Puebla had virtually no tenants in the 1 7 6 0's since they 
feared that the Indians might claim full possession of the 
land after a period of tenancy. In the huge hacienda of Santa 
Lucia, tenants were also unimportant numerically, but they were
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Table 3: Agricultural Production in Some Baiio Hi
in the Second Half of the 18th Century { i n  Î )--
District Demesne Tenants*
Wheat Maize Beans Maize
(1 ) Penjamo 1779 85.2 10.4 - n.d.
(2) Celaya 1767-72 94.0 90.0 90.0 n.d.
(2) Celaya 1782-3 87.0 91.0 81.0 n.d.
(2) Valle de Santiago 1765 80.0 42.0 34.0 n.d .
(2) Valle de Santiago 1793 66.0 20.0 1 1 . 0 n.d.
(3) Haciendas "Otates" and 
"Laborcita" 1752-6 n.d. 83.3 n.d. 16.7
(3) Haciendas "Otates" and 
"Laborcita" (Leon) 
1762-7
n.d. 66.0 n.d. 34.0
(4) San Luis de la Paz 1803 n.d. 28.0 n.d. n.d.
Except in the haciendas of "Otates" and "Laborcita" 
we do not know the proportion produced by the tenants. 
Non-derne sne production included, apart from tenants, 
small proprietors and Indian villages.
(1) Brading 1978: 27 .
2 Morin 1979: 272-3 .
3 Brading 1978: 73-4 .
(4) Brading 1978: 22 .
qualitatively important since a majority of them were Indian 
officials who tacitly agreed to induce the Indians of their 
communities to work in the haciendas in times of labour 
scarcity. Finally in the colonial Valley of Oaxaca, ground 
rent (although not a dominant form) was used to obtain 
labour by both Spanish and Indian landowners. In the first 
case, share cropping was the rule while Indian landowners (as
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chieftains) used the pre-hispanic torrazgo institution which 
implied a kind of seigneurity with payments of rent in money 
and labour. (24)
c) Hacienda Markets and Agricultural Prices
The relation between haciendas and the market has been 
a subject of debate during recent decades. A traditional view 
portrays the hacienda as essentially 'self-sufficient, 
autarchic and independent of the market', while for others it 
was precisely a favourable market situation which permitted 
the birth and growth of the hacienda.^ As Macera has pointed 
out, in the relation hacienda-market a clear differentiation 
must be made between the hacienda as a buyer and the hacienda 
as a seller of commodities in the market. With respect to 
the latter aspect, recent research has clearly demonstrated 
the hacienda's market orientation.^1  ^ We think we have 
sufficiently demonstrated this point in Chapter 4 above, where 
we showed that haciendas predominated around the main urban 
markets (Mexico City, Lima, Bogota, Guadalajara, etc) or 
close to the main routes of commercial traffic (the roads 
Santiago-Valparaiso in Chile, Lima-Potosi in the Cuzco area,
iq7qi'JlnQtra^ltl0na'‘ v^ew i-s presented and criticised in Frank 
f / i ' i '°_84. The opposite view is sustained by Borah, Frank 
and Gongora. A more balanced view is maintained by Chevalier 
t °,ln^ ca^es the occurrence of a general, but not absolute 
endency towards self-sufficiency in seventeenth century 
exican haciendas. It is clear that he refers to the 
^acisnda as a buyer of commodities, although he points out
markets. This point is made more clearly
fall in the silver output substantially
(xi) A recent summary of the 
De found in Liher 1976: 21-8.
se results and bibliography can
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Merida-Campeche in Yucatan etc). The other aspect (viz 
purchases of the hacienda in the market) is more complex and 
the view which asserts the self-sufficiency of the colonial 
hacienda in respect to its input contains at least a kernel 
of truth. As we shall see below the profitability of the 
haciendas varied according to the type of production practised, 
its location, access to capital and labour, etc. Not all 
haciendas were in a position to import or buy on the local 
market the necessary elements to ensure agricultural production 
and its realisation. In situations of low division of labour, 
inadequate transport systems and scarcity of means of payment, 
a relative self-sufficiency in the inputs of the hacienda was 
the only solution for continuous and profitable production.
Thus most of the colonial haciendas cultivated grains and 
raised livestock irrespective of their main line of production. 
This provided the rations for the resident labourers, the 
animal power necessary for transport and production tasks and, 
eventually, extra income. In some cases, haciendas had small 
industries which provided them with coarse clothes for their 
workers, earthenware and glass containers for agricultural 
products and usually had among their permanent workers, black­
smiths, carpenters, potters, muleteers, etc.^*3-^  A trend
(xii)^  The combination of grain and livestock production in 
colonial Spanish America was widely practised. Almost all the 
aciendas included in the bibliographical notes of this chapter 
shared this characteristic despite their main line of production.
recent paper by Taylor even defines the hacienda as rural pro- 
TVi Provide 'the local market with grains and livestock.
Ae existence of livestock and grain production is, of course,
?° proof of a tendency to self-sufficiency. It is necessary to 
now the percentage of this production consumed internally. For 
instance, the hacienda 'Santa Lucia' had several ranchos of 
naize to provide the workers with their rations, although some- 
lmes purchases of extra maize were necessary to feed them, 
n the other hand the hacienda of Otates was able to dispose of 
®ost of its maize production on the market. Our evidence for
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towards productive specialisation and therefore more dependence 
on the market for supplies was however evident in haciendas of 
high profitability. In the early 17th century the Mexican 
Jesuits tried to make haciendas specialise in sugar production 
keeping other crops to a minimum. This occurred in at least 
two haciendas in and around Morelos (Jalmolonga and Xochi- 
mancas). The same is true for the secular sugar hacienda of 
Atlacomulco also in Morelos. All three depended on the market 
for livestock, grains and most supplies. Similarly, in the 
early 19th century, Cuban sugar mills replaced the Sunday work 
of the slaves on their plots by extra work on sugar production 
and imported the necessary foodstuffs for the labour force 
from overseas. Big livestock haciendas such as the Sanchez 
Navarro's in Coahuila and 'Las Vacas' and 'Fontezuela' on the 
River Plate relied on the market for their supplies in the late 
18th century. In the two former cases, however, the haciendas 
became, through their shops, suppliers of commodities for their 
labourers and even for a whole region. (27)
Colonial haciendas incorporated commerce into their 
operations one way or another. Apart from cases where the 
owner of a hacienda was himself a merchant and commercialised 
its production and/or provided the hacienda and its peons with 
oloth, tools etc, most colonial haciendas had a shop or ware­
house which sold the products of the estates such as maize, meat
(xii) continued... 
from Jesuit or big 
always entirely for 
quite the opposite 
Production). (26)
industries in the haciendas comes mostly 
haciendas. Again this production was not 
internal consumption and in some cases 
(ie industry was the main line of
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or coarse cloth, or commodities bought especially for the 
shop, such as textiles, tobacco, sugar and sc on,to the workers. 
In either case, an important part of the hacienda's profits 
seem to have come from the estate's shop. The importance of the 
hacienda's shop varied widely in Spanish America. For some 
estates the resident peons constituted a captive market and 
they were virtually obliged to buy in order to recover wages 
owed to them or because of lack of credit anywhere else. 
Naturally the hacienda owner or administration took advantage 
of the situation by surcharging the commodities above the 
local market price. In other cases the estate shop was clearly 
a service rendered by the estate to their workers in order to 
attract labour to the haciendas. In these cases, probably no 
extra profit was made by the estate but certainly no losses 
either. x^l11) a second type of advantage provided by the 
hacienda shop was the reduction of cash payments to the workers 
to a minimum. The estate shop operated as virtual banks which 
credited the workers for their salaries in separate accounts 
and against which the workers could draw cash or commodities
+ • +'?arr^s asferts that, 'The Sanchez Navarro commercial
b •t’I- leS exP^ -aan in large measure the family's success in 
ouiiding ^  operating the latifundio' in late 18th century Coahuila. 
uiKewise the operation of a vast trade network by the Jesuits
r?gi°ns of Spanish America explains, to a large extent, 
e substantial profits obtained by their productive units and 
UD6+eX >^anS:'’0n colleges. On a smaller scale laymen built
Mra. networks which commercialised their haciendas' products 
tv e x ^co City, Cuzco and so on. The 'service for the workers' 
ype of hacienda shop can be illustrated by the hacienda Santa 
cia (Valley of Mexico), 'Ibarra' (Queretaro) and 'Dolores' 
tv n°rip ern. Chihuahua in the late 18th century. The 'exploitative' 
ype of hacienda shop existed on several Michoacan haciendas 
re sur°harges of 25 - 50$ were the rule. The economic impor- 
h„ Guadalajara hinterland and 'Dolores' provided the
th e?aa<?os with between 4- and 7% of the total gross income of 
aacaendas, while 2 Michoacan shop haciendas produced 20 and
1 7VATesP?c^aveGy cf the net income of these haciendas in the J-7"0's. (28)
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according to their bargaining power. This could mean retention 
of wages, payment in kind or cash and different levels of 
access to credit. Macera has calculated for eight haciendas 
of the Peruvian Sierra that less than 5$ of the wages owed to 
the workers was paid in money in the years around 1770, the 
rest being paid in commodities, land rent, royal tributes, etc. 
For Mexico it seems that the major part of the salaries of the 
permanent workers was paid in kind, although the proportions 
varied from estate to estate and even within a single estate 
from year to year. Thus in the haciendas of Ozumba, Ojo de 
Agua and Loreto in Puebla payment for the permanent workers was 
made up of 22$ in cash and the rest in commodities. In 1791 
however the proportion of the payment made in cash had increased 
to 54.71. The hacienda 'Cienaga de Mata' (northern Guadalajara) 
in 1777 paid exclusively in kind while the permanent workers 
of San Nicolas de Jongo (Michoacan) received 50$ of their salar­
ies in kind. Temporary workers both in Peru and Mexico seem to 
have been paid a larger proportion of their wages in cash, but 
again regional and chronological differences occurred. Van Young 
has noted a trend in the haciendas of the Guadalajara hinter­
land to increase the proportion of cash paid to the workers, a 
parallel decrease of the stocks of the hacienda shops and more 
availability of cash in the haciendas. Did this trend occur in 
other Spanish American regions? It seems quite possible for 
selected areas given, (a) the increase in silver production in 
Mexico and Peru in the late 18th century (see Chapter 6) which 
made the circulation of coin more possible, and (b) the expan­
sion of the urban markets, the proletarianisation of small 
Peasants and as a result the increase of commodity production
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in the countryside. We will now deal with these two problems. (29)
The enormous increase in the amount of precious metals 
produced and coined in Mexico, Peru and Colombia and, to some 
extent, in Chile and Central America in the late 18th century 
(see Chapter 6, especially tables 3 and 6), should have created 
in theory a powerful expansion of the monetary economy of 
these colonies. However this effect was counterbalanced by the 
increasing export of coin to Spain, either directly from the 
producing colonies or by re-exports through other colonies 
(Chapter 6, table l). Not having a complete series of legal 
precious metal exports, not to mention contraband, it is 
impossible to know the exact quantity of coin available in each 
colony at any one time. Contemporary estimates and complaints 
about the scarcity of coin however permit us to consider that 
the amount of coin avialable in the colonies was not substan­
tially affected by the increase of coinage. Thus in Mexico, 
despite a coinage of over 350 million pesos in silver alone 
during the period 1771-91» the amount of money available in the 
colony was reported to have decreased from 36 to 31 million 
pesos in the same period. In Peru, of the just over 100 million 
pesos coined in 1761-74» only 265*853 pesos (or 0.3%) remained 
ln the colony. A similar drainage of coin took place in Chile 
(where the amount of coin available seems to have increased) 
and Central America and Colombia. The effect of an increasing 
coinage on the forms of payment in the haciendas is further 
diminished if we consider that the former consisted of mostly 
high denomination coins only suited to large transactions and 
hardly accessible to rural workers. The minting of copper coins, 
which could have solved the problem of circulation in small
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transactions, was consistently opposed by the big merchants.
For their transactions with the European merchants they required 
coins of high denomination which were accepted internationally 
(i.e. silver or gold). The result of these practices for the 
colonial economy was dependence on a credit circuit which was 
controlled by the big merchant capitalists and centered in the 
colonial metropolis. It included smaller merchants, hacendados, 
hacienda workers and miners who were all linked in commercial 
networks. These networks were based on credit or delayed pay­
ments in kind or labour for commodities received in advance 
and cemented by loyalties or power and kinship relations.
For the rural worker, the last link in this chain of credit, 
this meant at least the possibility of surcharges on the items 
purchased from the hacienda shops, indebtedness and willing 
or free permanent attachment to the hacienda. (30)
Hacienda markets (and therefore profits) seem to have been 
severely limited during the colonial period by the competition 
exerted by the small and medium size agricultural producers.
In the rural areas, Indians or poor whites with arable land 
sufficient for subsistence needs and payments of tributes and 
tithe scarcely purchased from the haciendas, while in the urban 
markets this same sector depressed agricultural prices by selling 
below or just above the cost of production of the haciendas. ^ x:i'v^
(xiv) The evidence known to us in relation to this problem is 
scarce and limited mainly to 18th century Mexican regions. 
Furthermore it refers to the production of grain (that is a 
subsistence crop) for local or regional and not export markets.
Ihe relation hacienda-small producers in the market was complicated 
ln the 2nd case by the intervention of usurer merchants who 
advanced money against the future harvest of small producers 
selling it later in the export market.
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In central Mexico conditions for the formation of haciendas 
and their expansion existed from the mid-l6th century up to 
the 1620's . These consisted of the continued rise of grain 
(and agriculture) prices due to the drop in the quantity of 
Indian production channeled to the market by the encomenderos 
and the demand created by the opening of silver mines. After 
that period grain prices stabilised for the rest of the 17th 
century as haciendas increased production, silver production 
decreased and regulatory measures in the town markets were 
enforced. (31) During the 18th century, haciendas in central 
Mexico suffered from the same problem, that is the lack of 
markets big enough to push up the prices of agricultural 
commodities and thus stimulate hacienda production and profits. 
The seminal work of Florescano in this field shows that the 
price of maize, the main Mexican agricultural product, remained 
at some 10 reales per fanega from the 1720's to the 1780's 
in Mexico City, although it was subject to seasonal and cyclical 
variations. Only in the three decades around 1800(1785-1814.) 
was there a substantial increase in the price of maize which 
reached an average of 18 reales per fanega in the decade 
1805-14. The imbalance between maize production and maize 
demand in Mexico City was coped with in several ways by the 
hacendados of the city's hinterland. Firstly, by taking advan­
tage of the annual or seasonal price variations in the market 
ar|d storing maize until that of the smaller producers was 
already bought, in this way they profited from the higher 
prices that the subsequent scarcity produced. Thus years of 
bad harvests which transformed the small producers into maize 
buyers were a blessing for the hacendados who were able to
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dispose of their maize at a high price. The same process, but 
with less intensity, occurred during the months preceding 
the harvest when small producers stopped selling and eventually 
became maize buyers. Secondly, hacendados concentrated pro­
duction by means of buying or encroaching on the land of the 
small producers and even eliminating some medium-size 
haciendas. Finally, especially towards the end of the 18th 
century, the hacendados evaded the regulations which compelled 
them to sell all the maize that they took into the city in the 
municipal market place (the alhondiga), thus avoiding the 
payment of the tax of 5 real per fanega and, at the same time, 
weakening the purchasing capacity of the municipal 'posito' 
(granary) which tried to regulate prices by buying, storing 
and releasing maize at critical times to equate supply and 
demand. The cumulative effects of these three factors, together 
with the impressive population increase in the last decades 
of the 18th century, which grew by 35? between 1790 and 1810, 
explain the rising trend of maize prices from the 1780's 
onwards. With an expanding market and fewer competitors the 
haciendas of the Mexico City hinterland were able to increase 
enormously the value of their p r o d u c t i o n . A t  the same 
time, due to the increase in the number of landless peasants, 
the wages of the peons remained at the same level as before. (33) 
The rise in the price of maize in Mexico City in the
(xv) The value of the tithe in the Archbishopric of Mexico City 
increased from an annual average of ¿1 3 ,2 6 3 pesos in the decade 
72Q 7^  ^8,237 during the following decade and was equal to
9,719 in 1792. In the quinquennium 1806-10 the annual average 
had fallen to 510,081. (3 2)
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last decades of the 18th century was not an Isolated case. 
Agricultural prices in three other Mexican cities in northern 
Mexico (Zacatecas, Guadalajara and Leon) show the same trend; 
stagnant prices during the six or eight decades before the 
1780's and a sustained rising trend thereafter. More interes­
tingly the same trends that operated in Mexico City's hinter­
land with respect to the relation hacienda-small producers- 
market were also in force in the hinterlands of these urban 
centres. Both Guadalajara and Leon's haciendas had storage 
capacities which permitted them to wait for the months or 
years of high prices to sell, and in both areas the process 
of concentration of agricultural production was well under way. 
In Guadalajara, where Indian participation in the maize 
market represented consistently 1 2 or 13f of the total from 
the 1750's to the early 1780's, this participation had dropped 
to 1% or less by 1810. The situation was probably similar in 
Leon from the middle of the 18th century onwards. After a 
particularly bad harvest in 174-9, which amounted to a seventh 
of the average of previous years, a significant number of 
small producers were forced to sell their lands to expanding 
haciendas in order to buy maize at inflated prices to avoid 
starvation. Municipal control of the maize price through its 
market and 'posito' varied in these three urban centres. In 
Zacatecas the scarce resources of the posito did not permit an 
effective regulating action and, in cases of massive star­
vation, it had to appeal to the good will of the local 
notables to obtain loans to buy maize and re-sell it at a 
nominal price. Similarly the posito of Leon had to borrow 
money from the church to buy and sell maize during the sub-
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sistence crisis of the mid-1780's. Guadalajara's municipal 
council coped with the situation more energetically. From 
the 1760's the posito controlled the sale of the majority of 
the grain introduced into the city and in times of crisis 
seized stocks held by speculators, banned the export of 
grain from the area, etc. Even in the latter case the result 
of municipal control was the elimination of re-sellers and 
the reduction of the effects of famine rather than the elimi­
nation of the cyclical variation of prices which was the 
product of climatic conditions (droughts, frosts, etc) or 
the long-term trend of rising agricultural prices. Finally, 
population growth in the cities of Guadalajara and Zacatecas 
was spectacular during the second half of the 18th century.
The former doubled its population between 1760 and 1770 and 
doubled it again in the following 50 years, while the latter 
doubled its population between 1750 and 1800.(xv±) (34)
The only study of the relation hacienda-small producers- 
market outside Mexico that we know of deals with the province 
of Cochabamba in Upper Peru. By the 1780's haciendas seem to 
have dominated access to land in the region as 73? of the 
Indian population lived on them. Land tenure systems within the 
haciendas however left plenty of room for independent and
(xvi) The rate of population growth of the town of Leon cannot 
ascertainBd with the available data although there are indi- 
ations of a rapid growth between 1781 and 1810. In 1781 Leon had 
thp Pu^a^10n o f 5,500 to 6,700 inhabitants which was well below 
n-,0 Mexlco City, Guadalajara and Zacatecas which had
28»°C° and 25,500 inhabitants in 1793 and which ranked 
2 s,' i°unth and fifth among Mexican urban centres at the time, 
to S ecas’ a fining centre, has not been considered with respect 
concentration of grain production since it imported most of 
ne grain it consumed from the Bajio. (35)
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eventually marketable production in the form of tenancies, 
sub-tenancies and share cropping arrangements. As in the cases 
studied above this kept grain prices down and limited the 
profits realised by the hacendados through the sale of demesne 
production. Landowners fought back by storing grain to be 
released in the years of bad harvests and selling it in the 
upper lands which were most affected by droughts. These 
markets offered no competition from the small producers since 
hacendados controlled the mule-teams necessary for transport. 
Furthermore, hacendados, through their financial capacity, 
were able to acquire the farm of the ecclesiastical tithe 
and thus to collect roughly 10% of the entire grain production 
of the region and become a major grain seller. This did not 
mean very much in years of good harvests and low prices, 
however in years of scarcity this proved to be a major profi­
table speculation which rendered profits of around 50-60% in 
the early 1770's. Paradoxically, bids for the farm of the tithe 
reached their highest levels in the years when a bad harvest 
was expected and prices increased four or five times. Thus as a 
super-hacendado the tithe farmer, a hacendado himself, used 
the climatological disasters for his own profit, alienating a 
fraction of the harvest of the small producers without compen­
sation and giving it back at usurious prices when the 
peasants' stock was depleted. (36)
The cases studied above and some indirect evidence indicate 
that one of the main determinants of the formation of prices of 
grain in colonial Spanish American markets in the short and 
Medium term was the agricultural cycles. The effects
(xvii) This conclusion is also supported by the evidence pro­
vided by the study of grain and tuber prices and meteorological 
conditions in 18th century Potosi carried out by Tandater and 
Wachtel. (3 7)
of the annual agricultural cycles on the level of maize 
prices are quite clear for Mexican urban centres. Monthly 
maize prices in Mexico City, Guadalajara and Zacatecas and 
probably other urban cities, (xvM) indicate that during the 
months of the harvest, prices were relatively low and 
increased slowly to reach a peak just before the next harvest, 
(see table 4). This is of course a simplification since 
seasonal prices were affected by medium term trends, thus a 
bad harvest made prices during the harvest period remain 
high and, conversely, the prospects of a very good harvest 
made the prices lower well in advance of the harvest season. 
Also the practice of the landowners of releasing their maize 
from July to October slightly depressed prices during these 
months. Long term agricultural cycles are difficult to 
determine without long series of production, and even in that 
case the intervention of factors such as expansion of the 
area under cultivation, demographic change and the expansion 
of the market would distort the relation production-price 
which is the one which interests us. For shorter periods, 
however, it can be assumed that no major changes in relation 
to these factors occurred.
(xviii) Brading notes that in the towns of Silao and Leon 
summer prices were one or two reales higher than the annual 
average. Available bi-annual prices in the city of Oaxaca 
vyears 1788, 1790, 1791 and 1794) indicate that prices in the 
second half of the year were higher, which could indicate a 
pattern similar to the one noted above. (38)
(xix) True, landowners could significantly reduce the area under 
cultivation in their haciendas, but that would reduce their 
income unless there was a monopolistic situation or an agreement
etween producers. Conversely producers could expand production 
y exploiting new lands, but that required capital, labour and 
ands which were not available in the short term. Demographic 
changes due to migration could affect the relation production/ 
price, but it can be assumed that they are not connected with 
“e cycles described above.
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Figure 1 shows levels of maize production (as expressed in 
the tithe) and prices and their changes in the period 1749 
to 1789 in Leon-Silao.
Table *! rr-Ttbly Maize Prices in the Cities of Guadalaiar* g Q acatecas m  the hate 18th - J n -
January
February
March
April
May
June
July
August
September
October
November
December
Zacatecas
1796-9 (1)
15.3
17.4 
19.1 22
23
24 
19 21 
21 
22 
18 
16
Guadalaiara 
1776 (2)
c. 6 
c. 7 
c. 8 
c. 8
c.9c.ll 
c .15 
c .13 
c .13 
c.l2 
c. 6 
c. 6
Mexico City 
1762-80 (3)
11.4
11.5
11.7
12.412.8
13.1
12.8
12.4
12.312.6
12.2 
11.0
(1) Garner 1972: 81. Average of the monthly means (i.e. 
lowest price plus highest price divided by 2 ) .
(2) Van Young 1981: 4 .
(3) Florescano 1969: 205-1 8 . Average of the monthly prices 
ior the 19 years considered.
As can be seen production varied enormously from year to 
year, as did prices although less violently. The obvious 
observation to be made is that there was a very close negative 
correlation between levels of production and prices. Thus, 
in two-thirds of the years under consideration prices and 
levels of production changed in opposite directions. More 
importantly, if production and prices are organised in cycles, 
that is disregarding minor variations, the correlation is 
almost perfect, each productive cycle being the mirror image of
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Figure 1 shows levels of maize production (as expressed in 
the tithe) and prices and their changes in the period 174.9 
to 1789 in Leon-Silao.
Tabie 4: Monthly Maize Prices in the Cities of Guadalajara 
and Zacatecas in the Late 18th Century (ln reales 
per fanega)
Zacatecas Guadalajara Mexico C
1796-9 (1) 1776 (2) 1762-80
January 15.3 c. 6 11.4February 17.4 c.7 11.5March 19.1 c. 8 11.7April 22 c. 8 12.4May 23 c. 9 1 2 .8June 24 c.ll 13.1July 19 c .15 1 2 .8August 21 c .13 12.4September 21 c.13 12.3October 22 c . 1 2 1 2 . 6
November 18 c. 6 1 2 . 2December 16 c. 6 1 1 . 0
(l) Garner 1972: 81. Average of the monthly means
lowest price plus highest price divided by 2]
(2) Van Young 1981: 4.
(3) Florescano 1969: 205'-18. Average of the monti
for the 19 years considered.
As can be seen production varied enormously from year to 
year, as did prices although less violently. The obvious 
observation to be made is that there was a very close negative 
correlation between levels of production and prices. Thus, 
in two-thirds of the years under consideration prices and 
levels of production changed in opposite directions. More 
importantly, if production and prices are organised in cycles, 
that is disregarding minor variations, the correlation is 
almost perfect, each productive cycle being the mirror image of
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a price cycle.
Figure 1: Maize Prices and Maize Production in 18th
Century Silao (in reales per fanega, and fanegas)*
Reales Fanegas
20,000
15,000
10,000
5 , 0 0 0
Price
Production
Tithe or 1 0$ of the maize production in fanegas 
~ Prices in reales per fanega
* Source: Brading 1978: 180-3. See Appendix 1 for methods 
of calculation.
At the beginning of each cycle (i.e. 174.9-50, 1754-5 etc) 
we find an extremely low level of production and high prices 
while at the mid-period of the cycle the opposite situation
occurs.
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Two connected problems arise from the analysis so far.
Firstly, the representativity of the case Leon-Silao in 
relation to other Mexican areas, in other words, were maize 
prices and production so closely correlated in Mexico as 
a whole? And, if so, knowing that there was a rising trend 
in the price of maize in the three decades around 1800, 
does this mean that maize production lagged behind population 
growth during that period? The first question can be pro­
visionally answered in the affirmative if we consider the 
information on prices and climatic conditions in several 
Mexican areas during the major agricultural crises of the 
last century under colonial rule in Mexico and the correlation 
between maize prices in those areas. The subsistence crises 
of 1749-50, 1785-6 and 1809-11 had as common causes prolonged 
periods of drought, sometimes aggravated by severe frosts 
which reduced the maize harvest to a minimum. Table 5 provides 
information on climatic conditions and increases in the maize 
prices in some Mexican areas during these crises.
This clearly suggests a marked dependence of maize prices 
on the level of production, the former increasing as a pro­
portion from 67? to almost 400? in relation to normal levels.
As can be seen in Appendix 1 the prices of maize in the crisis 
years are the highest recorded for Mexico City, Leon-Silao and, 
probably, other areas. The examination of the movement of 
these prices indicates a strong positive correlation between 
those of Mexico City and Leon-Silao and, more hypothetically, 
between these two and the other areas included. This corre­
lation might indicate the beginnings of the formation of a
(xx)
capitalist national market, in the sense defined by Sereni,
(xx) See page 269
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Table 5: Climatic Conditions and Changes in the Price ofKaize durine the Subsistence Crisp? nr ToteColonial Mexico*
Region 174? 178fi-6 iso?- 1 1
ClimaticConditions
Increase Over Normal Price (**
Climati c 
Conditions
)
Increase Over Normal Price (**
ClimaticConditions
)
Increase Over Normal Price (*#)
Mexico as awhole Drought
Oaxaca Severe and unseasonal frost 100-500?
Drought & frost 1 3 2 ?
Guadal­ajara c. 135?
MexicoCity 67? 197? Drought 71?
Leon Drought 194? Earlyfrosts 390? Drought (**«)
S^ources : Prices in Leon Silao, Mexico City and Oaxaca (1808-10) in Appendix 1. See also Hamnett 1971a: 61-4» 69-70;Van Young 1981: 94-8; Florescano 1969: 147, 179; Brading 1978: 193,189.
** For Mexico City and Silao-Leon and Oaxaca 1809-11, normal prices have been established by averaging the prices available for the 10 years previous to the crises. For Guadalajara and Oaxaca in 1785-6 we have no series of prices. In the first case we have compared the top price of 40 reales per fanega registered in April 1786 with the average prices of April,June and July of 1787 (17 reales per fanega). In the latter case we have considered not the prices in the city of Oaxaca but in the surrounding villages given in the reports of the local royal officials.
*** Conditions recorded for Guanajuato, but probably the same in Leon-Silao (Brading 1978: 194).
(xx) That is a market where most of the production of an 
economic space (or nation) is produced in a capitalist way 
and is sold in the market at its production cost, including 
the average capitalist rate of profit. See the important 
qualifications of Sanchez-Albornoz. (39)
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or the effect of similar climatic conditions on the production 
levels of the regions considered. Without ruling out the 
effects of the incipient development and formation of a 
national capitalist market, especially in the Bajio and 
Mexico City hinterland, we are inclined to think that this 
correlation was mainly produced by similar agricultural cycles 
in the areas concerned. The information provided in Figure 1,
Table 5 and the figures for production available for Chaleo, ,
the main maize supplier of the Mexico City market, support
this. In 174-1, 1759 and 1773 Chaleo's annual production was
below 146,000 fanegas of maize and annual average prices in
Mexico City were relatively high (equal to or above 13 reales
per fanega). In 1744» on the other hand, maize production
was around 250,000 fanegas and the price of maize in Mexico
City was amongst the lowest of the decade (10.5 reales per
fanega). (40)
The answer to the second question is more complex. The 
impressive growth of the Mexican population during the decades 
prior to independence (36% between 1790 and 1810) does not 
need to be emphasised. However, this does not imply an imbalance 
ln the supply and demand of maize per se or agricultural 
products in general, since new lands could have been brought 
into cultivation or areas of subsistence production could have 
become linked to the urban markets. For instance, the crisis 
of 1785-6 stimulated the planting of maize in Morelos for 
the Mexico City market. Guadalajara City drew part of its 
supply of maize during that crisis from coastal areas not 
previously linked to the city and by 1808 it had extended 
fhe area from which it purchased its maize beyond its tradi­
tional hinterland. It could be argued however that the increase
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in the distances involved increased the average cost of 
transport and therefore the price of grain in the urban 
markets. Another factor to be taken into account to explain 
the rise of maize prices is agricultural and economic diver­
sification. Expansion of crops other than maize displaced the 
latter to peripheral areas and probably pushed its price up 
via scarcity or an increase in transport costs. In Oaxaca 
for instance the boom in cochineal production in the second 
half of the 18th century made many Indian producers disregard 
maize production and buy it on the market, thus creating 
difficulties of supply and high prices, especially during 
agricultural crises. Similarly, the increase in silver 
production had probably the same effect since it required 
additional labour and animal power for which maize was 
necessary as fodder. Another factor in the rise of maize 
prices by the end of the colonial period was the process of 
expropriation of church funds by the crown during 1805-9, 
which meant the forced repayment of long term loans by indebted 
agriculturalists to the Spanish treasury. According to Florescano 
this made it impossible for many small and medium size producers 
to continue producing at the same level. Last, but not least, 
Mexican haciendas achieved during this period greater control, 
in some cases a monopoly of the markets through the elimination 
°f small competitors and the increase of storage capacity which 
enabled them to release the grain in years of bad harvest. In 
this respect, information for Michoacan, Guadalajara and the 
®ajio indicates that towards the end of the 18th century 
haciendas substantially increased investments in granaries 
and storage facilities. (4-2 )
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Information about prices of staple food in other regions 
of colonial Spanish America is scarce but the data available 
suggests that some of the trends operating in Mexico were also 
present elsewhere in the Indies. Firstly, annual prices of 
the main staple foods varied widely from year to year in 
Cochabamba (maize), Potosi (grain and tubers) and Santiago de 
Chile (wheat, flour) (see Appendix l). In the first two cases 
this was due to the agricultural cycle. Secondly, long-term 
trends of price increases in the main staple foods seem to 
have been associated with sustained or increasing mining 
production. Thus, the price of beef in the town of Popayan 
increased fivefold from the l660's to the end of the 18th 
century, while the amount of gold registered in the town 
increased two fold between the first and the last decades 
of the 18th century. Likewise, the long term increase of the 
price of wheat flour in Chile could be associated with the 
two fold increase in mining production between the 1760's and 
1820' s. ^ xx:''^ For 17th century Mexico and late 17th and 18th 
century savannah of Bogota, Chevalier and Villamarin respec­
tively have explained the decadence of the haciendas and 
therefore lower agricultural prices by the difficulties 
experienced by the mining sector in these regions. Thirdly
(xxi) The decennial price of wheat flour in Santiago cal­
culated by Carmagnani shows a steady rise from the 1760's to 
the 1820's. Chilean mining production registered and exported 
through Santiago became important in the mid-18th century 
and grew steadily for the rest of the period. On the other hand 
no direct association can be established between agricultural 
prices and mining output in 18th century Potosi. (4-3)
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population increases occurred in the hinterlands of Santiago 
and Popayan during the periods of rising prices in these urban 
centres. However, without having figures for the population 
of the urban centres themselves this correlation remains 
hypothetical. Finally, export booms experienced by Chilean 
wheat in the late 17th and early 18th century, and Guatemalan 
indigo in the 1770's, created a temporary increase in food­
stuff prices. In Santiago wheat flour prices increased from 
19.5 reales per fanega in the 16 8 0's to 29 reales per fanega 
in the 1720's and returned to normal levels (below 20 reales) 
in the middle decades of the 18th century. This was due to 
the expansion of wheat production after the first decade of 
the 18th century. Maize prices in Guatemala were reported to 
have increased nine times from 1750 to 1780 and cattle prices 
two fold during the same period. As in Oaxaca, agricultural 
producers neglected foodstuff production to concentrate on 
the more profitable indigo production, but during the 1780 's the 
balance was restored through a gradual return of foodstuff 
production to a normal level. (4-4-)
So far we have argued that the competiüon of small 
producers was a hindrance to the realisation of profits by 
the haciendas through the reduction of prices during the 
periods of good harvests. It is necessary to add that even a 
situation of high agricultural prices did not necessarily 
œean high profits for the haciendas, unless they were accom­
panied by control of the labour force through economic or 
extra-economic compulsion. In the hinterland of the city of 
Oaxaca where a substantial increase in the prices of food­
stuffs occurred between 1 7 8 5 and 1 8 1 5 , hacendados were not
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able bo bake advanbage of bhe sibuabion. The rebenbion of 
plenbiful communal lands by bhe Indians pub bheni in a sbrong 
bargaining posibion vis-a-vis bhe hacendados. Sbabe resbric- 
bions on bhe sysbem of debb-peonage, forced brade and lack 
of collaborabion on bhe parb of bhe local bureaucrabs in 
imposing forced labour on bhe Indian communibies enhanced bhe 
Indians' favourable circumsbances. This sibuabion was reversed 
when bhe rebellion of 1810-15, which bhe Indians wholehearbedly 
supporbed, was over and bhe local bureaucrabs realigned bhem- 
selves wibh bhe inberesbs of bhe hacendados. Then bhe armed 
forces of bhe sbabe ensured a labour supply from bhe commun­
ibies bo bhe haciendas. Similarly in Morelos bhe high prices 
of 1786 did nob fully benefib bhe haciendas, which were nob 
able bo hire addibional workers bo harvesbbhe maize which had 
been planbed especially for bhis evenbualiby. Indians concen- 
brabed on bheir own maize fields and hacendados had bo requesb 
Indian compulsory labour from bhe aubhoribies which bhe labber 
seem bo have refused. (45)
The daba presenbed above permib us bo provisionally 
conclude bhab bhe formabion of urban markebs wibh susbained 
or rising agriculbural prices, combined wibh a quasi-monopoly 
of bhe facbors of agriculbural producbion, bhab is, land, 
labour and capibal, made bhe haciendas profibable and nob 
merely viable. We have sufficienbly dealb wibh bhe hacienda's 
conbrol of land and labour and we burn now bo consider 
ibs access bo sources of capibal.
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d) Sources of Capital
The primitive forms of capital accumulation during the 
early colonisation of the Indies were linked to the spoils 
of war: looting, Indian slavery and Indian tribute and, in 
the long run, the rent produced by land grants. While the two 
former disappeared very early (by c. mid-l6th century) and 
the product was spent in further conquests or in Spain, the 
two latter had a more lasting effect, settling colonisers in 
America and creating a demand for European agricultural pro­
ducts and the means of supplying them locally or regionally.
By the mid-17th century, the Indian tribute appropriated by 
private individuals (encomenderos) had almost totally lost 
its importance as a source of capital and new concessions 
of land grants were limited to the frontier areas of the empire. 
Thus, from around 1600 hacienda owners had to rely on their 
own profits or income, loans secured through the mortgage of 
their lands or encroachment of Indian lands to expand their 
lands and/or production. (/6)
Table 6 shows the main sources of credit for hacendados 
and other entrepreneurs in the 18th century in the Guadalajara 
region and Chile in 1639. Although we do not have figures for 
other areas and chronological periods, qualitative data 
indicate that church bodies (convents, nunneries, brother­
hoods etc) were the main source of credit in the Indies 
during the 17th and 18th centuries. Since only loans and 
mortgages controlled by the church are sufficiently docu­
mented (the effects of these activities for the church are 
dealt with elsewhere, see Chapter 9) we will limit ourself 
at the moment to the impact of these activities on agriculture. 
It is necessary to point out that not all the money owed to the
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church was the hacendados' debt, although the major part was 
secured by haciendas, and that it did not necessarily represent 
an investment in agriculture or even an initial transfer of 
money from the church to rural or urban entrepreneurs. This 
peculiar situation derived from the development of Catholic 
church institutions in Europe and America over a long period 
of time. During the colonial period the so-called capital of 
the church was composed, apart from direct investment in rural 
or urban property, by a) money loaned (depósitos) to private 
individuals or corporations on a short-term basis but usually 
extended for decades and not necessarily secured by urban or 
rural property, b) mortgages (censos) taken by owners of 
rural or urban property against a long term loan, and c) mort­
gages imposed on property by individuals as a form of ceremonial 
expenditure (eg the dowry of a nun, the patronage of a hospital 
or church, etc). In this case the 'capital', a nominal sum of 
money, remained with the proprietor of the property and he or 
she paid in exchange an annuity of usually 5% of the principal 
of the censo. As can be seen only in the two latter cases was 
property necessarily involved and only in (a) and (b) was 
money transferred from the church to lay people or institutions.
In no case however was it necessary to invest the principal of 
the loan or censo in the property given as a security. (¿7)
No general figures showing the degree of indebtedness of 
haciendas to the church are known to us, however, several 
hacienda studies for restricted areas and periods give us an 
impression of that indebtedness and, more importantly, reveal 
its economic consequences. Table 7 presents estimates of the 
proportion of the values of rural estates represented by the 
Principals owed to the church in certain Mexican areas. Three
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Table 6:
Ch*le (1) Guadalajara (2)
1639 ( t ) 1721-30 (*) 1761-70 (?) 1801-10 ( f )
Church 59.5 81.2 71.7 43.2
Secular
Institutions 13.1 0 . 1 1.8 11.1
Merchants 27.4 9.2 15.6 12.8
Other
Individuals 0 . 0 9.5 10.9 32. p
Total (%) 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Total in Pesos c. 903,993 640,994 1,006,059 953,837
* Sources: Gongora 1967: 71-96, especially 71-2 for Chile and Robinson (ed) 1979: 256-7 for Guadalajara.
(1) Accumulated borrowings and mortgages up until 1639. Of the c. 248,015 pesos owed to individuals only 48,015 pesos are documented, the rest are probably an inflated estimation and therefore the proportion of church loans would be higher. Excludes 781,731 pesos in credit sales by merchants.
(2) Borrowing and mortgages during each decade, excluding accumulated debts for previous periods.
comments are necessary to understand the limitations of the 
data assembled. Firstly, they cover different periods of 
time and therefore the percentages worked out might represent 
regional or chronological differences or both. In this 
respect the assertion of Brading that the increasing value of 
rural property in the Bajio at the end of the 18th century 
tended to minimise the importance of church loans while after 
the rebellion of 1810 this trend was reversed, is indicative 
°f a changing situation favourable to agricultural entre­
preneurs in the last decades of the 18th century.
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Table 6: £hurch Loans and Censo; tc Landowners and Estimated
Va-ues ir. Some Ar ens of Mexico durine the 18th Cen t urv (in pesos) ------------
i 2 3 4 5
Geographical Area 
or Institution
No of 
Estates Date EstateValues Loans £ % of Ind ednessIncluded (estimates) Censos (4/3 X :
1) Valley ofOaxaca 27 C 18 346,456 231,855 66.9
2) Tlaxcala 155 1712 1.769,637 748,735 42.3
3) Cholula (Puebla) 55 1790 788,442 550,504 69.8
4) Leon (The Bajio) 
4) Silao (The Bajio)
23 1777-1809 624.835 249,870 39.913 1782-
1823 341,687 145,870 42.65) Mexican JesuitEstates 81 1750's 5,000,000 or 1.325,004 26.56.000,000 22.1
1) Taylor 1972: 142, 250.
2) Semo 197: 177 Includes independent farmers (ranchos).
3) Erading 1971: 218, included 17 independent farmers.
4) Brading 1978: 92-3.
5) Riley 1972: 246, 256-60. Rough estimates based on loans or censos in the 1750’s and estimated values of the Jesuit rural properties between 1770 and 1803. This value could have been lower because of the increase of the price of land of the late 18th century or the deterioration of the estates after the Jesuit expulsion.
ihis impression is also supported by the case of the haciendas 
of the Valley of Oaxaca which increased their degree of indebted 
ness to the church during the first half of the 18th century 
but reversed that trend in the latter half by repayment of 
part of the principal borrowed. Secondly, Jesuit estates 
constitute a special case within colonial agricultural enter­
prises since their production, unlike that of the secular 
haciendas, was exempted from sale taxes and enjoyed an exemption
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from, and later a reduction of, the tithe (l/3 of the 
standard 10$). Thus, their corporate character and the vast 
resources and capital accumulated through donations, together 
with privileges made it easier for them to repay their loans. 
Finally, considering the difficulties of the hacendados of the 
valley of Oaxaca and Cholula and the prosperity of the Bajio 
region during the 18th century, an estimation of the indebted­
ness of Mexican haciendas to the church of the order of 40- 
60$ during the 18th century cannot be too wide of the mark. (48) 
The dependence of landowners on church loans and censos 
elsewhere in the Indies is difficult to ascertain without a 
generous sample of hacienda values and data on their outstanding 
debts. Such samples are known for Lower Peru and Latacunga 
(Ecuador), but given the fact that they include only Jesuit 
haciendas confiscated by the crown in 1767, they cannot be 
considered representative of these geographical areas, let 
alone the rest of Spanish America. The 97 Jesuit haciendas of 
Peru were evaluated around 1770-2 at 5,729,790 pesos, while 
their total debt to church bodies and private individuals in 
1767 was 539,466 pesos or 9-4$ of the value of the haciendas. 
Taking into account that the sale price for the cases known was 
around a quarter lower than the evaluation figure, and allowing 
a margin for loans made by individuals, we can arrive at a 
rough estimate of 10$ of indebtedness. This sound financial 
practice was probably impossible to follow by the average 
Peruvian hacendado since they did not enjoy the exemptions 
common to all Jesuit colleges in the Indies. Furthermore,
Jesuit investments in Peru were mainly concentrated in sugar 
production (51.4$) and vineyards (34,1$) which were the most 
profitable agricultural enterprises at the end of the 18th
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century. The ten or so haciendas of the Jesuit college of 
Latacunga were, on the contrary, livestock and grain estates. 
They were evaluated in 1767 at 145,342 pesos and were burdened 
with censos of ¿2,500 pesos or 29.2I  of the total value. There 
is little that can be said about these figures since, apart 
from coming from the same (privileged) institution, they 
represent a special chronological period (c. 1767) which seems 
to have been far more favourable economically for the Jesuits 
than previous decades. Thus, the finances of the Jesuit 
colleges in Peru during the 17th century show an increase in 
the amount of indebtedness which rose from 665, 155 pesos in 
1635 to 1,264,043 in 1700, a trend which was subsequently 
reversed. Now the period before 1700 was marked by heavy 
purchases of lands by the Society which, in turn, meant heavy 
borrowing, repaid slowly after 1700 and more rapidly after 
1750, a date which seems to mark a general recovery of the 
Peruvian economy after the slump which lasted from the 1680's 
to the first half of the 18th century. If we assume that the 
value of their lands in 1700 was equal to or below the value 
in 1767, then indebtedness would have been 22$ or more. (49) 
Apart from church loans and censos, agriculture received, 
at least in some Spanish nerican areas and periods, important 
direct or indirect investment from merchants and miners. The 
haciendas of northern Mexico were born in the late 16th century 
out of the necessity for mine owners to supply their mining 
camps with food for the workers, fodder and animal power. 
Although this subsidiary role of the hacienda as part of a 
mainly mining enterprise continued in many cases throughout 
the colonial period, haciendas became an investment in their 
own right for miners eager to establish a secure form of
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income and eventually establish an entail on them. Equally 
Mexican merchants, as early as 1620, were joining the landed 
elite through purchase or foreclosures of haciendas. This was 
especially so in relation to sugar haciendas which they financed 
and seem to have expanded. After the law of free trade of 1778, 
which diminished the attraction of long distance trade by 
allowing more competition in that field, merchants increased 
their participation in agriculture by acquiring haciendas and 
investing, like miners, in irrigation works, granaries, turning 
scrub land into arable land etc. (50) We have little infor­
mation about the participation of merchants and miners in 
agriculture in other Spanish American regions. It seems however 
that merchants invested, directly or indirectly, mainly in 
those agricultural sectors which ensured a high level of 
profitability. Thus merchants in early 17th century Guatemala 
invested in or financed sugar and indigo production only to 
withdraw during the slump of the mid-17th century. During the 
second half of the 18th century, the dynamism of the Atlantic 
trade provided a new group of Spanish merchants with the 
impetus to finance and participate directly in the production 
and export of indigo in Guatemala, a trade which reached a 
turnover of over 1,000,000 pesos per year. On the other hand, 
the merchants of late 18th century Buenos Aires invested 
little in ranching, a fact which probably reflected the buoyant 
situation of commerce in the Argentinian port. In 18th century 
Chile and Bogota merchants invested in agriculture but at the 
same time hacendados became merchants, a trend which seems to 
reflect a similar (low) profitability in both sectors. Finally, 
we have only found evidence of capital investment from agri­
culture in mining in the gold producing governorship of Popayan.
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Miners in 18th century Peru, Chile and Central America were, 
on the contrary, financed by merchants and even hacendados. (51)
e) Return Upon Capital
The problems involved in estimating the rates of return 
upon capital spent in agriculture are manifold. Apart from 
the scarcity of data on Spanish colonial haciendas, the method 
of calculation is a problem in itself. Firstly, let us consider 
the problem of mortgages and loans imposed on the haciendas 
and the respective interest payments. Some researchers seem 
to include the payment of interest among the cost of operation 
of haciendas (expenditure) and then compare the net income 
(total income minus expenditure) with the total capital of 
the hacienda (including the borrowed capital). With this 
method borrowed capital appears twice in the accounts, first 
as interest and then as a producer of returns. As we shall 
see, payment of interest could reduce or eliminate the returns 
upon capital spent by the landowner, but to include it in the 
calculation of the profitability of the hacienda is a mistake.
We have preferred to compare in Appendix 2 the annual net 
income of the haciendas against their values, which is the 
method used by most researchers. This method does not give an 
account of the returns of the hacendados but an account of 
the returns of the hacienda given its actual conditions of 
operation (markets, technology, labour systems etc). Thus, 
in the case of the hacienda San Juan Bautista (Appendix 2, 
case 2) a 2.6$ return on the hacienda (1,554- pesos per annum)
°an be divided into a 5% return on the capital borrowed by the 
hacendado (2,715 pesos p.a.) and a negative return for the 
hacendado (-1 , 1 6 1  pesos p.a.). (52)
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A second problem arises when we consider "the length of time 
for which statistics are available for a single hacienda.
This is particularly serious in the case of grain haciendas 
whose production oscillated violently from year to year. Thus, 
returns for a single year do not offer any guarantee that they 
are representative of a medium term trend. As a rule we have 
considered only haciendas whose net income is recorded for 
five or more consecutive years, in which case it is very 
likely that years of bad and good harvests balance each other 
out, so providing an average close to the medium term trend.
A further problem appears in assessing the value of the 
haciendas. Here two alternatives are open to the researcher: 
to accept either the contemporary estimate of the value of the 
hacienda or its contemporary sale price. The former is in many 
ways a fiction since an important part of these evaluations 
was comprised of the 'value' of land which was originally 
acquired through free land grants. However, from the point 
of view of agricultural production this fiction becomes fact 
through the monopoly of land suitable for commodity production, 
and thus an entrepreneur wishing to become a hacendado had to 
pay a price for land as well as installations, livestock, slaves, 
etc. Using the second criterion (the contemporary sale price) 
we run the risk of getting into a circular situation. This 
is so because the sale price of haciendas, at least in 18th 
century Mexico, was determined by the rate of interest on 
ecclesiastical capital (5%) and the annual average net income 
°f the hacienda, where the sale price was equal to twenty 
times the annual average net income, or anticipated rent 
(at the usual rate of interest) for the capital, which was
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transferred through the sale. Provided that the new owner 
did not spend money improving the conditions of production 
of the hacienda, that the market situation remained the same 
and that the hacienda did not deteriorate through bad admini­
stration, physical or social catastrophes and so on, the return 
on capital would be, on average, close to 5%. (5 3) However, 
the new owner could substantially increase the net income of 
the hacienda by investing in the building of dams, granaries, 
equipment etc, or by buying additional livestock or land which 
could increase the productivity of the whole enterprise by a 
better use of the resources (labour force, combination of 
Afferent activities, etc). Obviously if the landowner decided 
to sell the improved hacienda he or she would probably receive 
approximately the capitalised rent of the hacienda, according 
to the usual rate of interest, and the rate of return on 
capital for the new owner would be again circa 5% p.a. Unfor­
tunately we do not have data which make possible the quanti­
fication of the profitability of these investments. There are 
indications, however, that the rate of return derived from 
these investments could have been significantly higher than the 
lending rate. This was tacitly recognised as early as the 
1570's by the richest Mexican entrepreneur, Alonso de 
Villaseca. He asserted that the best investment was the 
purchase of 'half completed rural haciendas' of low price 
which, with additional improvements,would be transformed into 
valuable assets. This option was open only to entrepreneurs 
or institutions with enough capital or access to credit to 
undertake the necessary initial investment, and enough business 
sense to reinvest part of the profits in keeping up or improving 
the productive capacity of the haciendas.
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The Jesuits of Spanish America followed Villaseca's 
dictum very closely. In Mexico, New Granada and Peru they 
acquired half done1 haciendas and invested capital to make 
them really profitable. In central Mexico for instance the 
Jesuits bought lands piecemeal to create one of the best 
haciendas of the region! Santa Lucia. Over more than a 100 
years (late 1 6th century to early 18th century) they bought 
lands for around 150,000 pesos and invested in improvements 
to create an enterprise which was to be evaluated at 1,151,694 
pesos in 1776 and sold the same year for 660,140 pesos. (54) 
For 18th century Mexico, Brading has provided us with a 
generous sample of investments in agriculture from rich miners 
and merchants and even some relatively modest hacendados who 
had managed to render their newly acquired haciendas more 
productive, increase their values beyond the capital spent on 
them and expand production. The result of this policy was to 
have a very modest (or negative) net income in the year of 
investment, since investments and reinvestments were included 
in the expenditure, and an increased net income thereafter.
On the contrary, the sale of assets (livestock, slaves, land, 
etc) by the hacendado or failure to do the necessary repairs 
resulted in an increase of the net income in the year in 
question but a diminishing net income thereafter. This was the 
case of many of the expropriated Jesuit haciendas during the 
period of royal management after 1767, where repairs or invest­
ments were hardly carried out at all. (55) (See Appendix 2)
The changes in the rate of return on haciendas and their 
value due to investment or lack of reinvestment can be illus­
trated by the case of the hacienda 'Dolores' (Chihuahua) during 
the period 1790-1820. The hacienda, excluding its livestock,
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Tabie 8: Net Income. Inventorv Gains and Hates of Returnfor the 'Loiores' Hacienda (Chihuahua) 1790.-1820(in pesos)*
1790 1791-1795 1796-1800 1801-1805 1B06-1810 1811-1815 1816-1820 1790-1820
Net Income 667 -1,484 7,106 -296 1,076 16,311 9,485 32,865Inventory gains 461 4,111 5.942 10,654 6,589 8,626 -8,136 28,247Adjusted gain 1,128 2,627 13.048 10,358 7,665 24,937 1.349 61,112Livestock (head) 465 ...... . . . . . . . 5.076
Average Annual Rates of Return on a Capital Estimated at. 37.000 e
a) Considering only the net income 1.8* -0.8* 3.8* -0.16* 0.6* 8.8* 5.1* 2.9*
b) Considering the adjusted *ain 3.0* 1.4* 7.1* 5.6* 4.1* 13.5* 0.7* 5.3*
Average Annual Hates of Return on the Sale Price 45.400 pesos
a) Considering only the net income ... ...... ... ... 7.2* 4.2* 2.3*
b) Considering the adjusted jain ... ...... ... ... 11.0* 0.6* 4.3*
* Source: Benedict 1979: 408-9, 393.
was evaluated from 1771 until 1820 at 35,205 pesos. Table 8 
presents the quinquennial net income, inventory gains or losses, 
the adjusted gain of the hacienda and the rates of return 
calculated for the period. It should be noted that the rate of 
return calculated on the net income is just over half of that 
calculated on the adjusted gain of the hacienda (2.9% and 5.3?). 
Big differences also appear in assessing the value of the 
hacienda depending on whether the sale price of 4-5,4-00 pesos 
°r the evaluation of 35,205 pesos for the fixed assets is taken 
as the relevant figure. Since the growth of the assets (mainly
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Table 8: £et Income Inventory Gains and Hates of Bptnrt,
for the--Dolorer' Hacienda (Chihuahua) 1790-1 820(in pesos)* ---------
1790 1791- 1796- 1801- 1806- 1811- 1816- 1790-1795 1800 1805 1810 1815 1820 1820
Net Income 667 -1.484 7,106 -296 1,076 16,311 9,485 32,865Inventory gains 461 4,111 5.942 10,654 6,589 8,626 -8,136 28,247Adjusted gain 1,128 2,627 13.048 10,358 7,665 24,937 1,349 61,112Livestock (head) 465 ...... . . . . . . . 5,076
Average Annual Rates of Return on a Capital Estimated at 37.000
a) Consideringonly the net income 1.8? -0.8? 3.8? -0.16? 0.6? 8.8? 5.1? 2.9?
b) Consideringthe adjusted ■*ain 3.0? 1.4? 7.1? 5.6? 4.1? 13.5? 0.7? 5.3?
Average Annual Rates of Return on the Sale Price 15»¿00
a) Consideringonly the net income ' * * ....... ... ... 7.2? 4.2? 2.3?
b) Consideringthe adjusted jain ....... ... ... 11.0? 0.6? 4.3?
* Source: Benedict 1979: 408-9, 393.
was evaluated from 1771 until 1820 at 35,205 pesos. Table 8 
presents the quinquennial net income, inventory gains or losses, 
the adjusted gain of the hacienda and the rates of return 
calculated for the period. It should be noted that the rate of 
return calculated on the net income is just over half of that 
calculated on the adjusted gain of the hacienda {2.9% and 5.3%).  
Big differences also appear in assessing the value of the 
hacienda depending on whether the sale price of 4-5,4-00 pesos 
°r the evaluation of 35,205 pesos for the fixed assets is taken 
as the relevant figure. Since the growth of the assets (mainly
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livestock) was a product of natural repreduction it is 
clearly correct to use the latter figure plus some 1,860 
pesos for the livestock listed in 1790 U  pesos per head) 
which gives us a figure of 37,000 pesos. A final comment on 
the data is necessary. In all the five year periods the inven­
tory grew, except in 1816-20 when the drought of 1817-20 
killed 2,000 large animals in the hacienda, and the hacienda 
reached its ecological ceiling. This was probably reflected 
in the final sale price of the hacienda and certainly in its 
value. (56)
The example of the hacienda 'Dolores' and the previous 
discussion show the limitation of the data presented in Appendix 
3 and its sources. There we have calculated the rate of return 
upon capital considering the average net income for a period of 
five years or more and the inventory value of the hacienda at 
a time close to it. Ideally the value assessment should coincide 
with the beginning of the period considered and the net income 
include the delayed profits (increase of unsold stock) and 
money or resources spent as investments (i.e. purchase of 
additional slaves, livestock, irrigation works, etc). Conversely 
the sale, depreciation or destruction of assets should be 
deducted from the net income. Unfortunately colonial accounts 
do not discriminate between investments and other expenditures 
and it is difficult to evaluate the loss of assets. However, 
in some cases (numbers 3, 27, 32) the information provided 
permits us to come very close to this ideal. We have already 
seen in detail, Case 3 (Dolores), that a return of 2.9I p.a. 
hides a higher return if we consider delayed profits on 
investments. In the case of 'Santa Lucia' the only value 
assessment available to us is from 1776. Applying this value
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retrospectively to the 1750's it gives us returns of 3.0$,
3.4$ and 4.4$. Considering that the Jesuits made improvements 
worth several thousand pesos during the mid-1760's, the return 
on capital for the years prior to 1767 would have increased 
by diminishing the total value of the hacienda and, for 
1765-6, by inflating the expenditure with an investment 
barely used. Now if we consider the origins of the hacienda 
as a Jesuit enterprise in 1576 the returns are nothing less 
than impressive. In the year after the purchase net income 
was 1,500 pesos or 818$ return, and during 1582-6, 4,638 
pesos p.a. or 27.3$ average return. Furthermore, the sheep 
flock had almost doubled by 1585 and therefore the value of 
the hacienda increased. Apart from this, and the donation of 
two estancias de ganado mayor (6.7 sq miles) no other improve­
ments were carried out on the hacienda until 1586. The extra­
ordinary performance of the estate seems to have been the 
effect of the rising prices of wool and meat and the adminis­
trative capacity of the Jesuits. (57)
The third case worth examining in some detail is 'Huara'
(no 32) during the late 17th and 18th centuries. Here the 
inventory value of the hacienda has been calculated by Cushner 
for each separate year at market prices for each major compon­
ent of the hacienda (land, equipment and slaves). We have 
assembled the data into periods according to sugar prices in 
Lima and Huara. These prices were very high before 1695 
(c. 5 pesos per arroba), high but declining between 1795 
and 1721 (3 - 3.5 pesos per arroba), extremely low during 
the 1750's (l - 1.7 pesos per arroba) and low but increasing 
during the 1760's (1.7 - 2.8 pesos per arroba). These prices
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are clearly shown In the rate of return during these periods, 
although net income was also affected by the level of production 
which seems to have increased steadily throughout the century. 
Production and income in 1757 and 1764. illustrate this radical 
change in returns. Although the production was almost the same 
in these two years (11,813 arrobas and 11,715.5 arrobas 
respectively) the total sugar value almost trebled (from 11,222 
pesos to 32,803 pesos) dramatically increasing the rate of 
return.
Despite the limitations of the data presented in Appendix 
2 it is possible to draw some conclusions. Firstly, it is clear 
that the return on capital of the haciendas varied according 
to the economic conjuncture of the region in which they were 
located. The cases of 'Santa Lucia' in the 1580's and of 
'Huara' in the 18th century are good examples of the impact 
of prices on returns. A similar explanation can be given for 
the cases of sugar haciendas in Morelos in the late 17th and 
early 18th centuries since sugar prices in Morelos in the 
l680's were over 50$ higher than in the early 18th century. (58) 
Secondly, although the evidence is scarce, it is safe to assume 
that export prices had a similar effect. The high rate of 
return of the Cepi plantation (no 28) corresponds to a period 
of high prices of cacao in Caracas (an average of 18 - 20 
pesos per fanega). The decrease of the cacao price (c. 5 - 8  
pesos per fanega between 1653 and 1657) due to the competition 
of Ecuadorian cacao, must have reduced its return significantly 
through the decrease in net income if production remained at 
the same level, or through a necessary increase in the capital 
invested to ensure the same income through an increase of
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production. Similarly return on capital in Guatemalan 
indigo haciendas must have been substantial during the boom 
years of the 1770's and 1780's. By 1804 the decline of the 
trade due to Bengali competition, European wars and plagues 
had allegedly reduced the return of the best plantations 
to 5%. (59) Finally, and more tentatively, comparisons 
between haciendas' returns can b" made between geographical 
regions and agricultural sectors.
In Table 9 we have assembled the combined rates of return 
of 18th century Mexican and Peruvian haciendas together with 
other pertinent estimates. For Mexico the regional rates of 
return are compatible with the trends of agricultural develop­
ment that we know of. The difficulties of the hacendados of 
the Valley of Oaxaca during the 18th century have been outlined 
above and it is not necessary to reiterate them. For Puebla 
the only index of agricultural activity known to us for the 
period is the value of the agricultural production as indicated 
by the tithe. During the period 1748-76 this value remained 
stable to start with, growing again after 1776, the year in 
which our information ceases for all but one of the haciendas 
considered. Obviously tithe value is a poor substitute for 
lists of prices which in combination with information on wages 
would give a more precise picture of the situation of the 
haciendas. However, the complaints of the hacendados about 
the emigration of Tlaxacla and Puebla workers to central 
Mexico and the Bajio and the imposition of adscriptive peonage 
on the haciendas, also points to a crisis in the hacienda 
system in that region at the time. The Guadalajara hinterland, 
central Mexico and the Bajio regions have been analysed above 
and they all show conditions favourable to long term hacienda
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Table 9: Hacienda ir. Late — 1--Rste~ cf F'eturr ir. Selected Peri .^ S^ h Century Sr ani eh feerica * ons
neglon/Agri cultural Sector
Mexico
Puebla and Oaxaca 
(1762-82, 1789-95)
Leon, Chucetaro & San Luis de Potosi 
(Different periods 
between 1753-1639)
According to 
Appendix 2
2.2
A.2
Cases Included (Ko)
2.5,6,7,8,9,10(7)
13,14.21-4 (6)
Other Estimates
6* ( 1)
Guadalajara hinter­land (1767-82,1785- 
8)
Central Mexico (Valley of Mexico, 
Morelos) 1767-82, 1800-5
5.6 18,19 (2)
4.6 11,25-7 (4)
4.8* (C18) (2)
4.7 3,12,15,16 (4)
Northern Mexico (New Leon, Chihuahua, Durango) 1767-82, 1790-1820
Peru
Sugar (1760-66)
Vineyards (1762-6)
Others (grain, live­stock, 1762-6)
Chile
return have been calculated by dividing the total sun of the averages of the haciendas considered by the total sum of their values.
(1) Brading 1971: 217, (2) Van Young 1981: 225, (3) Macera 1977; 1: 27, (4) Barros Arana quoted in Barbier 1980: 40.
7.8 32-34 (3) 7-10* ?(3)
13.5 35-36 (2) 7-10* (3)
8.3 37-40 (2) 3-5* (3)
5* (4)
2 and notes below. Combined rates of
i k
i
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profitability from some time in the second half of the 18th 
century. For the hinterland of Mexico City Florescano dates 
this definitive take off from 1779. Brading, for Leon, 
establishes roughly the same date (early 1780's) for a sub­
stantial rise in the price of grain, livestock and lands, 
although he suggests that there was agricultural prosperity 
before that date. Finally, in Guadalajara City meat prices 
increased and remained at a high level from 1780, although Van 
Young indicates that land values were on the increase and 
hacienda profits were already high in the 1760 ' s . ^ xx;''^  As 
for Peru, the small number of haciendas considered has 
probably distorted the real returns for Peruvian haciendas 
as a whole. This is more likely in the grain and livestock 
sectors where the four haciendas included were located in the 
Cuzco and Huancavelica regions which were close to important 
mining centres. (60)
f) Hacienda Turnover
Having outlined the performance of agricultural enter­
prises in the Indies a quick overview of the individuals or 
corporations which controlled them is in order. The transfer 
of haciendas in a way other than through inheritance is not
(xxii) The impression of prosperity for agricultural producers 
in Guadalajara and the Bajio is supported by the trends of the 
value of agricultural production as recorded in the tithe. In 
the diocese of Guadalajara this grew constantly from the late 
1760's to 1805 with a decrease in the late 1780's and early 
1790's. In the diocese of Michoacan, which included most of the 
Bajio and San Luis but not Queretaro, the trend is much the same.
A constant increase from 1766 to 1807 with a small decrease in 
the mid-1790's. Obviously the value of this index as an indication 
of hacienda returns is very relative since it does not discrimi­
nate between hacienda and small producers or regions within the 
dioceses. (6l)
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necessarily an indication of lack of capital, mismanagement 
or difficulties in the agricultural sectors. Conversely the 
presence of many inheritors did not necessarily lead to the 
partition of haciendas, but as we will argue below, this 
tended to be the case in colonial Spanish America. The 
following discussion will hopefully illustrate the diffi­
culties faced by the hacendado class in retaining their 
sources of economic power and prestige in a changing situation 
brought about by demographic, commercial and mining cycles.
The economic performance of the hacendados (ie their net 
annual income) depended on the value of the hacienda(s) owned, 
its rate of return upon capital, its indebtedness and, indirectly, 
the hacendado's source of credit. Leaving aside for the moment 
the latter we can establish an equation in which the net annual 
income of the hacendado (i) equals the rate of return upon 
capital (RK), minus the product of the percentage of the 
value of the hacienda represented by the loan/s (L) made to 
the hacendado and having as a security the hacienda and the 
rate of interest (In) paid on this loan, multiplied by the 
total value of the hacienda:
I = (¡&RK - ÍL x In) x K
In a fairly typical case in 18th century Mexico a hacienda 
with a value of 100,000 pesos, an RK of U% and mortgages (L) 
of 4-0,000 would have a net income of 4.000 pesos per annum.
Since the usual lending rate was 5% in colonial Mexico our 
typical hacendado would have to pay 2,000 pesos in interest 
and thus his/her net personal income would be reduced to 2,000 
pesos per annum. Were the loans to the hacienda increased 
or its RK lowered I would become dangerously close to 0 or
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even negative. In this case further indebtedness, sale of 
the hacienda or its forced auction were the only alternatives, 
unless profits from other enterprises could balance the books 
of this particular hacendado. In the latter case, however, 
the landowner could more rationally redeem the principal 
and receive the future net income of the hacienda without 
deductions.
Obviously prospective buyers with substantial capital 
preferred to acquire and hang on to haciendas with a high 
return while haciendas which produced low returns were likely 
to fall into the vicious circle of indebtedness, bankruptcy, 
sale-resale. This was fairly common, since heavily indebted 
haciendas were sold (or auctioned) for small sums of cash 
and the obligation of the new buyer to pay the interest on 
the principal borrowed. Unless the market situation changed 
or money was invested to improve the hacienda, the landowner 
would in all likelihood become bankrupt a few years later and 
the hacienda re-enter the market. The result of this situation 
was a trend towards the polarisation of the hacendado class 
into two different categories. On the one hand that formed by 
the owners of one or several highly valued and profitable 
haciendas ^ xx:^ ^ ) usually with interests in other sectors 
(mining commerce, urban rentals etc), and on the other hand 
that formed by the owners of one or two haciendas of low
(xxiii) Tutino asserts that 'Among the great landed families 
who could operate numerous estates... profits averaged from 
6-9$ of capital value...in the late 18th century.'This 
compares very favourably with the average rate of return in 
Mexico at the time. (62;
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value and profitability and likely to leave the ranks of 
the hacendado class through bankruptcy. Investment from other 
sectors, changing market situations, laws of inheritance, 
good or bad business sense and luck within both categories 
of hacendados permitted a space for upward and downward 
social mobility. (6 3 )
The correlation between stability of ownership and 
hacienda performance is substantiated by the few regional 
studies which present information about family or insti­
tutional retention of estates. In the 18th century in the 
Valley of Oaxaca the high rate of indebtedness of the 
hacendados to the church is itself an index of bad perfor­
mance which confirms the difficulties of the hacendado class 
outlined above, and implies a quick hacienda turnover. In a 
(non-systematic) sample of 27 haciendas Taylor found that all 
the 20 haciendas 'mortgaged to over 80$ of their value were 
sold on or before the death of the owner' . In Tancintaro 
(Michoacan), of the 17 major land holdings listed by E.
Barret at least 10 of them were subjected to a rapid turn­
over, usually through foreclosure, during the late 17th and 
early 18th centuries because of the depressed conditions of 
the area (lack of labour force, disasters and epidemics).
Among those which escaped that fate were the two estates 
of the Urrutia entail and the hacienda 'Sinagua' of the 
Jesuits.
In the relatively prosperous Valley of Puangue (Chile) 
of a total of c. 25 haciendas, 9 remained within the same 
family or institution for 100 or more years during the 
period 1680-1880 while a small group (3or4) suffered periods 
of continuous sales and foreclosures. For the Guadalajara
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hinterland, Van Young has assembled data for a group of 35 
major hacxendas in the 18th century (1701-1805). On average, 
these haciendas were sold 4-.28 times during the period or 
once every 22.2 years. Now this group of haciendas was more 
stable during the latter part of the century (1 7 5 1 -1 8 1 5 ) 
when they were sold only 1.9 times on average or once every 
35 years. This latter period coincided with the prosperity 
of agriculture in the region. Haciendas which changed hands 
six or more times during the century did so mostly because of 
financial problems and those which changed hands three or 
fewer times were estates entailed early during the century or 
very well managed estates.
Finally, for the thriving 18th century Mexican Bajio, the 
40 haciendas accounted for by Brading seem to challenge the 
hypotheses of a positive correlation between stability and 
hacienda performance. During the 18th century (1712-1811)
3 haciendas remained within the same family for the whole 
period, 7 were sold only once, 13 twice, 10 haciendas 3 
times and the rest 4 or 5 times, making an average of 2 .3  
sales for the period or a sale every 43 years. This compares 
favourably with the sample of haciendas of the Valley of Oaxaca 
and the Guadalajara hinterland but seems to fail to reach the 
high level of stability achieved in the valley of Puangue.
The key to this anomaly seems to be the presence in the Bajio 
of a dynamic sector of miners and merchants who invested 
heavily in land. For instance, a powerful miner, the Count 
of Valenciana alone bought 9 of these haciendas in the 1780's. 
As we shall see in Chapter 6, the quick formation of capital 
ln Mexico and especially in the Bajio due to its mining perfor­
mance were unparalleled in Spanish America and permitted a
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quicker renovation of the landowning elites. (64)
A further problem faced by the hacendado class was the 
breaking up of haciendas due to partition by the inheritors. 
According to Spanish law, at the death of either spouse, 
family estate was divided so as to return to the remaining 
spouse his/her share (usually a half) and to divide the rest 
among the legitimate children in equal parts. The testator 
was allowed however to will up to a third of his/her estate 
to a preferred child and up to a fifth to someone of his/her 
own choice. This did not lead to the partition or sale of 
haciendas when legitimate children were few and resources 
plentiful (several haciendas, urban estates, jewelry, etc) 
which could be divided without diminishing the productive 
capacity of the haciendas, but for hacendado families of more 
modest resources partition or sale of estates was a real 
threat. Hacendado families had at their disposal, however, 
many resources which assisted in avoiding this dispersion 
of fortunes. Religious vocations among children usually led to 
the renunciation of inheritance or the return of the assets 
inherited to the family when they died, marital alliances 
within or outside the hacendado class could enlarge the capital 
resources of the hacienda through substantial dowries, links 
with the church (i.e. a close relative in a nunnery or a mona- 
stery) could give easy access to credit, etc.^xx^v^
(xxiv) The analysis of family structure and other aspects of 
hacendado activities fall outside our scope. See however for 
examples of these phenomena: Serrera 1977: 123,6,4,228<-47 passim 
especially 11-27; Altman et al (eds) 1976:256-71 passim; Lavrin 
& Couturier 1979: 288-97. For examples of partition of haciendas 
through inheritance see Brading 1978:118-9, 129ff; Borde & 
Gongora 1956:83-7; Van Young 1981: 13/-8.
A more direct way of avoiding the disintegration of family 
fortunes was the foundation of mayorazgos (entails) which 
were supposed to preserve almost half (7/15) of the wealth 
of the founder within one family line for ever. The wealth 
thus entailed (haciendas, slaves, urban estate, bureaucratic 
offices, etc) was transmitted undivided to the descendants 
of the founder according to specific rules of succession, 
usually the eldest son. In the Indies, the foundation of 
mayorazgos was subjected to little state control up until 
1789. From that time newly created entails had to include 
assets able to provide the holder with an annual income of 
at least 4,000 pesos and therefore limited the institution to 
families in possession of a sizeable fortune. The limitations 
on the property rights of the holders of the entail were 
however substantial. Disentailment of property was very 
difficult to obtain and required the consent of the local 
Audiencia and the crown. The authorities also fixed the limits 
of indebtedness of the holders and, finally, leasing contracts 
could not exceed 9 years. The importance of the mayorazgo 
institution in the Indies was small compared with Spain and 
its development was slow. It has been estimated that in Spain, 
30-50$ of the soil remained entailed by the landed aristo­
cracy during the 16th to 18th centuries, although this 
included seigneurial rights as well as property rights in the 
modern sense. For 18th century Mexico, Ladd has estimated the 
existing number of mayorazgos as c. 100, with a majority of 
them having relatively modest assets of between 30,000 and
100,000 pesos and only a handful reaching 500,000 pesos or 
more; the latter were mainly of 18th century creation. In 
Chile there were around 20 mayorazgos, all but one had been
founded in the 18th century and the majority of them were 
founded in the second half of that century. (65) As for 
entailed haciendas data is fragmentary but a rough idea can 
be obtained by looking at Table 10. The number of haciendas 
entailed in each area is small (under 15$ of the total in all 
cases), but the importance of the haciendas at the time of 
their entailment seems to have been higher than that percentage 
suggests. Thus the entailed haciendas of the Valley of 
Oaxaca were highly profitable during the 17th century while 
the entailed haciendas of the Guadalajara hinterland were 
notable for their value or extent. In almost all the cases 
presented in Table 10 the laws of entail impeded the partition 
or alienation of the haciendas concerned until independence, 
but did not prevent the decay of a number of them due to 
depressed agricultural production or the failure to reinvest 
in them. (66)
Another source of relative stability in hacienda ownership 
was constituted by the rural property of the church and parti­
cularly of the Jesuits. This stability derived not from a 
legal prohibition to alienate its property, as in the case of 
entails, but from its corporate character and the accumulation 
of wealth through donations, dowries, financial and productive 
undertakings, etc. Church corporations were in general in a 
more secure position than the secular hacendados. Like the 
powerful landowners they were able to acquire and keep fine 
haciendas due to their vast financial resources. Unlike them, 
they were affected neither by the laws of inheritance nor 
by the restrictions imposed on entails. However, not all 
church institutions had vast wealth, acquired landed estates
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Table 10: Entailed and Church Haciendes in Some SpanishAmerican Rerione in the 18th Century
Date of Ent-
Total Church* Church/Secular
## ***Secular Entailed ailment
(1) Valley of 57 8 10 33 6 5 between 1565-1625 the
t 100.0 14.1 17.5 57.9 10.5 last in 1677
(2) Leon & Rincon 40 - 2 38 0
t 100.0 5 95 0
(3) Guadalajara hinterland (sample) %
35 2 7 21 5 4 of them during C 18100.0 5.7 20.0 60.0 14.3
(4) Tacintaro(1714) 17 1 - 14 2 Both in 1652i 100.0 5.9 82.3 11.8
(5) Valley of Puangue 23 1 1 18 3 1777 & after
* 100.0 4.4 4.4 78.2 13.0
* Held by the church during the whole 18th century or a very long period (usually more than 50 years).
** Held by the church for a short number of years during the period.
*** Includes property held by individual priests.
(1) Taylor 1972: 124-5, 152-8, 174-191.
(2) Brading 116-7.
(3) Van Young 1981; 120-1, 170-1.
(4) E. Barret 1973: 89 and passim.
(5) Borde and Gongora 1956: Appendix 2.
or kept them for long periods. Thus the hacienda 'Hospital' 
(Morelos) of the Hospital Brothers of San Hipalito in Mexico 
City had constant financial deficits during the late 17th 
century and 18th century which ended up in the alienation of 
part of its lands to repay debts in 1789. On the other hand the
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wealthy 18th century Mexico City nunneries preferred financial 
and urban ventures to hacienda ownership and, as Table 10 
shows, retention of haciendas by church bodies was in many 
cases sporadic. For instance in the Valley of Oaxaca and the 
Guadalajara hinterland the church owned, at some time during 
the 18th century, over a quarter of the haciendas of each 
region but in both cases less than half of them were kept by 
the church for long periods. The key to this situation lies 
in the fact that a large proportion of the haciendas owned 
by the church for small periods were haciendas heavily mort­
gaged which the church had to foreclose and resell shortly 
afterwards in order to recover its principal. (67) The Jesuits 
of Spanish America on the contrary invested the major part 
of their vast wealth and had a record of remarkable stability 
and growth in their haciendas. Thus the Jesuit College of 
San Pablo (Lima) retained all the five haciendas owned in 
1650 until the expulsion of the order in 1767 and in the 
interim added six estates of different importance to their 
assets. Similarly, the College of 'Espiritu Santo' of Puebla 
retained its five major haciendas from the first half of 
the 17th century until 1767, adding in the interim a number 
of satellite ranches and haciendas to their assets. That 
these were not isolated cases is shown by the activities of 
20 of the 24 Jesuit institutions of Mexico. During 1670 to 
1767 they sold 9 estates, purchased 41» accepted 13 donations 
and obtained a land grant. If we consider that by 1670 the 
Mexican Jesuits were already substantial landowners we can 
conclude that the Jesuits of Mexico and perhaps the rest 
of Spanish America retained most of the haciendas acquired 
in the 16th and 17th centuries up until 1767 and constantly
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enlarged their assets. (xxv) (68) 
g ) Conclusions
The analysis of the agrarian structure of colonial Mexico, 
Peru, Colombia and Chile indicates that a continuous process 
of land appropriation and partial exploitation by the Spaniards 
occurred. The tempo of this occupation and its legalisation 
through grants and composiciones varied in the different 
regions and macro-regions according to the specific combination 
of three main interrelated factors. These were a) the density 
and character of the Indian population, b) the formation of 
markets for agricultural products and, linked to this, the 
profitability of the Spanish agrarian enterprises, and c) the 
presence of dense Spanish (or hispanised) population in the 
area.(xxvi)
The location of the initial Spanish settlements was, to a 
large extent, determined by the characteristics of the pre- 
hispanic societies in the Indies. The Spanish conquistadores 
and later the colonists settled in the politically and econo­
mically developed areas, which were at the same time the more
(xxv) A long list of haciendas retained for over 100 years by 
the Jesuits in Colombia and Quito can be compiled comparing 
partial data on Jesuit purchases and expropriated haciendas in 
1767 assembled by Colmenares (1969:617, 108-11, 114-7, 137-8). 
The same is true for the material assembled by Macera & Cushner 
on Peruvian Jesuits (Macera 1977, 111:16-25* 33-43 passim; 
Cushner 1980: 36-53 passim). For other long lasting church pro­
perty in colonial Spanish America see Burga 1976: 115-41»
Florescano (ed) 1975^ 447; Taylor 1972: 174-91 passim; Aranguiz 
1967: 221-3; Borde and Gongora 1956: 60,223,228).
(xxvi) We follow here the analysis of Lockhart for Mexico (in 
Altman et al (eds) 1976: 3-6). See also Prem (1978: 229ff) 
and, for a different point of view, Taylor 1972: 65-71, 107-10.
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rapidly conquered, and left those inhabited by warlike tribes 
or unsuitable for intensive agriculture as open frontiers.
In these frontier areas (northern Mexico, Western Colombia, 
southern Chile, etc) the process of occupation, legal approp­
riation and exploitation of land was slow due to the lack of 
Indians who could be submitted to the labour systems used by 
the Spaniards elsewhere and /or Indian attacks. In these 
frontier areas the lack of administrative control, the need 
for the Spanish state to stimulate the colonisation of the 
borders and the risks involved meant that the settlers were 
given access to generous land grants which resulted in the 
formation of latifundia which were not fully exploited. In the 
core areas on the other hand, the occupation, legal approp­
riation and exploitation of land by the Spaniards occurred 
at an early stage and progressed throughout the colonial 
period. This was in spite of the fact that Indian communities 
claimed possession of a substantial part of this land and that 
the state and the encomenderos, at least partially supported 
these claims in order to permit the physical reproduction of 
the communities and the production of a surplus, the tribute, 
on which they depended.
The dicotomy frontier/core areas is, however, insufficient 
to explain in full the process of occupation of lands by the 
Spaniards. Thus, in certain areas of high Indian population 
density, such as southern Mexico and sectors of Andean Peru, 
Indians retained most of the land at least until the late 18th 
century. Conversely, some areas which were originally of a 
frontier character, eg. areas of northern Mexico, became 
rapidly occupied and exploited by the Spaniards despite the
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lack of aboriginal population and in the face of Indian attacks. 
The key to the explanation of these phenomena lies in the con­
sideration of the formation of markets for Spanish agriculture, 
which to a large extent coincided with the centres where large 
numbers of Spaniards lived, and the trade routes between major 
colonial markets and the metropolis. These colonial markets 
were urban centres in which non productive activities, such as 
civil and ecclesiastical administration, commerce and so on and/ 
or non-agrarian production (mining and industry), were concen­
trated and which generated in their hinterlands the stimulus 
for agrarian commodity production and for the expansion of the 
acreage under Spanish control. For the core areas the case of 
the hinterlands of Mexico City, Puebla, Lima, Potosi, Bogota, 
Santiago, etc., exemplify this trend. In frontier areas such 
as the Zacatecas hinterland and the Mexican Bajio the mineral 
wealth attracted Spanish miners, merchants, churchmen and Indian 
workers, creating the conditions for a thriving commercial 
agriculture. Once these trends were consolidated, of course, 
those regions ceased to be frontier areas.
In our analysis of the agrarian structure of colonial 
Spanish America we have found two main types of productive unit: 
the Indian communities and the big landed estate or hacienda.
A brief summary and some conclusions as to the role played by 
each of them and the relations of production which characterised 
them is now in order.
The Indian communities were formed by relatively independent 
producers linked to kinship communities which had communal 
rights of possession of land and communal duties towards the 
Spanish state such as tributes and repartimiento obligations.
The material basis on which the Indian community rested was the
possession of land, which permitted the physical reproduction 
of its members and the generation of a surplus extracted by the 
state in the form of tributes, repartimiento drafts, ecclesias­
tical levies and so forth. The community was subjected, apart 
from ideological and political factors and the land encroach­
ment of the colonists, to two main pressures. On the one hand 
the need to maintain a balance between the community population 
and its land resources, an imbalance could be produced by either 
an increase in the former which was not compensated for by an 
increase in the latter, or a reduction of the land resources 
which in the long run produced a demographic decline through 
famines, forced emigration and so on. And on the other hand 
the exactions of the state, which could mean the sale of land 
to obtain the necessary cash to cover these demands, or the 
weakening of the labour force available in the community by 
the withdrawal of its members at crucial periods, such as 
harvest, or permanently.
During the 16th century all the Indian societies under 
Spanish dominion suffered a tremendous demographic decline.
This created almost everywhere in the Indies the possibility, 
which the Spaniards were quick to grasp, to appropriate lands 
in the areas close to Spanish settlements without seriously 
affecting the Indian/land ratio in the communities. The 
recovery of the Indian population in Mexico and Peru by the late 
18th century created an acute shortage of land resources in 
most of the communities close to important agrarian markets, 
and the surplus population was forced to join, temporarily or 
permanently, the labour force of the Spanish haciendas, other 
Spanish enterprises or rent lands from the haciendas or other 
Indian communities. On the other hand in central and northern
Chile and Colombia, where the Indian population decline contin­
ued beyond the 18th century Indian communities had land in 
excess of their subsistence needs and it was possible for them 
to rent out part of their patrimony to poor Spaniards and 
mestizos.
The pressures applied by the state and the colonists were 
many, but the most serious threats to the survival of the 
community and, indirectly, to their land resources derived 
from the tributary system and the repartimiento drafts for 
mining. A high rate of tribute, especially if paid in labour, 
and/or a repartimiento system including mining work resulted 
in the escape of large numbers of Indians from their communities 
to Spanish enterprises or other communities where, although 
landless, they were free of the repartimiento drafts and paid 
either a lower rate of tribute or none at all. The most 
seriously affected communities were obliged by the state to 
pay tributes for those Indians who had escaped and had no 
alternative but to sell community land, thus seriously diminish­
ing the possibilities for a future demographic expansion 
under conditions of economic independence. A quick review 
of the data presented in the previous chapterixxV:^indicates 
a correlation between the stability of the Indian communities 
and the nature of the Spanish exactions from them. The most 
favoured communities in the areas analysed were those of 
Mexico where tribute paid in labour was abolished in the mid 
16th century and the mining repartimiento system had little or
(.xxvii) See Chapter 3, especially Tables 6 and 7, and Chapter /, 
especially Tables 7 and 9.
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no importance during the colonial period. There Indian 
communities began to recover demographically by the second half 
of the 17th century and, in the early 19th century, over 90$ 
of Mexico's Indian population, and a higher proportion in 
areas of prehispanic Indian settlement, lived in their original 
communities. In Peru, although tribute paid in labour was 
eliminated by the late 1570's, mining repartimiento established 
m  the 1570's remained as an important feature of the colonial 
system affecting a large proportion of the Indian population. 
There Indian demographic recovery only started in the late 18th 
century and, by that time, almost 40% of the Indians had been 
uprooted from their communities and worked permanently in 
Spanish enterprises or rented lands away from their original 
communities. The provinces most affected were precisely those 
where the mining draft was enforced. Unfortunately we do not 
have data discriminating between community and non-community 
Indians for northern and central Chile and Colombia, but the 
continuation of the Indian population decline beyond 1800 and 
the impressive growth of the mestizo and poor white sectors in 
those colonies suggest a more pronounced process of dissolution 
of the Indian community. This process was directly connected 
with the continuation of the payment of tribute in labour in 
Chile until the late 18th century and, in Colombia, with the 
mining repartimiento which was only abolished in 1729.
Unfortunately we lack detailed, comparative studies of the 
internal structure and economic resources of the Indian 
communities during the colonial period. The data available 
however indicate the existence of a process of social differen­
tiation between different communities and of class formation
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winhm the communities, based in both cases on differential 
access to land, livestock, commercial opportunities and so on. 
The process of social differentiation between Indian commun­
ities was somewhat arrested by the colonial state by several 
mechanisms. Firstly the crown imposed on the Indian commun­
ities different tribute rates according to their economic 
potential and in general tried to limit the community members 
to the level of mere subsistence. Secondly Spanish law 
limited Indian land possession to a minimal acreage per tri­
butary which contrasted with the large grants conceded to 
Spanish individuals. Furthermore it limited the rights of 
the community over their lands to simple possession and they were 
therefore liable to reduction of their acreages according to 
the needs of the state. Only a few rich communities managed 
to acquire lands in fee-simple through composiciones or pur­
chases, but even in these cases they were liable to expropria­
tions. Finally funds accumulated by the community for periods 
of disasters and deposited in the community safes (cajas de 
comunidad) were systematically appropriated by the crown/xxv^ ^  
The most obvious case of class formation within the Indian 
communities was the one presented by the exploitation of the 
Peruvian forasteros by communities of originario Indians in 
the form of rents paid in labour kind or cash. However
within the communities of originarios class differences also 
appeared. Both in Mexico and Peru Indian chieftains, nobles 
and officials appropriated community land and exploited the
(xxviii) This economic degradation of the Indian communities to 
the level of mere subsistence was not complete since at least 
some communities had a number of resources at their disposal to 
reduce these pressures. One of these was the participation of 
their members in Indian sodalities which maintained economic 
resources available to their members in cases of disaster.
These were immune to crown appropriation although not to 
ecclesiastical embezzlement or expropriation.
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Indian commoners as tenants or unpaid workers. The colonial 
state, which needed to control the Indian population for tribu­
tary and repartimiento purposes, partially relied on the 
community chieftains and officials who were held responsible if 
these duties were not fulfilled. At the same time the crown 
granted those officials privileges such as exemption from tri­
bute and repartimiento drafts, tolerated their abuses of 
authority and respected their individual wealth. (69)
The function and development of the colonial Spanish 
American hacienda was determined by a variety of factors.
Among them the most significant ones were, a) the formation, 
expansion and contraction of the agrarian markets within each 
colony or the possibilities for export, which in the main 
determined the profitability of the haciendas and the stability 
or instability of the hacendado class, and b) the character 
and size of the Indian communities of each region, which to a 
large extent determined the forms of exploitation of labour 
used by the haciendas.
The initial stimulus for the production of agricultural 
items under the control of the Spaniards, as opposed to mere 
commercialisation of Indian production, arose with the need to 
find a substitute for food that was imported at a high price 
from Spain and was not produced by the Indians, such as wheat, 
livestock, sugar and so on. A second stimulus came about with 
the creation of mining centres in which a large number of non- 
agricultural producers with a substantial purchasing power 
lived, and where a supply of large numbers of dr if t animals 
and fodder was needed. In the markets thus provided the 
haciendas were in competition with smaller Spanish or mestizo
farmers and the Indian communities. In periods of high agri­
cultural prices this presented no obstacle for the profitability 
of the hacienda and the income of the hacendados. In periods 
of low agricultural prices, however, the income of the hacen­
dados was seriously hit, especially if they had high fixed 
costs (mortgages, a high labour bill and so on). To overcome 
this problem the hacendados used at least two strategies. One 
was the manipulation of the market by withholding their products 
from it during the years of good harvests and low prices and 
releasing them in the periods of scarcity. A second strategy 
was to reduce or eliminate the competition of the petty 
commodity producer by monopolising the productive factors: 
land labour and capital. Obviously the importance of these 
factors changed over time and from region to region. Initially 
land had little economic value and the use of the labour force 
through the encomienda, repartimiento and serfdom was the key 
productive factor which the hacendados strove to monopolise. 
Later on, as the population grew, land became, at least in the 
hinterlands of the big cities, the most important factor and 
landless peasants had to accept the terms offered by the 
hacendados to obtain their means of subsistence. As for 
capital, during the colonial period capital investment had 
little importance and to a large extent credit depended on the 
ownership of productive and well located land.
If the hacienda was externally, that is from the point of 
view of its sales, orientated towards the market to provide 
the landowners with the means to pay for a luxurious life 
style which was only available with large sums of money, 
internally, that is from the point of view of its purchases, 
the hacienda was orientated towards a natural economy. With
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a few exceptions productive and non-productive items consumed 
in the hacienda were produced internally, such as draft animals, 
food for the workers and, in many cases, containers, coarse 
cloth for the workers, tools and so on, or directly commercial­
ised by the hacendado through the hacienda shop. Labour 
itself became integrated into this natural circuit by legal 
adscription, serfdom, service tenantry, debt peonage and 
slavery. Only in some regions and periods did reliance on the 
market for the acquisition of productive items and payment of 
the workers in cash became important. Lack of liquid capital 
within the hacendado class, scarcity of coin and the interests 
of the merchant class, which depended for its profits on a 
network of credit relations, prevented the expansion of the 
money economy in the countryside and retarded the development 
of productive specialisation in the haciendas.
The size of the market and the degree of control of the 
haciendas over it locally or regionally and the variation of 
agricultural prices in other colonies and Europe largely deter­
mined the rates of return on capital of the colonial haciendas 
a.nd the stability of the hacendado class. Sudden expansion of 
demand for tropical products such as sugar, indigo or cacao 
brought about enormous rates of return for short periods in 
the Indies. Competition from new producers within or outside 
the colonies and the internal rise in the price of foodstuffs 
brought the profitability down but, demand remaining high, the 
haciendas engaged in these areas of production could achieve a 
handsome return. The collapse of international prices, a 
factor which was beyond the control of the hacendados, could 
however diminish the profitability of the haciendas to negative 
levels. Internal markets had more stability but wide
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fluctuations in agricultural prices also occurred. The 
establishment, growth or decay of mining and urban centres 
produced periods of increase or decline in agricultural prices. 
Seasonal and periodical 'crises' of overproduction also tended 
to diminish the profits of the haciendas, but in these cases 
the more powerful hacendados had at their disposal mechanisms 
of compensation which made these crises less serious.
The stability of the hacendado class was closely associated 
with the profitability of its haciendas and therefore indirectly 
with the market situation. Rich entrepreneurs (owners of 
large haciendas, miners, merchants, church bodies) acquired 
and held on to haciendas which provided high returns. As 
they were proprietors of several enterprises, these could be 
passed to their heirs at the death of the entrepreneur, with­
out dividing or selling each particular enterprise. The pro­
perty of corporate bodies or mayorazgos or entails provided 
a further stimulus to stability of ownership in these profit­
able haciendas. On the other hand unprofitable haciendas 
changed hands rapidly since they were already encumbered with 
mortgages and, unless the market situation changed favourably, 
this did not permit the owners the capital accumulation 
necessary to improve them in order to have at least a mediocre 
return. The owners of such haciendas were on the fringes of 
the hacendado class and their descendants usually joined the 
ranks of the large tenants, hacienda administrators, medium 
sized proprietors or the professions which were not connected 
with agriculture.
Colonial haciendas relied on a variety of labour systems 
ranging from slavery to waged labour passing through a series
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of intermediate forms. The size and character of the Indian 
population determined to a large extent the development of 
these labour systems. Where the Indian population was scarce 
or non existent, the development of intensive agriculture 
required the importation of African slaves as in Cuba, 
Venezuela and coastal Peru, or if capital for the purchase of 
slaves was not available, it had to wait for a substantial 
increase in the stratum of mestizos or poor whites as in the 
case of central Chile. Livestock raising haciendas, however, 
were less dependent on demographic factors and they could be 
run with a handful of encomienda Indians, slaves or hired 
hands. The presence and survival of populous Indian commun­
ities submitted to the Spaniards, on the other hand, meant 
that there was an abundance of labour for the haciendas which 
was employed by them according to the capacity of the markets, 
the regulations imposed by the state and the capacity of the 
communities to retain their members and their land resources.
Up until the early 17th century, the state forms of distribu­
tion of the Indian labour force among colonists (encomienda, 
tribute paid in labour and the repartimiento system) were of 
enormous importance for the operation of the haciendas. By 
that time haciendas had managed to acquire a stable and full 
time population, with only a weak connection or none at all to 
the Indian communities. Finally during the last decades of 
the colonial period, at least in the highly commercialised 
areas of central Mexico where there was a surplus Indian 
population, haciendas increasingly relied on temporary workers 
hired from the Indian communities.
The demographic factor does not exhaust the determination 
of the forms of labour used by the colonial haciendas. The
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process of obtaining, retaining and exploiting the labour 
force in the haciendas was also connected to the market situa­
tion, the expansion of the monetary economy and the policies of 
the state and the practices of its agents. Within the perma­
nent labour force of the haciendas we have discerned 5 or 6 
forms of obtaining/retaining labourers. Their characteristics 
in terms of coercion and the type of payment received have 
been summarised in Table 11. The first three forms of 
hacienda labour listed (legal serfdom, adscripted peonage and 
debt peonage) required a system of extra-economic compulsion 
exerted by the hacienda itself and ensured by the officials of 
the state who, legally or illegally, enforced the retention of 
the workers on the haciendas. The main difference between 
these forms was the payment of the labour force which ranged 
from the mere usufruct of land under legal serfdom to, in 
theory, cash for debt and adscripted peonage. In the case of 
debt peonage their debt could be either an advantage or dis­
advantage for the worker depending on the labour market situa­
tion. An initial advance of wages for the workers could re­
sult from the inability of the hacendado to obtain workers by 
other means and this involved a risk for the hacendado depend­
ing on whether wages increased or decreased locally and the 
possibilities of the workers to repay the debt or escape. 
Several techniques were used by the hacienda owners, such as 
levying surcharges on the items sold in the hacienda shop, 
stimulating conspicuous expenditure, gaining the connivance of 
the local bureaucrats and so on, to diminish this risk to a 
minimum. The two other forms of permanent labour used in the 
haciendas (free peonage and service tenants) did not need
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political coercion for their operation but differed in the 
type of payment the worker received.
The data presented in Chapter 5, section b, fragmentary 
as it is, at least suggests some trends in the development of 
the forms of permanent labour used by the haciendas. Firstly 
the coercive forms of labour tended to be retained in the areas 
of scarcity of labour and little development of the regional 
markets. That was the case of Oaxaca, Tlaxcala and most of 
Andean Peru. On the contrary, in areas close to important 
markets and well provided with labour, such as the Mexico City 
and Guadalajara hinterlands, the Bajio and coca producing 
areas of Upper Peru, these forms tended to become obsolete and 
were replaced by free peonage and tenancies. Secondly, the
Table 11: Main forms of permanent labour used by the colonial
haciendas. (*)
Type coercion usufruct of land as the only form of payment.
Legal serfdom +
Adscriptive peonage +
Debt peonage +
Free peonage 
Service,tenants
(*) + indicates the presence of the trait, - its absence.
situation of tenants, initially similar to independent pro­
prietors, increasingly deteriorated under the double pressure 
of population growth and the impact of commodity production, 
e.g. 18th and 19th century Chile and the Mexican Bajio. 
Thirdly, there seems to be a cause and effect relation
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situations where there was a surplus in the supply of labour 
between the development of a monetary economy and free peonage, 
e.g. the cases of the Guadalajara and Mexico City hinterland 
and the Mexican Bajio. Finally the sample of regions and 
haciendas analysed indicates that de facto coercive forms of 
obtaining and retaining a permanent labour force predominated 
within the colonial Spanish American hacienda.
